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At a point in the future that is no longer remote, renewable energy will be a 
necessity.  The construction of large renewable energy farms is central to a 
transition away from fossil fuels, but distributed renewable energy 
technologies—wind turbines in backyards and solar panels on roofs—are 
immediately essential as well.  Widespread deployment of distributed 
renewable technologies requires rapid innovation led by renewable energy 
pioneers—individuals who act as market leaders and prove to their neighbors 
that these new energy devices are safe and worthy of use.  Existing law and the 
very structure of governmental authority over energy is ill-suited to this energy 
transition and stifles the efforts of these pioneers.  Public bodies must therefore 
embark upon a substantial overhaul of what we call land-energy rules—legal
requirements governing the construction and physical location of renewable 
technology.  This Article assesses the relative institutional capacities of 
different levels of government to determine which will best ensure that land-
energy rules enable a drive toward distributed renewable energy and 
concludes that the powers of municipal governments must be unleashed.  
Innovation will occur from the ground up, and municipalities must actively 
work to enable the next great energy transition in this country: a move toward 
energy produced from the sun, the wind, the earth’s internal heat, and other 
renewable sources.
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INTRODUCTION
The strength of a nation lies in its power—increasingly, not just its political 
power, but its access to energy.  Without abundant energy, economies do not 
move,1 progress slows, and inspiration stagnates.  By these measures, 
American power is lagging behind the world,2 and in many respects, we are 
moving backward.  The antiquated American energy infrastructure needs 
1 Benjamin S. Warr et al., Increase Supplies, Increase Efficiency: Evidence of Causality Between the 
Quantity and Quality of Energy Consumption and Economic Growth 16–17 (INSEAD Soc. Innovation Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 2009/22/EPS/ISIC, 2009), available at http://knowledge.insead.edu/doc.cfm?cd=41726. 
2 Keith Bradsher, A High-Speed Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2010, at B1 (“Other countries aren’t 
waiting,” explained President Obama, discussing clean energy and high-speed rail developments.  “They want 
those jobs.  China wants those jobs.  Germany wants those jobs.  They are going after them hard, making the 
investments required.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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massive revision to establish a system powered substantially by renewable 
resources.  We know that the fossil fuels on which the current system depends 
will be much more difficult to extract in the future;3 we know that dependence 
on foreign fossil fuel sources creates international relations problems and 
national security risks;4 and we increasingly accept the reality of the negative 
environmental impacts of extracting fossil fuels and converting them into 
power.5  There is broad public support for some kind of governmental response 
to these problems, but that general sentiment for change is not tied to concrete 
policy initiatives;6 thousands of small, technical regulatory questions must be 
addressed to bring about the large alterations of the national energy 
infrastructure required for salutary policy initiatives.  But those inquiries 
cannot be fruitfully pursued until we have answered the more fundamental 
question of how the current, dysfunctional allocation of energy policy-making 
authority may be corrected.  Against the conventional wisdom that the national 
scope of the energy problem requires a primarily centralized solution from the 
federal government, this Article argues that local governments—cities and 
towns—have one of the most significant roles to play in the transition to 
renewable energy, particularly in the near term as distributed renewable 
technologies are deployed.  It concludes that municipalities working above a 
federal regulatory floor are best positioned to foster, through regulation, much 
of the innovation that will be necessary for this transition. 
One critical regulatory role that local governments are well positioned to 
play in the short-term transition to renewables is facilitating the development 
and adoption of distributed renewable technologies that generate electricity 
3 See infra notes 77–101 and accompanying text. 
4 See U.S. Energy Facts, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm? 
page=us_energy_home#tab2 (last updated Nov. 22, 2010) (explaining that the United States relies on net 
imports for twenty-four percent of its energy). 
5 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS 
REPORT 30 (Abdelkader Allali et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf; infra note 63 and accompanying text; see also Henry Fountain, U.S. Says BP Well 
Is Finally ‘Dead,’ N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2010, at A14 (reporting that BP’s failed oil well in the Gulf of 
Mexico released approximately 205 million gallons of oil into the Gulf). 
6 See Michael K. Heiman & Barry D. Solomon, Power to the People: Electric Utility Restructuring and 
the Commitment to Renewable Energy, 94 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 94, 107 (2004) (noting that 
“over half of Americans claim they are willing to pay a premium for ‘green power,’” but arguing that market 
and regulatory failures have made that choice impracticable for most consumers); Anthony Leiserowitz, 
Climate Change Risk Perception and Policy Preferences: The Role of Affect, Imagery, and Values, 77 
CLIMATIC CHANGE 45, 46 (2006) (“Since the year 2000, numerous public opinion polls demonstrate that large 
majorities of Americans are aware of global warming (92%) . . . and already view climate change as a 
somewhat to very serious problem (76%).”). 
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close to the point of use—paradigmatically the backyard wind turbine and the 
rooftop solar panel;7 this Article focuses on this role.  Accordingly, the Article 
analyzes legal requirements governing the construction and physical location 
of distributed renewable devices—what we call land-energy rules.  Beyond the 
distributed scale, renewable energy devices like solar panels and wind turbines 
may be installed in large “farms” that function like existing fossil-fuel-burning 
power plants in the sense that they generate large quantities of electricity in a 
single location and then send it over transmission lines to distant consumers.8
Establishing these large facilities requires overcoming economic and 
regulatory complexities, however; renewable farms are costly, require 
integration into large-scale transmission grids, and may occupy territory that 
overlaps the borders of several states.9  Distributed renewables, we argue, are 
just as essential10 as large-scale installations to establishing a stable nationwide 
energy infrastructure powered substantially by renewable resources, but the 
distributed generation piece of the energy policy puzzle has been largely 
ignored by legal scholars.11  This is harmful because distributed renewable 
energy projects face serious impediments that require immediate attention: 
consumer uncertainty about their effectiveness and practicality, the need for 
innovation to make existing technologies effective under a variety of 
geographic and sociopolitical conditions, and adverse local land use rules.12
Local governments have a crucial role in overcoming regulatory barriers to 
7 See RYAN FIRESTONE & CHRIS MARNAY, ERNEST ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB.,
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES FOR CARBON EMISSIONS MITIGATION (2007), available at http://eetd.lbl. 
gov/ea/emp/reports/62871.pdf; WADE CAN., 2010 GUIDE TO DECENTRALIZED ENERGY IN CANADA (2010), 
available at http://wadecanada.ca/doc_index/2010-Guide-to-DE-in-Canada.pdf. 
8 See PAUL BREEZE, POWER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES 186–87, 198 (2005) (describing large solar 
plants); id. at 162–63 (describing wind farms). 
9 See, e.g., Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 100–08; Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power 
Transmission Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015 (2009). 
10 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE SMART GRID (2009), available at http://www.oe.energy.gov/ 
DocumentsandMedia/DOE_SG_Book_Single_Pages%281%29.pdf (noting that distributed generation, as part 
of an “islanding” system, can allow communities to generate power even when there is no power available 
from a utility); Hermann Scheer, Solar City: Reconnecting Energy Generation and Use to the Technical and 
Social Logic of Solar Energy, in URBAN ENERGY TRANSITION: FROM FOSSIL FUELS TO RENEWABLE POWER 1, 
21 (Peter Droege ed., 2008) (arguing that “specific decentralized technologies . . . offer the optimum solution” 
because they help ameliorate our “outdated dependency on [existing energy] infrastructure”); see also Sara C. 
Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1224 (2009) (“[W]e cannot depend on large 
installations . . . . [because] end users of large installations include only those people who live within the area 
that can be reached by transmission lines.”). 
11 But see Bronin, supra note 10.  But see generally Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with 
Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547 (2010) (arguing for small-scale generation). 
12 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 99; infra notes 136–44, 224–33, and accompanying text. 
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distributed renewables, and thus, in the larger transformation of the energy 
system. 
Traditional theoretical treatments of environmental regulation suggest a 
centralized, federal solution to the problems facing distributed renewables.  
Subnational regulation is problematic, the argument goes, because it generates 
negative externalities and may create interjurisdictional “races to the 
bottom.”13  While these arguments carry important truths, regulatory scholars 
increasingly recognize the benefits of decentralizing policy-making authority 
in certain areas.14  Devolving policy-making authority to subnational 
governments promises regulatory experimentation and the efficiencies 
generated by regulatory competition among jurisdictions.  It also leverages a 
greater number of institutional resources (including, importantly, localized 
expertise and experience) and allocates policy-making authority to officials 
most familiar with distinctly regional or local harms.15  Full devolvement to 
local authorities would not be effective, however, and we do not propose that 
here.  An important counterweight to the enhanced local authority that we 
advocate will be the establishment of federal regulatory standards that 
constitute a mandatory minimum or “floor” to ameliorate the negative 
consequences of regulatory competition.16
The emerging academic consensus recognizes the potential benefits of state 
and local regulatory autonomy and therefore favors cooperative regimes that 
allocate regulatory authority among several levels of government.  Indeed, this 
“cooperative federalism” approach is reflected in several major federal 
environmental protection statutes.17  But the cooperative federalism literature 
tends toward generalization; it focuses on how the federal and state
governments should share regulatory power.  Local governments are typically 
13 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State 
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1210–11 (1977).  Races to the bottom 
involve states competing to attract industry by loosening regulation, thus dragging other competing states 
toward increasingly lax environmental protections.  See id. at 1211–12. 
14 See, e.g., infra note 297. 
15 See James E. Krier, Commentary, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-
Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. REV. 323, 326–28 (1974); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1236–42 (1992). 
16 On this idea of federal regulatory floors, see generally William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: 
Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1565–66 (2007). 
17 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1102–
03 (2009). 
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ignored or discussed only as an afterthought, and we argue that this must 
change. 
State governments are increasingly important environmental regulators in 
practice.  In the shadow of federal inaction on climate change,18 state 
governments have responded to public demand for climate change initiatives in 
a number of ways—by enacting renewable portfolio standards (financial 
incentives to promote the adoption of renewable energy technology) and other 
energy efficiency programs.  Some states have been far more aggressive than 
others, as one should expect from a system designed to foster experimentation 
and regulatory competition.19  Yet as Table 1 demonstrates, local governments, 
too, have entered the sustainability arena with differing degrees of 
enthusiasm.20  The result of these early cooperative regulation experiments is a 
patchwork of measures implemented by a multitude of institutions, but one that 
lacks the coherent macro-strategy for cooperative regulation that is needed to 
accomplish the dramatic infrastructural overhaul that will move the American 
energy system toward sustainability.21
With both the potential benefits of state and local government participation 
and the need for a broad strategy to shape and discipline a cooperative policy-
making regime in mind, this Article reassesses central positions in the 
environmental federalism literature with an eye to the particular challenges 
facing distributed renewables.  We propose that the distributed renewable 
energy macro-strategy should include a large role for local governments.  We 
argue that local government institutions are best situated to manage and 
encourage the use of distributed renewables if empowered to operate above a 
federal regulatory “floor” of minimum standards.  There are, however, few 
one-size-fits-all answers in our increasingly complex regulatory world; the 
optimal allocation of regulatory power among levels of government may 
18 Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is Motivating State and Local 
Governments to Address a Global Problem and What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental 
Law?, 38 URB. LAW. 1015, 1021 (2006); Stephen Lacey, Prospects Fading for U.S. Climate Legislation in 
2010, RENEWABLE ENERGY WORLD (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/ 
2010/01/prospects-mixed-for-clean-energy-legislation-in-2010; cf. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (United States not a ratifier). 
19 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE & PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, CLIMATE CHANGE 101:
STATE ACTION (2006), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/101_States.pdf; Carlson, supra
note 17, at 1098–99; Engel, supra note 18, at 1016–20; infra notes 184–207 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra Table 1; see also, e.g., JOHN BAILEY, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, LESSONS FROM THE 
PIONEERS: TACKLING GLOBAL WARMING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL (2007), available at http://www.newrules.org/ 
sites/newrules.org/files/images/pioneers.pdf. 
21 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 95–97. 
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therefore vary from one regulatory subject to another—including among 
different subjects of environmental and energy regulation.22  We seek a 
realistic solution, and formulating one requires careful analysis of existing law 
and institutions to determine which modifications will both promote 
substantive policy goals and be plausibly implemented in light of institutional 
realities.  We provide that analysis here. 
In the first Part of this Article, we give a brief history of major American 
energy transitions.  In Part I.B, we describe the current state of America’s 
energy infrastructure and argue that the next great energy transition will 
involve a move toward electricity generation by renewables, including 
distributed renewables.  In Part I.C, we identify similarities between the 
circumstances of earlier transitions and those surrounding current efforts to 
promote renewable energy.  We identify two important factors involved in past 
infrastructural changes23 that we argue may be significant drivers of the 
transition to distributed renewable energy in a well-structured regulatory 
regime.  First, we discuss the critical role of energy “pioneers” or 
“entrepreneurs” whose critical initial successes have often required favorable 
action by local governments or even informal sub-local actors like 
neighborhoods.  The second factor is technological innovation in the 
application of distributed renewables, which is also promoted when differing 
regulatory and physical environs encourage experimentation. 
In Part II, we directly confront the question of regulatory strategy.  We 
argue in Part II.A that the strategy for allocating regulatory authority over 
distributed renewables should focus on encouraging technological innovation 
and the efforts of energy entrepreneurs; in Part II.B, we analyze the relative 
capacities of the federal, state, and local governments to do those things.  We 
conclude that federal leadership in the form of minimum standards and funding 
is necessary, but local governments rather than the states are the best potential 
partners for the federal government in pursuing the shift to distributed 
renewable energy; indeed, we conclude that laws precluding state interference 
with local efforts may be necessary.  Local governments have traditional 
authority over land use rules, the modification of which is essential to the 
success of the renewable energy transition; they have the best access to 
information about the local geographic, economic, demographic, and social 
22 See William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 108 (2005). 
23 An accurate identification of causes would require careful empirical analysis of these past events, 
which we do not attempt in this Article. 
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conditions that determine which distributed renewable technologies or mix of 
technologies will be effective in a particular place; and they are the most 
receptive forums for the appeals of renewables pioneers seeking the initial 
regulatory victories that will push the legal and social spheres toward change.  
The policy variation likely to result from conferring local government 
authority over distributed renewables also has the potential to spur 
technological innovation as distributed renewable energy device makers are 
forced to adapt to thousands of different local regulatory environments.
I. INNOVATION
Innovation in energy moves at the pace of an ancient steam engine running 
on the last bits of coal.  Unlike new energy-consuming gadgets that appear on 
the market at a dizzying pace, energy production—the source for all of these 
appliances and personal electronic devices—is tied to a lumbering 
infrastructural system that has only changed within discrete periods of history.  
This Part describes important energy transitions that have occurred within the 
past two centuries in the United States and, building on observations from 
these past transitions, addresses two factors that will be necessary for the next 
great transition to renewables: first, innovation by renewables pioneers, and 
second, new land-energy rules—rules that dictate, direct, or constrain the 
construction and location of distributed technologies—to enable such 
innovation. 
A. Past Energy Innovations 
In addition to the advent of the steam engine24 and the move from steam 
engines to electricity in the industrial sector, one of the first major energy 
transitions in the United States occurred in the last half of the nineteenth 
century when Americans began to make the infrastructural leap from portable 
lighting devices like whale oil lamps and tallow candles to gas lights and 
electricity.25  In 1817, Washington Hall in Philadelphia glowed with 2,000 wax 
candles to light a late-night ball in celebration of George Washington’s 
birthday;26 by 1836, the city had established gas lighting in homes,27 and by the 
24 See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2d ed. 2006) 
(explaining the significance of the steam engine to the industrial revolution). 
25 LOUIS STOTZ & ALEXANDER JAMISON, HISTORY OF THE GAS INDUSTRY 6 (1938) (“During the first four 
decades of the nineteenth century, sperm oil and candles were the only illuminants used by the average city 
dwelling family.”). 
26 Id. at 7. 
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late 1800s, this innovation was sufficiently affordable to out-compete portable 
oil lamps and candles.28  Eventually, electricity—electrons produced by a 
magnet spinning near a wire29—began to power incandescent light bulbs in the 
homes of adventurous consumers, and small companies offered electric service 
in several major East Coast cities by the 1880s.30  Gas lighting remained 
competitive during this transition,31 but consumers increasingly bought the 
industry slogan that “[i]f it is not electric—it is not modern,”32 thus slowly 
forcing gas companies out of the lighting business. 
This transition was uniquely local in several respects.  First, it was an 
innovative grassroots movement that only later became a large industry; it was 
inspired by individuals and grew within cities.  Creative entrepreneurs began to 
use gas-lit lamps and then attempted to persuade other citizens to adopt this 
new technology.33  Once a sufficient number of consumers believed in this 
“brilliant novelty,”34 the next phase of the transition required tearing up streets 
and constructing pipes35 to transport gas to homes and factories—and 
eventually, wires for delivery of electricity.  The move from candles to 
gaslights to electricity therefore also relied upon the second uniquely local 
driver of energy transitions: favorable local land policy (and sometimes, in 
those days, a hearty dose of corruption).36  Entrepreneurs organized small 
27 Id. at 9. 
28 Id. at 7–8 (explaining that “[f]rom 1875 to 1885, and thereafter, the use of candles practically 
disappeared,” as candles were replaced with kerosene lamps and then gas light systems). 
29 STEVEN W. BLUME, ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM BASICS FOR THE NONELECTRICAL PROFESSIONAL 14 
(2007) (explaining that “if one takes a coil of wire and puts it next to a moving or rotating magnet, a 
measurable voltage will be produced in that coil”—a simpler description of Faraday’s Law, which represents 
“how electric generators produce electricity”). 
30 STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 111–12 (explaining that by 1890, “the electric light had already 
begun to find popular favor and was beginning to make a big dent in the gas lighting business”); Robert L. 
Bradley, Jr., The Origins and Development of Electric Power Regulation, in THE END OF A NATURAL 
MONOPOLY 43, 44 tbl.1 (Peter Z. Grossman & Daniel H. Cole eds., 2003) (showing electric service available 
in nine major cities between 1881 and 1890). 
31 STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 117 (“[B]y 1914 there were 50 million incandescent gas mantle 
lamps in use . . . .”). 
32 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
33 George T. Brown, The Gas Light Company of Baltimore: A Study of Natural Monopoly 5, 9–12 (Johns 
Hopkins Univ. Stud. in Hist. & Pol. Sci., Ser. 54, No. 2, 1936) (describing individuals’ experiments with gas 
lighting in America and their publicization of their products through newspaper advertisements and 
demonstrations). 
34 Id. at 10 (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 11, 1802). 
35 Bradley, supra note 30, at 54 (explaining the “tearing up [of] the streets” required for new gas mains 
and the above-ground poles and wires required for the new electricity (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
36 See, e.g., id. at 48 (discussing early studies that advocated for state regulation of electricity, partially 
on the basis that the regulation would be “above ‘big city political machines’”). 
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corporations37 and then lobbied city councils to pass ordinances that allowed 
for the installation of infrastructure.38  These efforts eventually resulted in the 
establishment of local service companies that provided electricity to a small 
group of residents within close geographic proximity to the physical plant.  In 
Chicago in 1907, about forty-five firms had franchises to sell electricity to the 
city’s residents,39 and some cities even had competing electric franchises along 
one street.40
A second important innovation that occurred at both the state and national 
levels, however, quickly reversed this local trend.  Nikola Tesla introduced 
new technology in the late 1800s that allowed for the efficient transmission of 
electricity over long distances.41  Samuel Insull—the great pioneer of electric 
delivery systems—then expanded his campaign to centralize energy,42 and this 
model has dominated since.  Under the centralized model of energy provision, 
large power plants send electricity over thousands of miles of transmission 
lines to a broad customer base.43
More than a century later, humans are now experiencing a new wave of 
energy innovation44 as we slowly move toward renewable technologies.  This 
transition will again be uniquely local.  Like the move from candles to 
gaslights to electricity, the transition to renewable energy will depend on local 
factors: energetic entrepreneurs, willing investors, and supportive municipal 
land use regulation.  Individual residents will need to experiment with 
renewable devices installed on their property by emerging “green” start-up 
37 Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (describing how Rembrandt Peale, the father of the Gas Light Company of 
Baltimore, persuaded the editor of the Federal Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser along with another 
“small group of men” to form the company). 
38 Id. at 15 (describing how Peale and the other investors persuaded the Baltimore City Council to pass 
an ordinance authorizing the laying of pipes on city property). 
39 Bradley, supra note 30, at 73 n.4. 
40 JOHN BAUER & PETER COSTELLO, PUBLIC ORGANIZATION OF ELECTRIC POWER 16 (1949). 
41 See Bradley, supra note 30, at 44; see also JILL JONNES, EMPIRES OF LIGHT 93–94 (2003) (describing 
how Tesla had his first “electrical epiphany” of alternating current in 1882, began developing a prototype of an 
AC induction motor in 1883, and had installed arc lighting on “certain major streets” and “a few factories” by 
1886). 
42 JONNES, supra note 41, at 46–47. 
43 Electric Power Industry Overview 2007, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/ 
electricity/page/prim2/toc2.html (last visited May 1, 2011) (“[Two hundred ten] large . . . investor-owned 
electric utilities . . . own more than 38 percent of the Nation’s generating capacity and serve about 71 percent 
of ultimate consumers.”). 
44 See JEREMY RIFKIN, THE HYDROGEN ECONOMY 4, 9 (2002) (arguing that a “profound change is about 
to occur in the way we use energy” and defining the change as a move away from fossil fuels and toward 
“inexhaustible” hydrogen-powered fuel cells). 
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companies, and these pioneers will need to publicize their successes.  If a 
critical mass of solar panels appears on neighborhood roofs and thousands of 
wind turbines spin in backyards, perhaps consumers, city-by-city and town-by-
town, will begin to believe that “if it’s not renewable, it’s not modern.”45
Although previous transitions involved largely independent local efforts to 
augment the efforts of energy pioneers, the modern regulatory and 
infrastructural landscape requires federal–local cooperation to spur the efforts 
of pioneers and technological innovators in the transition to renewables.  
Indeed, the federal government is already providing direct funding to some 
cities—bypassing the states—to implement limited distributed renewable 
programs.46  The federal government purposefully has chosen to partner with 
cities because it believes that “cities have an important role to play as 
champions of progressive energy efficiency and renewable energy efforts.”47
In other energy areas, the federal government has funded entrepreneurs 
directly.  The Department of Energy, for example, has offered a ten million 
dollar prize to the first entity that develops a more energy efficient lightbulb 
that meets that competition’s high standards.48
Beyond innovation and federal–local partnerships to enable innovation, the 
adoption of distributed renewables will also be a distinctly local movement 
because it will partially reverse the consolidation and centralization of energy 
production that swallowed up the first local electric plants.  The future of 
energy may meet the past as homes and businesses become new energy 
producers. 
A successful transition to distributed renewable energy, however, will also 
require policymakers to recognize that America recently attempted a great 
push toward innovation in this field and failed.  The mistakes of the past must 
not be repeated.  In the 1970s, when severe fuel shortages reminded America 
of its heavy reliance on foreign fuels, policymakers rushed to the drawing 
45 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the similar phrase used by the electric industry). 
46 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Solar America Cities Special Projects, SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES (Feb. 15, 
2011), http://www.solaramericacities.energy.gov/about/special_projects (describing the Solar America Cities 
program, which has already “launched partnerships with 25 large U.S. cities to develop comprehensive, city-
wide approaches to accelerating solar energy adoption” and additional projects launched in 2009). 
47 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Frequently Asked Questions, SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES (Dec. 30, 2010), 
http://www.solaramericacities.energy.gov/about/frequently_asked_questions/#6. 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BRIGHT TOMORROW LIGHTING COMPETITION (L PRIZE™) 1 (2009), available 
at http://www.lightingprize.org/pdfs/LPrize-Revision1.pdf. 
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boards to solve America’s energy problem.49  One solution during this time 
was to encourage increased reliance upon nonrenewable American fuels.  
Congress proposed three bills between 1974 and 1980 attempting to force 
utilities to use coal (an abundant American resource), instead of oil or natural 
gas, and two of the three bills passed.50  But federal agencies also started to 
think about energy production more creatively, and they pumped out mustard-
yellow manuals on the siting and installation of renewable energy sources.51
Congress, in turn, passed aggressive measures to persuade Americans to buy 
and use these novel technologies.52  Enterprising individuals (motivated by 
generous federal incentives) hired technicians to install solar panels on their 
homes or geothermal heating systems in their basements.53  By 1978, a 
bureaucratic director was sufficiently optimistic to predict that “with 
aggressive Federal support, there are realistic circumstances in which small-
scale energy systems could compete favorably with conventional energy 
sources in many residential, commercial, and industrial applications by the end 
of the next decade.”54  A “high solar energy scenario” developed by a 
committee of the federally commissioned National Research Panel in 1979 
imagined that a federal policy would “require, after 1990, adoption of solar 
energy for all new buildings . . . for which it is applicable,”55 and President 
49 See IGOR I. KAVASS & DORIS M. BIEBER, ENERGY AND CONGRESS: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND REPORTS 1974–1978, at i–iv (1980) (describing 1974 as the year “when the 
concern about oil and other energy sources began to intensify in the United States Congress”). 
50 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., ENERGY POLICY 66–67 (2d ed. 1981). 
51 See, e.g., ALAN S. MILLER ET AL., ENVTL. LAW INST., LEGAL BARRIERS TO SOLAR HEATING &
COOLING OF BUILDINGS: SOLAR ACCESS AND LAND USE: STATE OF THE LAW, 1977 (1977) (prepared for the 
Energy Research and Development Administration and highlighting the opportunities for solar energy and the 
legal barriers that will likely need to change). 
52 See, e.g., Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, sec. 101(a), § 44C(b)(2)(A), 92 Stat. 3174, 
3175 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 25D (2006)) (providing a “residential energy” tax credit of thirty 
percent of expenditures on a renewable energy system (up to $2,000)); ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: THE FEDERAL 
ROLE § 3.05, at 3–11 (Linda Elizabeth Buck & Lee M. Goodwin eds., 1982) (showing federal direct assistance 
for “solar energy systems,” which ranged from $5,000 to $10,000 for residential owners, $2,500 per dwelling 
unit for multifamily residential buildings, and $100,000 per building for agricultural or commercial buildings). 
53 See, e.g., Danny S. Parker, Very Low Energy Homes in the United States: Perspectives on 
Performance from Measured Data, 41 ENERGY & BUILDINGS 512, 512–13 (2009). 
54 Russell W. Peterson, Foreword to OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NTIS ORDER #PB-283770,
APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY’S ENERGY NEEDS, at iii (1978). 
55 SOLAR RES. GRP., SUPPLY & DELIVERY PANEL OF THE COMM. ON NUCLEAR & ALT. ENERGY SYS., THE 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUPPORTING PAPER 6: DOMESTIC POTENTIAL OF SOLAR AND OTHER RENEWABLE 
ENERGY SOURCES 10 (1979). 
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Carter officially aimed to produce twenty percent of America’s energy using 
solar technology by the year 2000.56
Prices for the familiar energy sources like gasoline and heating oil, 
however, eventually began to stabilize, and the popular fixation on energy 
independence and sustainability vanished nearly as quickly as the long lines at 
the gas pumps.57  Historically, federal support for solar and wind peaked 
between 1980 and 1984 and then sharply declined, leveling off at a low degree 
of financial support before 1990 and only occasionally increasing through 
2000.58  Whether for financial reasons or a lack of innovation, American 
“installed capacity of renewable power has remained far below levels analysts 
believed would be in place by the early 21st century.”59  For example, by 2009, 
less than one percent of America’s energy came from solar and wind sources.60
America’s renewable energy development has also lagged behind that of many 
other countries.61  And this failure is not for lack of effort; as Donald Klass 
observes, “An integrated, large-scale, renewable energy industry has not been 
realized in modern times despite the major expenditures made to develop and 
scale-up renewable energy technologies.”62
The brief and relatively uninfluential fervor for a new system of energy in 
the 1970s did not return to America until the rise of a new concern in recent 
years: the warming of the earth’s surface temperature.63  Although the 
56 Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to Market Facilitator, 25 
ENVTL. L. 715, 717 (1995) (citing Springfield, Illinois Remarks to Lincoln Land Community College Students 
and Local Residents, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1862, 1864 (Sept. 22, 1980)); see also Preface to LEGAL ASPECTS OF 
SOLAR ENERGY, at vii (John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence eds., 1981) (“The federal government has 
established as a goal that by the year 2000, 20 percent of the nation’s energy will be from the sun.”). 
57 RIFKIN, supra note 44, at 4 (“The gasoline flowed and it was cheaper than ever [following the 
embargo].  The world got back to business as usual.”). 
58 Peter H. Kobos et al., Technological Learning and Renewable Energy Costs: Implications for US 
Renewable Energy Policy, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 1645, 1646 (2006). 
59 Id. at 1645. 
60 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2009, at 8 fig.1.2 (2009), 
available at http://www.eia.gov/FTPROOT/multifuel/038409.pdf. 
61 Kobos et al., supra note 58, at 1646 (describing Europe’s and Japan’s relative success with growth in 
renewables). 
62 Donald L. Klass, A Critical Assessment of Renewable Energy Usage in the USA, 31 ENERGY POL’Y
353, 353 (2003). 
63 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established by the United Nations 
Environmental Program and the World Meteorological Organization “to provide the world with a clear 
scientific view on the current state of climate change.”  Organization, IPCC, http://www.ipcc.ch/organization/ 
organization.htm (last visited May 1, 2011).  It published its first report warning of warming in 1990.  See 
IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE IPCC 1990 AND 1992 ASSESSMENTS 47 (1992), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/English/ipcc-90-92-assessments-full-
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magnitude of the problem and the accuracy of risk calculations remain 
uncertain, a consortium of scientists from around the world has warned that we 
are heading down a path with potentially significant consequences—from 
rising seas, more severe storms, and longer droughts to higher extinction rates 
for animal and plant species.64  Coupled with the growing menace of climate 
change is America’s unhealthy dependence on foreign sources for more than a 
quarter of the energy that it consumes.65  Federal, state, and local policymakers 
have thus returned to the arguments of the 1970s, calling for fresh ways of 
producing, using, and thinking about energy.  The “new” renewables’ current 
piece of the pie is stunningly low, but it is slowly growing.66  At the large 
scale, states are encouraging the construction of solar and wind farms.67  At the 
small scale, individual consumers are also moving toward renewables.68  In 
2006, individuals purchased “about 7,000 small wind turbines,” for example.69
By 2008, small wind turbine sales had increased to 10,500 units.70  As America 
makes a second attempt to deploy a critical mass of distributed renewable 
systems of energy production, we must ask how we can ensure that as this 
movement rises, history will not repeat itself.  We must identify the factors that 
report.pdf.  Its most recent report concludes: “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . .”  IPCC, 
supra note 5, at 30. 
64 For a detailed discussion of these potential impacts, see IPCC, supra note 5, at 46–50. 
65 U.S. Energy Facts, supra note 4 (“In 2008, net imported energy (imports minus exports) accounted for 
26% of all energy consumed.”). 
66 Wind power accounted for about 0.05% and solar power comprised a trivial 0.09% of Americans’ total 
energy consumption in 2008.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE ENERGY TRENDS IN 
CONSUMPTION AND ELECTRICITY 2008, at 8 tbl.1.2 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar. 
renewables/page/trends/trends.pdf.  In 2008 (all in units of quadrillion British thermal units, or Btus) 
Americans consumed 83.532 units of fossil fuels, 0.113 units of electricity net imports, 8.427 units of nuclear 
electric power, and 7.367 units of renewable energy.  Id.  Of the renewable energy component, the non-solar 
and wind components included 3.852 units of biomass, 2.512 units were conventional hydroelectric energy, 
and 0.360 units of geothermal energy.  Id.  Robert Gross and his co-authors define the “new” renewables as 
including technologies “such as solar, modern biomass and wind power,” and they use this term to contrast the 
new renewables with “old” renewables with more negative environmental effects, such as “large hydroelectric 
schemes and the use of traditional biomass and agricultural waste in developing countries.”  Robert Gross et 
al., Progress in Renewable Energy, 29 ENV’T INT’L 105, 106 (2003). 
67 See, e.g., Texas Renewable Portfolio Standard, STATE ENERGY CONSERVATION OFFICE, http://www. 
seco.cpa.state.tx.us/re_rps-portfolio.htm (last visited May 1, 2011) (describing Texas’s construction 
requirements). 
68 See Miller, supra note 56, at 727. 
69 Kristina Shevory, Homespun Electricity, from the Wind, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at F1. 
70 RON STIMMEL, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, AWEA SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET STUDY 3 
(2009), available at http://www.windtamerturbines.com/pdf/09_AWEA_Small_Wind_Global_Market_ 
Study.pdf; cf. RON STIMMEL, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, AWEA SMALL WIND TURBINE GLOBAL MARKET 
STUDY 3 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.awea.org/documents/2010_AWEA_Small_Wind_Turbine_ 
Global_Market_Study.pdf (indicating that turbine sales have since declined slightly to 9,800 units sold in 
2009). 
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will lead to real, sustained innovation in the sector of our economy that drives 
all other sectors. 
B. The Need for a New Energy Transition 
Before describing the innovations that will be necessary to spur a move 
toward distributed renewables and identifying the land-energy policies that 
currently apply to these innovations, this section will briefly explain why an 
energy transition to renewables—and particularly to distributed renewables 
such as wind turbines in backyards and solar panels on the roofs of homes—is 
essential.
1. Why Renewables? 
At a point in the future that is no longer unimaginably remote, renewable 
energy will be necessary to human survival.  Humans require energy for our 
every endeavor.  But our vision remains locked to the near horizon.  We 
prioritize the development of new technologies to scour our shales, coalbeds, 
and ocean floors for the last molecules of fuel,71 searching for resources that, 
while vital to our current energy infrastructure, are ultimately unsustainable.  
Meanwhile, other nations forge ahead with massive leaps toward a future 
basket of plenty by developing efficient public transportation, commercially 
viable hydrogen fuel cells, advanced solar technologies, and domestic wind 
turbine manufacturing.72  Many small towns in Germany and Austria are now 
entirely “energy autonomous” or on track to meet that goal, producing much of 
their power from the sun and wind;73 some municipalities in the United States, 
on the other hand, continue to build coal-fired power plants, which provide 
71 James W. Bunger et al., Hubbert Revisited—5: Is Oil Shale America’s Answer to Peak-Oil Challenge?,
OIL & GAS J., Aug. 9, 2004, at 16, 20 (discussing how Shell Oil is investing in a Colorado project, wherein it 
applies subsurface heaters to shales to convert kerogen to oil and gas); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, at 35–37 (2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/ 
oiaf/aeo/pdf/0383(2009).pdf (discussing how producing more offshore resources “will require considerable 
time, in addition to financial investment” but predicting continued offshore development). 
72 Jonathan Adams, Japan Leads the Race for a Hydrogen Fuel-Cell Car, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 
1, 2010, at 11; Keith Bradsher, China Leading Race to Make Clean Energy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2010, at A1 
(“China vaulted past competitors . . . last year to become the world’s largest maker of wind turbines . . . .”). 
73 Scheer, supra note 10, at 21 (describing the “large number of small towns or counties . . . which are 
striving to achieve or even have already achieved 100% energy autonomy” using solar and biofuels). 
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short-term fixes74 and create long-term environmental and human health 
problems.75
America is running out of some fuels, and our willingness to accept the 
environmental and health-based consequences of extracting the unconventional 
sources of these fuels may be declining.  The United States relies on fossil 
fuels for the bulk of its energy,76 yet oil and natural gas are becoming more 
difficult to obtain, forcing us to expand unconventional modes of production.77
Domestic coal, although offering a more substantial cushion than oil and gas, 
will be abundant for perhaps as few as 150 years longer.78  Estimates of the 
point at which the costs of extraction will exceed the benefits of extracting 
these remaining nonrenewable sources vary widely.79  Perhaps humans will 
choose to prioritize activities like mining huge blocks of shale and blasting 
them with heat to force out the last few drops of oil80 over investing heavily in 
sustainable technologies. But at some point, the most creative extraction 
74 Peter Bacqué & Rex Springston, Should a Coal-Fired Power Plant Be Built in Surry?  Yes: It’s Good 
for the Economy, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, May 17, 2009, at A8 (describing a then-proposed 750- to 
1,500-megawatt coal-fired power plant in Surry County, Virginia). 
75 See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Ash Flood in Tennessee Is Found to Be Larger than Initial Estimates, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A10 (describing a massive coal ash spill at a coal-fired power plant). 
76 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 66, at 8 tbl.1.2 (showing that petroleum accounts for about 37% of 
total U.S. energy consumption, coal for 22%, and natural gas for 24%).  Nuclear power, which is also 
nonrenewable, accounts for about 8% of annual U.S. energy consumption.  Id.; Nonrenewable Energy Sources,
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm?page=nonrenewable_home (last 
visited May 1, 2011) (defining the mined uranium ore used in nuclear power production as a “nonrenewable 
fuel”). 
77 Shahriar Shafiee & Erkan Topal, An Econometrics View of Worldwide Fossil Fuel Consumption and 
the Role of U.S., 36 ENERGY POL’Y 775, 780–81 (2008) (concluding, based on Energy Information 
Administration and British Petroleum data, that “if the world continues to consume oil and gas at 2006 rates, 
the reserves of oil and gas will last a further 40 and 70 years, respectively”); see also ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, at 58 (2010), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/pdf/0484(2010).pdf (“Worldwide, the reserves-to-production ratio [of natural 
gas] is estimated at 60 years.”); Ben Casselman & Russell Gold, Drilling Tactic Unleashes a Trove of Natural 
Gas—And a Backlash, WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2010, at A1 (noting that “[t]oday, the industry estimates that 90% 
of all new gas wells are fractured” in reference to a method of unconventional natural gas extraction called 
hydraulic fracturing); Natural Gas Supply, NATURALGAS.ORG, http://www.naturalgas.org/business/ 
supply.asp (last visited May 1, 2011) (noting that the Potential Gas Committee has estimated total future 
available domestic natural gas to “equal about 100 years of supply”). 
78 How Much Coal Is Left, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energyexplained/index.cfm? 
page=coal_reserves (last updated Feb. 19, 2010) (observing that if coal consumption increases at the projected 
growth rate, “U.S. recoverable coal reserves would be exhausted in about 146 years if no new reserves are 
added”).  But see id. (explaining that without this assumed growth rate, “the U.S. recoverable coal reserves 
represent enough coal to last 234 years”). 
79 Shahriar & Topal, supra note 77, at 776. 
80 J.O. Jaber & S.D. Probert, Environmental-Impact Assessment for the Proposed Oil-Shale Integrated 
Tri-Generation Plant, 62 APPLIED ENERGY 169, 171–72 (1999). 
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techniques may prove to be more difficult, expensive, and environmentally 
unpalatable than the renewable alternatives, and the exact number of years 
remaining for easy acquisition of nonrenewable fuels does not matter.  The 
plain fact is that most of the energy sources upon which we currently rely—
unlike renewable fuels—cannot be “regenerated on a human time scale.”81
Even enthusiasts for relatively clean-burning fossil fuels like natural gas have 
begun to recognize the inevitable “march towards sustainable renewable 
energy sources[;]”82 they now stress the importance of natural gas as a filler to 
be relied upon during the slow transition to renewables and, more generally, to 
a sustainable energy system.83
Renewables are not only valuable in the long term as fossil fuels become 
increasingly scarce.  They are overwhelmingly abundant, and once the 
infrastructure is in place to capture them, they offer an immediate partial84
answer to concerns about energy shortages and reliance upon foreign fuel 
sources.  Some optimistically calculate that the energy from the sun that hits 
the earth’s land and waters is about “three thousand times more than the 
present power needs of the whole world.”85  The potential for onshore wind 
81 Alicia Valero et al., Inventory of the Exergy Resources on Earth Including Its Mineral Capital, 35 
ENERGY 989, 989 (2010). 
82 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY ET AL., MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2009), 
available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/EPreports/Shale_Gas_Primer_2009. 
pdf.  The Ground Water Protection Council is a consortium of state regulators that has advocated, in some 
regulatory areas, against heightened federal regulation of new gas drilling techniques.  Id. at ES-3 (“State 
regulation of the environmental practices related to shale gas development, usually with federal oversight, can 
more effectively address the regional and state-specific character of the activities, compared to one-size-fits-all 
regulation at the federal level.”); Ground Water Protection Council, Resolution 03-5, Requesting Legislative 
Clarification of the Definition of “Underground Injection” in the Safe Drinking Water Act, available at
http://www.gwpc.org/advocacy/documents/resolutions/RES-03-5.htm (last visited May 1, 2011) (asserting that 
the Council “supported and continues to support USEPA’s position that hydraulic fracturing is not 
underground injection under the [federal] SDWA [Safe Drinking Water Act]”).  We describe the Council as an 
“enthusiast” for natural gas because it argues in one document that natural gas is an “attractive energy source” 
that is “efficient and clean burning,” and that “shale gas . . . will be vital to meeting future energy demand.”  
Scott Kell, Foreword to U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY ET AL., supra.
83 U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY ET AL., supra note 82, at 6. 
84 See generally ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE POWER TO REDUCE CO2 EMISSIONS (2007), 
available at http://my.epri.com/portal/server.pt?Abstract_id=000000000001015461 (discussing the energy 
“PRISM”—a concept that explains that a mix of measures, such as energy efficiency, carbon capture and 
storage, nuclear power, and others, including renewables, will likely be required to meet carbon reduction 
goals); id. at 2–5 (arguing that there is no one “silver bullet” to achieve carbon reduction goals). 
85 Valero et al., supra note 81, at 992 (citing Jan T. Szargut, Anthropogenic and Natural Exergy Losses 
(Exergy Balance of the Earth’s Surface and Atmosphere), 28 ENERGY 1047 (2003)).  This estimate is based on 
an estimate of the sun’s exergy.  Exergy is a form of energy measurement that equalizes all fuels, thus allowing 
for easier comparison.  Id. at 989.  It is “a measure of [an energy form’s] usefulness or quality or potential to 
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energy is, by some estimates, similarly large.  Taking into account land uses 
that compete with turbines needed to capture the energy from wind, total wind 
resources well exceed “world demand for electricity,”86 according to some 
studies.  At the domestic level, estimates suggest that there may be sufficient 
solar radiation and wind in the United States to fulfill all of America’s energy 
needs.87  And one study concludes that solar energy systems could cover the 
electricity portion of America’s energy needs using only about 0.6% of the 
total land area of the United States.88
Renewables, although a “nondepletable” source of energy characterized by 
relatively benign environmental effects,89 do have flaws.  The built 
infrastructure necessary to capture renewable resources does not currently 
exist,90 and humans may not be willing or able to make the tradeoffs that 
would be necessary to develop this capacity.  The sheer quantities of materials 
cause change.”  Alexandros Gasparatos et al., A Critical Review of Reductionist Approaches for Assessing the 
Progress Towards Sustainability, 28 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 286, 295–96 (2008). 
86 BREEZE, supra note 8, at 153; see also Cristina L. Archer & Mark Z. Jacobson, Evaluation of Global 
Wind Power, 110 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. D12110, 1 (2005), available at http://www.stanford.edu/group/efmh/ 
winds/2004jd005462.pdf (“Even if only ~20% of [the ‘global wind power generated at locations with mean 
annual wind speeds  6.9 m/s [meters per second] . . . for the year 2000’] could be captured, it could satisfy 
100% of the world’s energy demand for all purposes.”); Gross et al., supra note 66, at 106 tbl.1 & n.a 
(concluding that wind produces 20,000 to 40,000 terawatt-hours of useful energy output annually—assuming 
that the wind was captured “using known technologies and allowing for physical constraints”).  Global net 
generation of electricity in 2007 was 18.8 trillion kilowatt-hours, which is equal to 18,800 terawatt-hours.  
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 77, at 4. 
87 In 2008, America consumed about 99.4 quadrillion Btus of energy.  ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 
60, at 13 tbl.1.5.  United States wind energy potential is an estimated 10,000 billion kilowatt-hours annually.  
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WIND POWERING AMERICA: CLEAN ENERGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (2004), available 
at http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/pdfs/wpa/35873_21century.pdf.  This is equal to 34.12 quadrillion 
Btus of energy, or approximately one-third of total annual U.S. energy use.  Vasilis Fthenakis and his co-
authors estimate that solar energy could “satisfy 90% of the total energy needs of the US by 2100.”  Vasilis 
Fthenakis et al., The Technical, Geographical, and Economic Feasibility for Solar Energy to Supply the 
Energy Needs of the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 387, 396 (2009).  This assumes that distributed photovoltaics, 
photovoltaic-compressed air energy storage, and concentrating solar power all would be deployed, with “about 
90% of the solar production” occurring in the Southwest, id. at 397, and it is “contingent on a national 
commitment to a renewable-energy-based electricity production and distribution system,” id. But see F. E. 
Trainer, Can Renewable Energy Sources Sustain Affluent Society?, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 1009, 1023 (1995) 
(concluding, based on costs, that “it is highly unlikely that renewable energy sources could sustain present rich 
world per capita levels of energy use”). 
88 Paul Denholm & Robert M. Margolis, Land-Use Requirements and the Per-Capita Solar Footprint for 
Photovoltaic Generation in the United States, 36 ENERGY POL’Y 3531, 3539 (2008).  This assumes that the 
efficiency of photovoltaic modules is 13.5%.  Id. at 3534. 
89 Gary W. Frey & Deborah M. Linke, Hydropower as a Renewable and Sustainable Energy Resource 
Meeting Global Energy Challenges in a Reasonable Way, 30 ENERGY POL’Y 1261, 1262 (2002). 
90 See, e.g., Fthenakis et al., supra note 87, at 389–91. 
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needed, from steel to silicon and rare metals,91 as well as the land required for 
the infrastructure, inevitably create costs.92  Renewables are also not as easily 
interchangeable, storable, and transportable as some nonrenewable fuels.93
When the sun is behind clouds or the wind dies down, an energy-consuming 
source must rely upon a back-up stored energy source or traditional fuels that 
are burned to generate electricity, which then flows through the grid.94
Despite these limitations, renewables have fewer negative impacts on 
human health, security, and the environment than do traditional fuels.  A 
European Commission study, for example, attempted to identify all of the 
relevant externalities of energy production, focusing on and quantifying 
“environmental impacts,” “global warming impacts,” “accidents” (“rare 
unwanted events in contrast to normal operation”), and “energy security” 
(“unforeseen changes in availability and prices of energy carriers”).95  Beneath 
these categories, in turn, researchers considered the effects of energy 
production on “health, crops, building materials, forests, and ecosystems,” 
among other things.96  The results suggest that renewable sources of electricity 
may have lower externality costs than nonrenewables, with the exception of 
nuclear power in some European countries.97  Many other factors, of course, 
must be considered before concluding that renewables are the ideal energy 
solution.  New technologies, for instance, are costly, and those costs fall 
91 See Trainer, supra note 87, at 1018 (estimating that a tripling of “world steel, glass, and concrete 
production” could be required if renewable energy supplied global power needs); Katie Howell, Imported 
Minerals, Metals Fuel U.S. Shift to Homegrown Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
gwire/2009/06/09/09greenwire-imported-minerals-metals-fuel-us-shift-to-home-57275.html. 
92 Fulvio Ardente et al., Life Cycle Assessment of a Solar Thermal Collector, 30 RENEWABLE ENERGY
1031, 1052 (2005) (discussing “direct emissions of metals” that occur when solar collectors are cut and welded 
and “indirect emissions” from the “production of raw materials” that go into the solar panels, but observing 
that “wastes are very low” from solar panel production); Craig K.R. Willis et al., Bats Are Not Birds and Other 
Problems with Sovacool’s (2009) Analysis of Animal Fatalities Due to Electricity Generation, 38 ENERGY 
POL’Y 2067, 2067 (2010) (“[I]t is bats that face the most widespread and worrisome species-level conservation 
consequences from wind turbines.”). 
93 Michael J. Economides & David A. Wood, The State of Natural Gas, 1 J. NAT. GAS SCI. &
ENGINEERING 1, 2 (2009). 
94 See Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Intermittency of Wind, Solar, and Renewable Electricity Generators: 
Technical Barrier or Rhetorical Excuse?, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 288, 289 (2009) (describing the intermittency issues 
of renewables). 
95 EUROPEAN COMM’N, EXTERNE: EXTERNALITIES OF ENERGY 13–14 (Peter Bickel & Rainer Friedrich 
eds., 2005), available at http://www.externe.info/brussels/methup05a.pdf. 
96 Id. at 51, 53. 
97 Results of ExternE (Figures of the National Implementation Phase), EXTERNE, http://www.externe. 
info (last visited Nov. 10, 2010); see also BREEZE, supra note 8, at 15 (summarizing the ExternE results). 
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disproportionately on low-income energy users.98  The broader point is that 
renewables offer great promise and should not be dismissed as merely a minor 
contribution to an overwhelming energy challenge. 
One could fill several volumes in attempting to pinpoint the optimal energy 
package for the short term as the United States responds to the need for a 
sustainable energy profile with a substantial renewables component.  It is clear, 
however, that the ideal short-term energy profile would include a mix of 
renewable and nonrenewable sources that would prevent electricity rates from 
skyrocketing; provide a reliable, uninterrupted source of power; lower 
America’s dependence on foreign energy resources; and reduce the current 
negative externalities of energy production.  Here, we simply argue that 
renewable energy should become a reliable and substantial piece of America’s 
total energy mix within several decades and should be a dominant part of the 
mix in the far future.  The ultimate goal for the percentage of U.S. energy to be 
provided by renewables in the near term is not essential to our discussion, 
although state governments have suggested what a realistic percentage might 
be.  Approximately thirty-three states have specified deadlines by which 
renewable or alternative energy must comprise a percentage of the state’s 
electricity package,99 ranging from eight percent in Pennsylvania100 to as high 
as thirty-three percent in California.101  Some cities have aimed even higher; 
98 See, e.g., Joseph P. Tomain, “Steel in the Ground”: Greening the Grid with the iUtility, 39 ENVTL. L. 
931, 959 (2009) (describing low-income consumers as “price-sensitive to energy costs”). 
99 See Donald S. McCauley et al., Renewable Portfolio Standards, in CAPTURING THE POWER OF 
ELECTRIC RESTRUCTURING 175, 184–87 (Joey Lee Miranda ed., 2009). 
100 U.S. Dep’t of Energy, States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE 
ENERGY, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last updated June 16, 
2009).  Pennsylvania has an Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards Act.  See 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1648.1–1648.8 (West 2010).  The Act requires that “at least 8% of the electric energy sold by an electric 
distribution company or electric generation supplier to retail electric customers . . . in the 15th year after the 
effective date of this subsection is sold from Tier 1 alternative energy resources.”  Id. § 1648.3; see also id.
§ 1648.2 (defining “alternative energy source” and “Tier I alternative energy source”).  Tier I alternative 
energy sources include “solar photovoltaic and solar thermal energy,” “wind power,” “low-impact 
hydropower,” “geothermal energy,” “biologically derived methane gas,” “fuel cells,” “biomass energy” 
(“organic material from a plant that is grown for the purpose of being used to produce electricity” and “any 
solid, nonhazardous cellulosic waste material that is segregated from other waste materials, such as waste 
pallets . . . landscape or . . . tree trimmings . . . and other crop by-products or residues”), and “methane gas 
emitting from abandoned or working coal mines.”  Id. § 1648.2. 
101 See California Renewables Portfolio Standard, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/ 
PUC/energy/Renewables/index.htm (last visited May 1, 2011).  Maine has a higher renewable percentage; by 
2017, forty percent of Maine’s electricity must be from renewable sources.  See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-
A, § 3210(3) (2010) (requiring that providers’ portfolios consist of eligible renewables); id. § 3210-C (setting a 
goal for an incremental increase in the portfolio requirement, resulting in a 10% increase by 2017); 65-407-311 
ME. CODE R. § 3 (LexisNexis 2010) (same).  But Maine includes hydropower in its definition of renewable 
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San Jose, for example, endeavors to “[r]eceive 100 percent of [its] electrical 
power from clean renewable sources” by 2025.102  Keeping this range of 
visions in mind, subsection 2 will explain why distributed renewables are an 
important piece of the near-term renewables goal. 
2. Why Distributed Renewables? 
Renewable energy exists at two scales.  There are “farms,” which are large, 
concentrated arrays of generating units that produce mass quantities of power, 
and “gardens,” in the form of smaller, distributed systems.  At the large scale, 
rows of space-age mirrors and solar parabolic troughs dot the southwestern 
landscape,103 and wind turbines tower over the plains.104  At the smaller scale, 
homes and businesses place solar panels on roofs, tap into geothermal 
resources in the subsurface, or install a wind turbine in a parking lot or 
backyard. 
At the distributed scale, renewables fit an energy production model that has 
existed for thousands of years; energy is consumed close to its source.105  This 
localized system enabled by distributed renewable technology offers unique 
opportunities for sustained local economic empowerment in even the smallest 
communities.106  Homes, businesses, and factories become long-term 
generators of power and income.  A distributed renewable structure that is 
placed on a lot can, with the proper transmission and distribution infrastructure 
and electricity metering policy, generate much of its own power and sell some 
back to the grid.107  A group in Japan has captured this concept in a phrase that 
sources, and with hydro, it already meets this requirement.  Therefore, the standard will not likely lead to much 
growth in the wind and solar sectors.  McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 188. 
102 CITY OF SAN JOSE, 2009–2010 CLEAN TECH LEGISLATIVE AGENDA 2 (2009), available at http://www. 
sanjoseca.gov/mayor/goals/environment/SANJOSECLEANTECHAGENDA2009.pdf. 
103 See, e.g., BREEZE, supra note 8, at 201 (describing the nine solar trough farms built in California in the 
1980s and 1990s); Matthew L. Wald, What’s So Bad About Big?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at H1 (describing 
a solar power plant with “six rows of mirrors, each nearly a quarter-mile long”). 
104 A Leader in Texas Wind Power, LOWER COLO. RIVER ASS’N, http://www.lcra.org/energy/power/ 
renewable_energy/windpower.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2010) (explaining that “[w]ide open West Texas, 
where the winds whip across the plains, and the Gulf Coast region, are ideal locations for wind power projects, 
also called wind farms,” and describing the farms that have been built). 
105 See, e.g., Bernadette Del Chiaro & Rachel Gibson, Government’s Role in Creating a Vibrant Solar 
Power Market in California, 36 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 347, 354 (2006). 
106 RIFKIN, supra note 44, at 241 (“Were all individuals and communities in the world to become the 
producers of their own energy, the result would be a dramatic shift in the configuration of power: no longer 
from the top down but from the bottom up.”). 
107 See, e.g., Jeffrey Gangemi, Selling Power Back to the Grid, BUS. WEEK (July 6, 2006), http://www. 
businessweek.com/smallbiz/content/jul2006/sb20060706_167332.htm (discussing how a homeowner’s 
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plays on the negatively phrased “Not in My Back Yard” or “NIMBY” land use 
ideology, defining the movement toward distributed renewables as “Energy In 
My Yard”—EIMY.108
Construction of additional renewable production facilities—both large and 
small scale—is necessary for proper growth of renewable energy capacity, and 
policies governing both scales will need to change.  This Article, however, 
focuses on distributed renewables because they offer several distinct benefits 
over large projects.  Large renewable projects, apart from the challenges of 
financing and antiquated state energy regulation,109 face the extremely high 
barrier of the siting process.  Droves of individual landowners, environmental 
groups, and other organized lobbies have voiced their concerns over the 
aesthetic and environmental impacts of tall wind turbines and acres of solar 
arrays,110 and a push to build more and larger farms will only heighten these 
concerns.111
“rooftop solar power generation system pays him an extra $3,000 per year on top of producing all the energy 
he needs to power his New Jersey home for free”).  See generally Bronin, supra note 11, at 547 (arguing for 
greater emphasis on “microgrids,” or “small-scale distributed generation between neighbors of energy derived 
from sources such as solar collectors, wind power systems, microturbines, geothermal wells, and fuel cells”). 
108 Hiroaki Niitsuma & Toshiko Nakata, EIMY (Energy In My Yard)—A Concept for Practical Usage of 
Renewable Energy from Local Sources, 32 GEOTHERMICS 767, 768 (2003). 
109 See Kenneth Westrick et al., The Top 10 Least Exploited and Developed U.S. States, 6 N. AM. WIND 
POWER 18, 23 (2009) (describing state programs like renewable portfolio standards (which, by requiring a 
percentage or specific quantity of the state’s electricity to come from renewable sources, make wind energy 
more profitable), grid interconnection policies, and corporate tax incentives as important factors in wind 
energy development, but observing that ten states with high wind energy potential lack such policies). 
110 NAT’L COMM’N ON ENERGY POLICY, SITING CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2006), available 
at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/Siting Critical Energy Infrastructure_448851db5fa7d.pdf (“The 
headlines are replete with examples of new, supposedly advanced facilities that continue to run into local 
opposition.”); Alain Nadai & Dan van der Horst, Editorial, Wind Power Planning, Landscapes and Publics, 27
LAND USE POL’Y 181, 181 (2010) (“[P]rotests . . . have resulted in the delay and even abandonment of 
proposed wind farms and other renewable energy facilities . . . .”); Felicity Barringer, Environmentalists in a 
Clash of Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009, at A17 (describing some environmental groups’ opposition to 
solar and wind projects in places like the Mojave Desert and the Nantucket Sound). 
111 Further, as often occurs with actions that will affect state coffers, politicians are already fighting over 
who will pay for and receive the transmission that will connect renewable farms to consumers, meaning that 
those areas with the highest renewable potential may not be prioritized for development.  See Matthew L. 
Wald, Debate on Clean Energy Leads to a Regional Battle over Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at A13 
(explaining that “[a]n influential coalition of East Coast governors and power companies fears that building 
wind and solar sites in the Midwest would cause their region to miss out on jobs and other economic benefits” 
and that the “[t]he East Coast advocates may have won a crucial first round” in the passage of a climate bill 
with transmission on clean energy provisions in the House, but observing that “a wind machine in North 
Dakota would produce more energy than the same machine in some Eastern states”).  New regional 
governance processes that bring together local, state, and federal institutions to address the myriad issues 
posed by renewable farms will need to emerge, and some already have.  See, e.g., W. GOVERNORS’ ASS’N &
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN RENEWABLE ENERGY ZONES—PHASE 1 REPORT 2 (2009), available at 
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Small-scale renewables on rooftops, parking garages, factories, and in 
yards, on the other hand, are an immediate and substantial step toward 
increasing renewable energy capacity.  A homeowner or business in an area 
with adequate enabling regulations for small-scale renewable electricity 
generation can have a system up and running in several months.112  Distributed 
generation systems may also attract less political attention than wind and solar 
farms.  Small-scale projects, often initiated by cities, are less likely to draw in 
the organized landowners and special interest groups that tend to successfully 
block higher profile, large-scale systems.113  Indeed, some surveys have shown 
that the public holds a more favorable attitude toward small-scale 
renewables,114 although there are still strong local zoning battles over their 
placement.115
A final benefit of distributed generation is that it could quickly reduce 
America’s dependence on fossil fuels.  Small-scale renewable generation 
systems, individually considered, generate relatively low quantities of 
electricity, but their contribution could be large in the aggregate.  Electrical 
utilities face a unique challenge due to the characteristics of their product.  
Electricity cannot yet be effectively and economically stored in large 
quantities,116 but it must be instantaneously available when demanded.117
Many power plants therefore exist only to meet consumer demand for 
electricity when demand exceeds the normal base load.  These plants power up 
http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/WREZ09.pdf.  But there is much more work to be done in this area.  
The regional governance issues posed by solar farms are an immediate problem and, though beyond the scope 
of this Article, are the subject of a separate, forthcoming piece.  See Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional 
Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (arguing that because utility-scale 
renewable technology must be placed in the areas of strongest wind and sunlight—ignoring existing 
jurisdictional lines on the ground—each renewable development may cross multiple jurisdictional lines and 
lead to regulatory commons and anticommons challenges). 
112 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., A DETAILED GUIDE TO INSTALLING A SOLAR 
ELECTRIC SYSTEM, http://www.powernaturally.org/publications/consumermanual2-final.pdf (last visited Feb. 
17, 2011) (showing that a typical photovoltaic system is “fully operational” within nineteen to twenty weeks). 
113 See supra note 110. 
114 A study in the United Kingdom concluded that “the public are generally more comfortable with the use 
of small-scale technologies in their locale.”  Jonathan Burton & Klaus Hubacek, Is Small Beautiful? A 
Multicriteria Assessment of Small-Scale Energy Technology Applications in Local Governments, 35 ENERGY 
POL’Y 6402, 6407 (2007). 
115 See Abby Goodnough, Turning to Windmills, but Resistance Lingers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at 
A25; supra note 109. 
116 Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 454 (2002). 
117 See Paul Denholm & Robert M. Margolis, Evaluating the Limits of Solar Photovoltaics (PV) in 
Traditional Electric Power Systems, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 2852, 2853 (2007). 
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during times of “peak” electricity demand118 such as hot summer days when air 
conditioners run at maximum capacity.  Outside of the peak periods, these 
“peaker” plants sit idle or operate at low levels as spinning reserves.119  This is 
where renewables, including distributed renewables, show one of their greatest 
strengths.  By providing the additional electricity needed during peak times,120
distributed renewables may have a disproportionately large effect on clean 
energy production121 and could reduce the need for fossil-fuel-burning peaking 
plants.122
Distributed renewables, considered collectively, offer several unique 
advantages over centralized utilities.  They can be built and deployed quickly, 
they may not face as much consumer or political opposition, and they reduce 
the need for fossil-fuel-fired energy.  Much effort will be required, however, to 
move these promising technologies to a point of greater prominence within the 
energy system. 
C. Requirements for Widespread Deployment of Distributed Renewables 
This section addresses two connected components that will be required to 
move toward a world with more distributed renewables that are applied in a 
118 Id.
119 Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, Time for a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform RTO-Run Centralized 
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 509 n.76 (2008). 
120 Cf. BREEZE, supra note 8, at 200 (explaining that “[i]t can, therefore, be argued that solar power is best 
deployed for peak power generation,” but if utilities begin to better manage and even out consumer demand, 
peak demand level may decline, and the “marginal value of the solar output may fall”). 
121 Denhlom & Margolis, supra note 117, at 2584 (explaining how during a particular week investigated, 
“PV generation provides significant benefits by reducing demand during peak periods”); id. at 2583–84 
(showing a strong correlation between electricity demand and solar photovoltaic electricity generation in Texas 
in the summer); Sovacool, supra note 94, at 294 (explaining that an installed PV array in California reduced by 
half “the number of natural gas ‘peakers’ needed to ensure reserve capacity”); see also CHRISTY HERIG, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., USING PHOTOVOLTAICS TO PRESERVE CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY CAPACITY 
RESERVES 2 (2001), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy01osti/31179.pdf (providing the data on the 
reduced peak load in California described by Sovacool); id. at 4 fig. (“The correlation between PV output and 
load demand is normally high.”); Jad Mouawad, The Newest Hybrid Model, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2010, at B1 
(explaining that a large array of solar panels at a Florida utility’s gas-fired power plant will “provide extra 
power when it is most needed: when the summer sun is shining, Floridians are cranking up their air-
conditioning and electricity demand is at its highest”). 
122 See David Hodas, Imagining the Unimaginable: Reducing U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Forty 
Percent, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 289 (2008) (explaining that under Florida’s proposed combination of 
“energy efficiency and renewable sources” policies, “[s]ummer peak demand would be reduced by 20,480 
MW (the equivalent of roughly forty new 500 MW coal-fired power plants)”); Vance Little, Note, Using the 
Commerce Clause to Short-Circuit States’ Ability to Pass Power Costs onto Neighbors, 2008 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 149, 154–55 (“[N]etwork designers have come to rely on smaller natural gas or diesel plants 
for shorter peaks in load at various times throughout the day . . . .”). 
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greater variety of contexts.  First, innovative entrepreneurs will need to install 
distributed generation and actively promote it within their communities.  
Second, in order to allow renewables “pioneers” or “entrepreneurs” to embark 
upon their projects, municipal governments must be free to enact all local land 
use regulations and standards, including building codes and zoning, necessary 
to encourage and ensure relatively predictable regulation of the installation of 
renewables.  We will refer to these as land-energy rules.
1. Energy Entrepreneurs 
Distributed renewable generation so far remains an intriguing anomaly in a 
primarily centralized system of nonrenewable energy production,123 and it will 
stay that way if innovative homeowners and renters—the entrepreneurial 
pioneers of the renewable energy world—do not take an active role in 
installing and using it.  In a world increasingly dominated by corporations and 
powerful special interests, this claim may sound far-fetched, but distributed 
renewables are indeed dependent upon individuals, not just groups with larger 
stakes in the issue.  Corporations produce the technology, but the success of 
any distributed renewable business wholly depends upon individuals’ 
willingness to install the technology and to persuade others of its usefulness.  
The entrepreneurs required here are individual residents and businesses who 
are willing to place small infrastructure on their property.  The effort will not 
succeed without individual effort, which, in the aggregate, makes the 
manufacturing of distributed renewable technology economically feasible. 
Further, entrepreneurs must operate within conducive regulatory contexts.  
The transition toward distributed renewables is like the introduction of any 
other new technology, but it has more significant implications due to the 
infrastructural investment required.  It requires enthusiastic inventors of the 
product to experiment with and perfect the technology and for the users of the 
product to demonstrate by doing.  In the case of distributed renewables, much 
of the product perfection is already occurring.124  A partnership between 
Edinburgh, Scotland, and Michigan has introduced a roof wind turbine to 
123 See supra text accompanying note 60. 
124 See, e.g., John Casey, Technology Smooths the Way for Home Wind-Power Turbines, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 15, 2008, at F3 (quoting the President of the New York State Energy Research and Development 
Authority, who observed that “the technology has improved, and the cost per project is coming down” and that 
“[t]urbines for farms and residential applications are seeing much more activity” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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America,125 for example, and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory has 
developed high-efficiency, thin-film solar cells, which are more affordable 
than traditional cells and can be placed on “roof shingles, windows, [and] 
siding.”126  But still more progress can be made in solar and wind technologies 
if consumers begin to demand more and better technologies and operate them 
in a variety of physical environments and regulatory contexts.  The immediate 
work that is needed, the “product” that must be advertised so to speak, is the 
entire package—the proof that a solar panel or wind turbine, as installed, can 
fulfill a family’s or business’s energy needs. 
As we will describe in more detail below, the eccentric businessman 
Rembrandt Peale initially succeeded in persuading Baltimore to switch to gas 
lighting not by inventing a gas lamp (others had already done that127), but by 
installing it in a museum, advertising the innovation, and proving to local 
citizens that it worked.128  Gas lighting later expanded in part due to local laws 
enabling infrastructural change.  Similarly, when air conditioners were first 
introduced to cities around the mid-1900s, an informal survey conducted by 
Fortune magazine suggested that the most effective advertising for this new 
technology—the proof that it worked and was worth purchasing and 
installing—came from the “advertisements” of neighbors.129 Fortune chose 
the air conditioner to satisfy its curiosity about effective marketing techniques 
because this relatively novel technology was, in 1954, “climbing up the 
acceptance curve from the luxury to the necessity category.”130  The air 
conditioner (like today’s solar panels and wind turbines) was also “highly 
visible, and thus provide[d] a convenient index of how people are influenced 
by one another.”131 Fortune toured Philadelphia neighborhoods to locate the 
areas that tended to have more air conditioners.132  Once it identified these 
neighborhoods,133 it noticed that the number of air conditioners differed 
125 Anne Eisenberg, Wind Blows, and the Electric Meter Spins Backward, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, at 
BU4. 
126 Press Release, Nat’l Renewable Energy Lab., Record Makes Thin-Film Solar Cell Competitive with 
Silicon Efficiency (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://www.nrel.gov/news/press/2008/574.html. 
127 David Melville and Dr. Charles Kugler patented gas lighting in America.  Brown, supra note 33, at 
11–12. 
128 See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
129 William H. Whyte, Jr., The Web of Word of Mouth, FORTUNE, Nov. 1954, at 140, 140; see also BILL 
BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART 191 (2008) 
(discussing the Fortune article). 
130 Whyte, supra note 129, at 140. 
131 Id.
132 Id. at 142. 
133 Id.
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substantially block-by-block, and the blocks with the most air conditioners 
were those with house walls along the alleyways—the socially frequented 
portions of the neighborhood where children played and mothers watched for 
their safety.134 Fortune concluded that once a social group coalesced, all that 
was necessary to cause air conditioners to spread like wildfire along a block 
was the “catalytic influence of a leader,” such as a mother with a recently 
installed air conditioner who would trumpet her happy experiences with the 
technology to the group, which would then pass on the experience through
word of mouth.135  While the new technology to be promoted is no longer gas 
lighting or the air conditioner, the same sort of demonstrated and individually 
advertised application of a new technology will be required to convince large 
numbers of individuals to adopt distributed renewables. 
The switch to a new source of electricity, however, has broader 
implications than most technology transitions.  The introduction of new 
renewable energy devices sparks individuals’ fear of the unknown in every 
aspect of their lives.136  They may worry that the heat will stop working on the 
coldest day of the winter or the smart phone will not charge just when a crucial 
message must be conveyed.  The switch to renewables also requires a higher 
up-front commitment, both mentally and financially.  The financial layout for a 
renewable-energy-generating device is in some cases one-quarter to one-half as 
large as the purchase of a modest $100,000 home,137 which is the largest 
investment that a typical individual will ever make.138  And it requires, in many 
respects, a spirited adherence to social do-goodedness.139  With high up-front 
134 Id. at 143. 
135 Id.
136 See William H. Lawrence & John H. Minan, Product Standards and Solar Energy, in LEGAL ASPECTS 
OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 153, 160 (“The novelty of the equipment [used in solar projects] leaves 
many consumers with fears about its performance reliability.”). 
137 See Del Chiaro & Gibson, supra note 105, at 364 (“[A] typical 2.5 kW [solar power] system—a size 
that typically would be expected to generate at least half of the home’s electricity needs—is estimated to cost 
approximately $20,000.”); Shevory, supra note 69 (indicating that residential turbines “cost between $12,000 
and $55,000”). 
138 See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 9 (2001) (describing how a home is 
often an individual’s only asset aside from retirement assets). 
139 See R. Cooke et al., Alternative Energy Technologies in Buildings: Stakeholder Perceptions, 32 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 2320, 2325–26 (2007).  One respondent in a survey of alternative energy stakeholders in 
the United Kingdom explained: “From the clients [sic] point of view we ask them to consider renewables in 
the long term to save money and save the planet.”  Id. at 2325.  “[T]he main reasons for using [alternative 
energy technologies] in building projects are perceived to be (a) long-term economic benefits, (b) the 
availability of subsidies, (c) image benefits, (d) the desire to reduce environmental impacts and (e) corporate 
social responsibility (CSR).”  Id. at 2325–26; see also id. at 2326 fig.1. 
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costs, many renewables do not pay off, in terms of the energy savings 
exceeding the costs of purchasing and construction, for at least a decade.140  In 
a highly mobile society,141 those who invest are unlikely to stay long enough to 
see this payoff.  Finally, the transition to distributed renewable technology 
requires consumers to overcome negative perceptions of the product.  As one 
respondent in a series of alternative-energy-focused interviews in the United 
Kingdom stated, clients “need to be convinced that these systems will work 
and will not have to be replaced with expensive traditional replacements after 
occupancy.”142
In past large energy transitions from candles to gas lighting and electricity 
and then to centralized energy production, these many barriers to energy 
innovation were breached.  And, interestingly, these surges forward were 
influenced by individual, charismatic entrepreneurs aided by local government 
policies.  Baltimore, for example—one of the first American cities to receive 
gas light service—was the home of Rembrandt Peale,143 an eccentric museum 
owner who displayed various paintings, stuffed fishes, and animals to the 
public.144  As historians tell the story, Peale enhanced his collection after his 
father funded a successful expedition to unearth the first mammoth skeleton 
found in the United States, and Peale discovered in displaying this 
archaeological attraction that “catering to the public curiosity” could be a 
profitable business venture.145  As a new curiosity, he decided to purchase a 
gas-making machine for his museum and to produce light, thus introducing a 
novelty to the public and at the same time attempting to condition the public to 
a new form of energy, which he hoped would be a successful business 
venture146:
140 See Del Chiaro & Gibson, supra note 105, at 364 (“Over a 30-year time period [in California], the 
average benefit in terms of cumulative cash flow is approximately $4,500 and ‘simple payback’ (the time it 
takes for an investment to ‘pay for itself’) can be expected within ten to twelve years.”). 
141 Between 1995 and 2000, nearly half (49.5%) of the U.S. population aged five and over moved.  U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, MIGRATION AND GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY IN METROPOLITAN AND NONMETROPOLITAN 
AMERICA: 1995 TO 2000, at 2 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-9.pdf. 
142 Cooke et al., supra note 139, at 2325. 
143 STOTZ & JAMISON, supra note 25, at 13. 
144 See id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 14. 
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GAS LIGHTS 
WITHOUT OIL, TALLOW, WICKS OR SMOKE
It is not necessary to invite attention to the gas lights by which my 
salon of paintings is now illuminated; those who have seen the ring 
beset with gems of light are sufficiently disposed to spread their 
reputation; the purpose of this notice is merely to say that the 
Museum will be illuminated every evening until the public curiosity 
shall be gratified.147
A day earlier, Peale had similarly dangled a temptation before his audiences, 
explaining, 
Yesterday evening, for the first time, the citizens who attended at 
the Baltimore Museum were gratified by seeing one of the Rooms 
lighted by means of CARBURETTED HYDROGEN GAS. . . .  We are 
much pleased to find that the illumination by GAS will be continued 
every evening for some time . . . that each citizen may have an 
opportunity of being convinced how much superior it is to every 
other kind of artificial light.148
In installing the gaslight system and publishing these advertisements, Peale 
was doing exactly what today’s pioneers of solar and wind energy must do.  
That is, they must lead by example, applying the new and novel energy system 
and proving to the public that it works—ensuring that the “public curiosity” is 
not only “gratified,” but that the new form of energy production becomes an 
accepted part of modern society.  And the laws must allow these entrepreneurs 
to follow this course. 
The road to centralized electricity production—another great energy 
transition of the last two centuries enabled in part by local policies—was paved 
by another particularly enterprising individual, Samuel Insull.149  This was not 
an easy route; Insull encountered “inertia which . . . could be overcome best by 
individual initiative and persistent effort.  The new energy had to fight its way 
against [e]ntrenched interests” like gas lighting.150  “The people were already 
served with light, heat, and power, according to then-prevailing standards.  
Only enthusiasts had a glimpse of the future position of the new energy.”151
Insull embarked upon a campaign to persuade America and its governing 
147 Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 13, 1816). 
148 Id. (quoting FED. GAZETTE & BALT. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 12, 1816). 
149 See Bradley, supra note 30, at 46 (describing Insull’s support of centralized energy production). 
150 BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 14. 
151 Id.
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institutions, however, that centralized energy producers regulated as natural 
monopolies would form an ideal system of electricity provision, arguing that 
“[t]he best service at the lowest possible price can only be obtained . . . by 
exclusive control of a given territory being placed in the hands of one 
undertaking.”152  By 1933, approximately twenty-two companies ran the bulk 
of the American electric industry.153  The transition to centralized energy 
surely was driven in part by the invention of improved transmission 
technology.154  However, the efforts of entrepreneurial individuals like Peale 
were important as well. 
Once individuals pave the way to a new form of energy production or 
delivery, proving that the new technology is effective and convenient, a larger 
economy must form around this new innovation to ensure that it is available to 
the public, and laws must be revised to allow for its widespread dispersal.  To 
achieve these goals, the initial individual efforts must expand to collective 
endeavors.  Others have recognized this need for group action in advocating 
for sweeping changes in the energy system.  In a 1949 book arguing for the 
formation of local public leagues to provide electricity, for example, the 
director of the American Public Utilities Bureau argued that in the “first step” 
necessary for this type of change—“legislative action by the city council”—
individuals were needed: 
[O]fficial leadership is necessary, and usually depends upon the 
mayor and prominent members of the council.  Ordinarily such 
persons will be reluctant to initiate the proposal and to “stick out their 
necks,” unless there is substantial support or pressure.  If there is a 
vigorous local league with a large membership, official leadership 
will emerge and legislative action is likely to follow.155
Indeed, this movement toward a larger group to advocate for new energy 
technologies and their associated infrastructure emerged during the transitions 
to gas lighting and later to centralized electricity.  Rembrandt Peale persuaded 
a group of investors to form the Gas Light Company of Baltimore,156 and three 
152 Bradley, supra note 30, at 46 (second alteration in original) (quoting Samuel Insull, President’s 
Address (June 7, 1898), in NATIONAL ELECTRIC LIGHT ASSOCIATION: TWENTY-FIRST CONVENTION 14, 27 
(Samuel Insull ed., 1898)). 
153 BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 22 (citing U.S. FED. POWER COMM’N, NATIONAL POWER 
SURVEY, POWER SERIES NO. 2, PRINCIPAL ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (1936)). 
154 See supra text accompanying note 41. 
155 BAUER & COSTELLO, supra note 40, at 244–45. 
156 Brown, supra note 33, at 14 (“By Friday, June 14, 1816 a small group of men, convinced by the 
demonstration at the Museum, had banded themselves into the Gas Light Company of Baltimore . . . .”). 
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days after the company formed, the Baltimore City Council passed an 
ordinance to “provide for the more effectually lighting the streets, squares, 
lanes and alleys of the city of Baltimore” using carburetted hydrogen gas, and 
to empower Peale’s new companies to lay pipes throughout the city for this 
purpose.157  Without local government laws enabling the infrastructure 
necessary to technological change, these energy transitions might never have 
occurred. 
In the modern energy transition to renewables, before groups rally around 
this relatively new form of energy—thus enabling substantial investment and 
stronger lobbying power—the renewables pioneers must pave the way for a 
new industry oriented around this energy form.  And to do this, the pioneers 
will need amenable land energy rules in addition to monetary incentives and a 
general spirit of adventurousness and desire for social change.  Unfortunately, 
these rules in their current form are wholly inadequate. 
2. Existing Local Land-Energy Rules 
Individual entrepreneurs will not be able to install wind turbines and solar 
panels without zoning laws and building codes that allow these devices, yet in 
many regions, such felicitous land-energy rules do not exist.  This was starkly 
illustrated in 2009 when the planning board of Bourne, Massachusetts, twice 
blocked a homeowner’s attempts to install a backyard wind turbine, and the 
superior court affirmed the board’s decisions.158  The need to enable (or, in 
some cases, command159) local governments to reshape land use laws to 
accommodate distributed renewables—to create land-energy rules, in other 
words—was well documented during the failed push toward renewables in the 
1970s, and the literature generated useful suggestions for improvement.  In 
1977, for example, the federal Energy Research and Development 
Administration suggested legal solutions to enable the solar heating and 
cooling of buildings in many contexts, from ensuring that buildings have 
adequate access to sunlight160 to encouraging the installation of solar 
157 Id. at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that the ordinance was passed on Monday, 
June 17, 1816). 
158 Goodnough, supra note 115. 
159 WILLIAM A. THOMAS ET AL., OVERCOMING LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT USE OF SOLAR ENERGY 
SYSTEMS 12 (1978) (suggesting that “[f]ailure by state or local governments to protect skyspace will 
discourage solar energy use” and concluding that “Constitutional Protection of unobstructed solar skyspace” is 
therefore critical (emphasis omitted)). 
160 Miller, supra note 51, at 39–40. 
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technology on mobile homes.161  The following year, the American Bar 
Foundation attempted to identify possible “legislative remedies” at the federal, 
state, and local levels to reduce “legal barriers to the use of solar energy 
systems,”162 including building code and zoning-related barriers.163  In 1981, 
law professors from San Diego and Villanova edited a book that offered an 
even more comprehensive view of the “legal issues in solar heating and 
cooling and in solar photovoltaics,” and they attempted to resolve some of 
these issues,164 suggesting model ordinances for solar rights165 and improved 
technology standards and building codes for solar installation.166  Other recent 
legal scholarship has proposed structures for local laws to enable the use of 
renewables, such as regulations or landowner agreements that create access to 
sunlight.167  In Part II, this Article will make proposals for necessary renewable 
energy rules from a broader perspective; it will describe and defend the 
governance level at which land-energy rules must be written and revisited.  We 
hope that this will inspire further discussion about specific rules that should be 
implemented. 
To set the stage for our approach to fostering the transition to distributed 
renewables, the following sub-subsection provides a sampling of the land-
energy laws that have been implemented to date—some of which reflect the 
suggestions of the literature from the 1970s through today.  Because solar 
access laws, which are a key part of land-energy rules, have been thoroughly 
discussed in the literature,168 it will focus on the zoning and building codes that 
address distributed renewables.  It will work from the top down, investigating 
some of the federal, state, and local efforts that have directly impacted the 
development, content, and application of land-energy rules. 
161 Id. at 165–70. 
162 THOMAS ET AL., supra note 159, at 1. 
163 Id. at 16, 19–27. 
164 Preface to LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at xiii. 
165 Melvin M. Eisenstadt & Albet E. Utton, Access to Sunlight: A Legislative Approach, in LEGAL 
ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 45, 51–64. 
166 Lawrence & Minan, supra note 136, at 168–75. 
167 See generally Sara C. Bronin, Modern Lights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 881 (2009). 
168 See, e.g., supra notes 11, 167. 
PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 
2011] LOCAL ENERGY 909 
a. Federal Land-Energy Policy 
Most federal policy that has encouraged (or frustrated) renewables 
innovation has focused on finance.169  Generally, the government has provided 
financial incentives for energy technologies and fuels; while these economic 
policies do not fall within the land-energy realm, they have strongly influenced 
renewables innovation and thus merit brief discussion.  Many federal financial 
incentives have negatively influenced renewables innovation by encouraging a 
continued reliance upon nonrenewable technologies and fuels.  By 1981, the 
U.S. government had already “expended approximately $217.4 billion to 
stimulate the production of nuclear, oil, coal, and other energy sources.”170
But beginning in 1978, incentives directed at renewable energy technology 
began to compete with the public money flowing to fossil fuels with the 
passage of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA)171 and the 
Energy Tax Act.172  PURPA required utilities to buy power generated by small 
qualifying facilities at the amount that it would have cost the utility to generate 
or purchase the power from another source;173 this forced utilities to treat small 
electricity generators, including renewables, as equal market players.174  The 
Energy Tax Act, in turn, provided a tax credit for expenditures on residential 
solar, wind, and geothermal energy.175  These incentives have continued to 
flow over the years and have, in some cases, expanded.176  As of 2010, several 
incentives specifically directed toward distributed generation remain active.  
169 See Ronald H. Rosenberg, Diversifying America’s Energy Future: The Future of Renewable Wind 
Power, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 505, 532 (2008) (noting that, as a result of a lack of national control over private 
investment in electricity production, the government’s provision of financial incentives is critical to the 
development of renewables). 
170 John H. Minan & William H. Lawrence, State and Federal Tax Incentives to Promote Solar Use, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SOLAR ENERGY, supra note 56, at 69, 69. 
171 See McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 177 (describing the development of PURPA as a response to oil 
embargoes). 
172 Minan & Lawrence, supra note 170, at 69. 
173 McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 177. 
174 See id. (discussing how new contracts based on expected avoidance costs created a constant revenue 
stream for qualified facilities, which include small renewables). 
175 Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-618, sec. 101(a), § 44C(a)(2), (b)(2), 92 Stat. 3174, 3175 
(repealed 1990). 
176 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, POLICIES TO PROMOTE NON-HYDRO RENEWABLE 
ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES AND SELECTED COUNTRIES 7 (2005) (discussing extensions of the Energy 
Policy Act’s tax credit and the concomitant increase in the number of renewable technologies covered).  The 
Energy Policy Act of 1992, for example, provided a production tax credit for wind energy and biomass plants.  
Id.  “The incentive expired in 1999” but has been consistently renewed and remains in place today.  Id.; cf. 
I.R.C. § 45(d) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (showing the continuation of a production tax credit for electricity from 
renewables). 
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The Tax Code provides a thirty-percent credit for the cost of expenditures by 
individuals on qualified residential solar, small wind, fuel cell, and geothermal 
technologies,177 as well as for the tax basis of a business’s renewable energy 
property.178  The 2009 federal stimulus package converted these business tax 
credits for renewable technology to grants, provided the renewable property 
was placed in service or construction began in 2009 or 2010.179  The federal 
government has also funded research, development, demonstration, and 
deployment efforts to expand and improve renewable energy and, since the 
1980s, has shared the costs of these efforts with industry partners.180  The 
results include “higher efficiency” solar panels, heating systems, and 
architectural designs for solar-heated homes, as well as “advanced wind 
turbine designs,”181 among other advances.  Finally, ongoing direct funding for 
the adoption of renewable technologies has been provided to cities through 
programs like the Department of Energy’s “Solar America Cities.”182
Programs like Solar America Cities, in addition to their financial stimulus 
for renewables, also represent “soft” efforts by the federal government to 
influence local land-energy laws in order to increase opportunities for the 
installation of renewables technologies.  The Department of Energy views 
current local laws that fail to adequately address issues such as solar 
permitting, “solar rights ordinances,” and “infrastructure planning,” as some of 
the “key barriers” to the acceleration of the solar market.183  In this way, the 
federal government influences local land-energy policies by doling out funds 
to municipalities and suggesting changes in local laws to reduce these barriers.  
With the exception of programs like Solar America Cities, however, the federal 
government has had little direct influence in local land-energy rules. 
177 I.R.C. § 25D(a). 
178 See generally id. § 38(a)–(b)(1) (2006) (providing a business credit, to include an “investment credit 
determined under section 46”); id. § 46 (including an “energy credit” within the “investment credit”); id.
§ 48 (a)(1)–(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (defining the energy credit). 
179 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1603 (a), (d), 123 Stat. 115, 
364–65 (providing a grant in lieu of a tax credit for geothermal and solar property as defined in § 48(a)(3)(A) 
of the Internal Revenue Code and small wind energy property in § 48(c)(4) of the Code). 
180 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 176, at 7. 
181 Klass, supra note 62, at 365. 
182 SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR POWERING YOUR COMMUNITY: A GUIDE 
FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1–2 (2d ed. 2011), available at http://solaramericacommunities.energy.gov/pdfs/ 
Solar-Powering-Your-Community-Guide-For-Local-Governments.pdf. 
183 Hannah Muller, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Accelerating Solar Energy at the Local Level (June 11, 2009) 
(PowerPoint presentation), available at http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/documents/pdf/6_solar_america_ 
hannah_muller.pdf; see also SOLAR AM. COMMUNITIES, supra note 182, at 60, 64.  
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b. State Directives 
States have been forceful drivers of the recent rise in renewable innovation.  
Like the federal government, they have influenced distributed renewables 
innovation through financial incentives, but they have also enacted important 
land-energy rules.  On the financial side, New York and California provide 
cash incentives for the installation of solar technologies on buildings;184
Illinois pays thirty percent of the cost when individual residents and businesses 
install wind and solar technology;185 and Pennsylvania has given free solar 
technology systems to twenty municipalities that committed to consuming 
twenty percent of their energy from “clean” sources by 2010.186  More than 
twenty-four states also offer indirect financial incentives for renewables 
through a variety of tax schemes,187 and more than thirty states have passed 
renewable portfolio standards, which require utilities to generate or purchase 
renewable energy.188  At least three states (Arizona, Colorado, and New 
Mexico) require a portion of this percentage to come from distributed 
renewables,189 and several give more credit—through the use of multipliers—
to electricity produced through distributed generation.190
States have also effected innovation in distributed renewable technology 
through land-energy rule making.  State laws in this area do not typically 
require the installation of distributed renewables and the infrastructure 
necessary to support them; only New Jersey comes close by requiring that a 
184 Compare The California Solar Initiative—CSI, GO SOLAR CAL., http://www.gosolarcalifornia.ca.gov/ 
csi/index.html (last visited May 1, 2011), and California’s Renewable Energy Programs, CAL. ENERGY 
COMM’N, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010), with PV Incentives,
POWER NATURALLY, http://www.powernaturally.org/programs/solar/incentives.asp (last visited May 1, 2011). 
185 Solar and Wind Energy Rebate Program, ILL. DEP’T OF COMMERCE & ECON. OPPORTUNITY,
http://www.commerce.state.il.us/dceo/Bureaus/Energy_Recycling/Energy/Clean+Energy/01-RERP.htm (last 
visited May 1, 2011). 
186 Pennsylvania Clean Energy Communities Program, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, http://communities. 
trfund.com (last visited May 1, 2011). 
187 Bronin, supra note 167, at 883. 
188 McCauley et al., supra note 99, at 175, 184–87 tbl.3.2. 
189 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1804(A)–(B) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-2-124(1)(c)(I) (2010); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 62-16-4(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring that twenty percent of retail electricity sales come 
from renewables by January 1, 2020); N.M. CODE R. § 17.9.572.7 G (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring, for 2011 
through 2014, that at least one-half percent of the electricity from renewables come from distributed 
generation and that this percentage rise to three percent beginning in 2015). 
190 See Ryan Wiser & Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., State of the States: Update on RPS 
Policies and Progress 13 (Nov. 18, 2009) (PowerPoint presentation), http://www.cleanenergystates.org/ 
Meetings/RPS_Summit_09/WISER_RPS_Summit2009.pdf (showing that Washington and Nevada have 
multipliers for distributed generation). 
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developer of a new home offer to install or have someone else install a solar 
energy system for a prospective owner.191  Instead, the few state land-energy 
policies that address distributed renewables clarify that municipalities have 
authority to regulate renewables, require the accommodation of renewables 
through local codes, or, in some cases, direct the content of local renewable 
energy regulation.  Wisconsin’s approach, for example, is aggressive: it 
prohibits any political subdivision from placing “any restriction, either directly 
or in effect, on the installation or use of a wind energy system that is more 
restrictive than the rules promulgated” by the state.192  New York, more 
moderately, delegates discretionary authority to cities to pass regulations 
designed for “the accommodation of solar energy systems and equipment and 
access to sunlight necessary therefor.”193  This is important because the 
traditional understanding of local government zoning authority characterizes 
local governments as arms of the state that derive all of their powers from their 
state “parent.”194  Although all states have provided their local governments 
with some zoning authority through State Zoning Enabling Acts,195 those 
statutes may not clearly confer municipal authority to regulate renewable 
energy technologies.196
A few states have begun to clarify local zoning powers regarding the 
installation of distributed renewables.  California, for example, provides that if 
municipalities require approval of a solar energy system installation, they must 
follow the process that they apply to an “architectural modification of the 
property,” and that the solar approval “shall not be willfully avoided or 
delayed.”197  The regulation also subjects solar energy systems to state and 
federal standards, requiring, for example, that they meet applicable state and 
local “health and safety standards and requirements” and national safety and 
performance standards within model codes, and that certain solar energy 
191 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27D-141.4(a) (West 2010). 
192 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 66.0401(1m) (West Supp. 2010). 
193 N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20 (McKinney 2003). 
194 Richard Briffault, Our Localism: The Structure of Local Government Law (pt. 1), 90 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 7–9 (1990) (describing how conventional theory sees the local government as “a creature of the state” and 
how under Dillon’s Rule, which only allows local governments to exercise expressly granted powers, “[t]he 
scope of local power is further affected”). 
195 Francesca Ortiz, Zoning the Voyeur Dorm: Regulating the Home-Based Voyeur Web Sites Through 
Land Use Laws, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 929, 939 n.44 (2001) (“All states have adopted enabling acts modeled 
after the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act . . . .”). 
196 See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2346 (2003) (describing the 
limits of zoning enabling acts). 
197 CAL. CIV. CODE § 714(e)(1) (West Supp. 2010). 
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systems be certified by national rating corporations.198  The state adds teeth to 
these rules by prohibiting municipalities who fail to comply from receiving 
state-funded solar grants or loans.199
California, unlike the few states that have addressed distributed renewables 
and have focused primarily on solar permitting, also dictates a wind turbine 
permitting process for counties.  It allows counties to adopt ordinances 
“provid[ing] for the installation of small wind energy systems located outside 
an urbanized area, but within the county’s jurisdiction,”200 and it requires the 
counties, in approving applications under the ordinance, to follow streamlined 
permitting procedures.201  County ordinances may establish specific 
requirements for the distance between the turbine and the property line, turbine 
height, and “view protection, aesthetics, aviation, and design-safety 
requirements,”202 but the state also partially restricts counties’ powers.  
Counties may only allow turbines of a certain height (conditioned upon the 
acreage of the property), minimum setback distances may generally only match 
the height of the tower, the system “shall not substantially obstruct views of 
adjacent property owners,” and turbine noise shall not exceed 60 decibel 
levels, or a lower decibel level required within a general zoning plan.203
Through these regulations, California has granted a good deal of authority over 
the installation of distributed generation to counties operating outside of city 
and town lines but has cabined these powers within state land-energy 
standards. 
Arizona does not address permitting for wind turbines but does specify 
standards for municipal issuance of solar permits.204  It directs cities and towns 
to require that construction plans show the location of the solar energy system, 
for example, and to require that installation plans show how the panel will be 
attached to the structure.205  It also limits the standards that municipalities may 
impose—preventing them from requiring official approval of a solar energy 
system from a professional engineer unless “necessary,” for instance.206
198 Id. § 714(c)(1)–(3). 
199 Id. § 714(h)(1). 
200 CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65896(a) (Deering 2010). 
201 Id. § 65896(b). 
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-468 (Supp. 2009). 
205 Id. § 9-468.A.1(a)–(b). 
206 Id. § 9-468.A.1(e). 
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Further, a municipality in Arizona may only assess building or permit fees for 
any solar permits required to defray the cost of issuing the permit.207
In sum, several states have either inserted themselves into the land-energy 
rule-making process or have directed municipalities to enable distributed 
renewables through their own land-energy rules.  Just as much or more action, 
however, has occurred at the local level. 
c. Local Initiatives and Barriers 
Local governments, perhaps more than their federal and state counterparts, 
have represented the extremes in land-energy rules.  Some have banned 
distributed renewables, and others have actively encouraged them.  Many cities 
are acting as their own renewables pioneers.  Chicago,208 Houston,209
Phoenix,210 Dallas,211 San Diego,212 and San Jose,213 for example, have all 
installed or are in the process of installing solar panels on city buildings and 
structures.  Phoenix wants fifteen percent “of the energy used by the city [to] 
come from renewable energy sources” by 2025 and aims to achieve this goal 
“through city-owned and city-sponsored projects, primarily through public-
private projects.”214  And in 2009, the City of San Jose declared that it would 
“[r]eceive 100 percent” of its electrical power “from clean renewable sources” 
207 Id. § 9-468.B. 
208 Future Initiatives, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/future_ 
initiatives/51.php (last visited May 1, 2011). 
209 Sustainability Projects—Energy Sources, GREEN HOUS., http://www.greenhoustontx.gov/epr-
energysources.html (last visited May 1, 2011). 
210 Solar and Other Renewable Energy Projects, CITY OF PHX., http://phoenix.gov/greenphoenix/ 
sustainability/solarproj.html (last visited May 1, 2011). 
211 Dallas City Hall, Toward a Sustainable Dallas 24 (Oct. 17, 2007) (PowerPoint presentation), 
http://www.greendallas.net/pdfs/SustainableDallas_101707.pdf. 
212 In 2006, “[t]hree new solar panel systems were commissioned”—one on a recreation center, and two 
on city libraries.  City Energy Accomplishments 2006, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sandiego.gov/ 
environmental-services/energy/programsprojects/accomplishments/2006.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011).  In 
2005, the city produced a total of 153,000 megawatt-hours of renewable electricity annually.  City Energy 
Accomplishments 2005, CITY OF SAN DIEGO, http://www.sandiego.gov/environmental-services/energy/ 
programsprojects/accomplishments/2005.shtml (last visited May 1, 2011).  Some of this was from photovoltaic 
panels on eleven city buildings.  Id.
213 Memorandum from John Stufflebean, Dir., Envtl. Servs., to Transp. & Env’t Comm., City of San Jose 
3 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at http://www.sanjoseca.gov/clerk/CommitteeAgenda/TE/082707/TE082707_ 
4.pdf. 
214 CITY OF PHX., PHOENIX: LIVING LIKE IT MATTERS! ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM 28 
(2008), available at http://phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/@inter/@env/@sustain/documents/ 
web_content/021142.pdf. 
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within fifteen years by working “in tandem with its residents and 
businesses.”215
In zoning and building codes, cities and towns are also slowly moving 
toward rules that enable a smooth permitting and installation process for 
distributed renewables.  Woodbury, Minnesota, includes residential wind 
turbines as a “permitted accessory use” in several zoning districts and clearly 
outlines safety standards and aesthetic requirements for the turbines.216
Winnebago County, Illinois, recently passed an ordinance “designating wind 
farms in the county as a permitted use,” meaning that individuals and 
developers wishing to install one or more wind turbines will not need to obtain 
individualized special-use approval for their projects.217  Wayne, New Jersey, 
has established “minimum standards to which a small wind energy system is to 
be installed.”218  On the distributed solar front, Austin, Texas, includes “solar 
collectors” as a permitted “accessory use” in residential districts219 and adds its 
own construction- and safety-related requirements220 to the Uniform Solar 
Energy Code,221 which it adopts in large part.222  Despite these encouraging 
efforts, a search through large cities’ municipal codes demonstrates that most 
barely acknowledge the existence of distributed renewables.  Their building 
codes do not contain minimum standards for the construction or installation of 
these technologies.  They do not describe how solar panels are to be mounted 
on roofs, for example, or minimum cable strengths required to secure wind 
turbines.  Their zoning codes also generally fail to include wind turbines or 
solar panels within permitted accessory uses or to place minimum setback or 
maximum height requirements on wind turbines.  This leaves renewables 
pioneers in the difficult position of guessing, only to be rebuffed by the 
planning board and courts,223 often after having invested a substantial sum of 
money in a renewables project.224
215 CITY OF SAN JOSE, supra note 102, at 2. 
216 WOODBURY, MINN., MUN. CODE § 24-405 (2010), available at http://library1.municode.com/default-
now/home.htm?infobase=14365&doc_action=whatsnew. 
217 Illinois Board Passes Ordinance, 6 N. AM. WIND POWER 47 (2009). 
218 TOWNSHIP OF WAYNE, N.J., MUN. CODE § 211-126(2) (2009), available at http://ecode360.com/ 
?custId=WA0473. 
219 AUSTIN, TEX., MUN. CODE § 25-2-893 (2010), available at http://www.amlegal.com/nxt/gateway.dll/ 
Texas/austin/thecodeofthecityofaustintexas?f=templates$fn=default.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:austin_tx$anc=. 
220 Id. § 25-12-191. 
221 INT’L ASS’N OF PLUMBING & MECH. OFFICIALS, UNIFORM SOLAR ENERGY CODE (2009). 
222 AUSTIN, TEX., MUN. CODE § 25-12-193. 
223 See, e.g., Goodnough, supra note 115, and accompanying text. 
224 See Goodnough, supra note 115.  The landowner had spent about $30,000 in preparatory construction 
work for the wind turbine project, which was denied by the town planning commission.  Id.
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Although many municipalities have failed to address the distributed 
renewables issue at all—thus leaving a void for the renewables pioneers—
others have approached the issue from opposite extremes, either providing 
clear standards for how and where renewable technologies may be constructed, 
or, alternatively, banning the technologies or severely limiting their use.225
Given the current landscape of land-energy rules, the important theoretical 
question that follows is about what should be done to move forward: Which 
level of government, regardless of its current approach to renewable energy, is 
best suited to encourage innovation in distributed renewables technology and 
should therefore be empowered to regulate it?  We take up this question in the 
next Part. 
II. INSTITUTIONS
Increasing total distributed renewable energy generation and the adoption 
rate of distributed technologies—which we have argued is essential to 
America’s future energy infrastructure—requires a substantial policy shift to 
encourage promulgation of renewables-supporting land-energy rules.  Yet the 
substantive benefits of a policy proposal seldom provide sufficient independent 
justification for adoption.  Implementation must also be considered, and we 
turn to implementation questions now.  The complexities of America’s 
multilayered federal system raise two categories of questions.  First, there are 
questions about which level of government—federal, state, local, or some 
combination of these—will be, as a matter of relative institutional competence, 
most likely to facilitate the operation of energy entrepreneurs, spur innovation 
in distributed renewable technologies, and promote increased use of distributed 
renewables if given authority for implementing energy policy.  Second, there 
are constitutional and other legal questions about the permissibility of actually 
allocating implementation authority and costs in the way that comparative 
institutional analysis suggests would be optimal.  We address both sets of 
questions in this Part. 
A. Theoretical Dilemmas 
The ideal level of governance for land-energy rules that support the 
implementation of distributed renewables is best determined by looking to the 
225 Patricia E. Salkin, New York Climate Change Report Card: Improvement Needed for More Effective 
Leadership and Overall Coordination with Local Government, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 946 (2009) 
(explaining that some New York municipalities are banning wind turbines through their zoning codes). 
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broader literature of environmental regulation.  Renewables are, after all, 
inherently connected to pressing natural resource issues.  Siting renewable 
production devices impacts scarce land resources,226 and the use of renewable 
fuels reduces the quantities of greenhouse gases and other pollutants emitted in 
the production of energy.227
Analysis of the intergovernmental dynamics of environmental regulation 
has gained nuance since the push for centralized federal pollution control 
legislation in the 1970s and 1980s.228  A natural reaction to a salient 
environmental crisis like global climate change may be to demand direct 
intervention from the highest level of government, and the importance of 
federal leadership in environmental regulation cannot be overstated.  But a 
moment’s reflection reveals that environmental problems are everyone’s 
problems; it therefore makes sense that all levels of government should be 
involved in solving them.  As Daniel Rodriguez has noted, “The necessity of 
inter-governmental collaboration is a settled principle in the emerging 
literature on biodiversity protection,”229 and, increasingly, the broader 
environmental literature recognizes the importance of cooperative 
intergovernmental solutions, including regimes of federal–local government 
cooperation.230  Existing law reflects this trend, as many major federal 
226 See, e.g., Theocharis Tsoutsos et al., Environmental Impacts from the Solar Energy Technologies, 33 
ENERGY POL’Y 289, 291 tbl.2 (2005) (summarizing some of the land use impacts of solar technologies, such as 
“[r]eduction of cultivable land” and “[i]mpact on ecosystems”).  But see Denholm & Margolis, supra note 88, 
at 3541 (estimating that for the United States to supply all of its electricity using solar generation, only 0.6% of 
total U.S. land area would be required). 
227 See, e.g., Tsoutsos et al., supra note 226, at 290 (summarizing the carbon dioxide emissions savings of 
solar compared to combined-cycle and coal-fired power plants). 
228 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13 (setting out seminal economic arguments for centralized federal 
environmental regulation); Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional 
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV.
713, 747 (1977) (summarizing similar arguments).  But see Revesz, supra note 15, at 1210 (critiquing 
Stewart). 
229 Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Role of Legal Innovation in Ecosystem Management: Perspectives from 
American Local Government Law, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 745, 747–48 (1997). 
230 See, e.g., David E. Adelman & Kirsten H. Engel, Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce 
Technological Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 835, 840 (2008) (arguing for both a federal and state role in 
regulating to reduce greenhouse gas emissions); Buzbee, supra note 22, at 108 (emphasizing “the benefits of 
regulatory overlap, cooperative federalism structures, and redundant enforcement mechanisms” in 
environmental regulation); Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–08 (noting “cooperative federalism” regimes 
operate in a number of substantive environmental areas and a turn in the literature toward more “contextual” or 
“dynamic” conceptions of intergovernmental relations); Robert L. Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A 
Collective Action Perspective on Federalism Considerations, 41 ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 
6–10), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1667533 (analyzing several models for 
intergovernmental collaboration in regulatory efforts to foster adaptation to climate change); John R. Nolon, In 
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environmental statutes—the federal Clean Air and Clean Water Acts, for 
example—require the cooperation of state and local governments for 
implementation.231  But the best specific allocation of regulatory roles among 
the levels of government in the distributed renewable energy context has not 
been explored.  We seek to fill that gap in this Part. 
We begin in this section with an examination of central debates in two 
relevant, but abstract, fields: the economic analysis of law and positive 
political theory.  Working through these debates does not yield a clear answer 
to the question of the optimal allocation of regulatory authority over distributed 
renewable energy issues.  Both strands of theory suggest, at most, that a mixed 
regime involving more than a single level of government likely will be more 
effective than unilateral action.  However, and importantly, examining the 
relevant theses in these literatures yields critical insight into the kinds of 
considerations that must be addressed in the project of constructing a 
potentially fruitful allocation of authority in this context.  In the next section, 
we consider additional factors, unique to the distributed renewables context, 
which also impact the proper allocation of distributed renewable authority. 
1. The Efficiency Debate 
One challenge in determining an optimal level of land-energy governance 
for distributed renewables arises from the ongoing centralization versus 
decentralization debate in the law and economics literature on environmental 
regulation.232  A familiar argument for centralized environmental regulation is 
Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365, 372–77, 
410–13 (2002) (canvassing local environmental initiatives, arguing for collaboration among federal, state, and 
local environmental policymakers); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads 
of a National Land Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 392 (2002) (noting federal-local cooperation in 
brownfield redevelopment); A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What Is Its Niche?,
60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 581–82 (1993) [hereinafter Tarlock, Biodiversity] (federal-local collaboration in 
management of sensitive wetlands); A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed 
Management, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2002) (similar); see also Timothy F. Malloy, The Social 
Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 269 
(2010) (arguing that even academic commentary on the proper allocation of regulatory authority among the 
levels of government is insufficiently attentive to context-dependent considerations). 
231 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409–
7410 (2006); Buzbee, supra note 16, at 1565–66; Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07. 
232 See generally Stewart, supra note 13 (setting out the classical race to the bottom argument for 
centralized environmental standard-setting); Stewart, supra note 228 (similar); Revesz, supra note 15 
(mounting a seminal critique of classical law and economics justifications for federal, rather than state, 
authority in environmental regulation); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a 
“Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997) (critiquing Revesz’s work); Daniel C. Esty, 
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the risk that absent federal control, state regulation will generate negative 
interstate externalities.  Environmentally harmful activities often have effects 
that cross state lines, and individual states will have incentives to regulate only 
to the extent that in-state benefits captured offset the costs of regulation—
political capital costs, remediation costs, jobs and other economic benefits lost 
when tough environmental laws drive away industry.233  In other words, 
individual states with discretion over environmental regulation will lack 
sufficient incentive to regulate optimally to reduce harm to their own citizens 
as well as to the citizens of “downwind states.”234  This argument is 
particularly salient—and correct, we believe—for regulations addressing air 
pollutants (including greenhouse gases) and water pollutants that harm 
transboundary aquifers, rivers, or other water bodies.  In these cases, the 
physical pollutants and their effects are unconstrained by geographic 
boundaries and are, at least with respect to providing a regulatory floor to 
prevent harm to the natural resources and human health, best addressed at a 
federal level.  Another traditional argument for federal control is a version of 
Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996) (same); Scott R. Saleska & Kirsten H. 
Engel, “Facts Are Stubborn Things”: An Empirical Reality Check in the Theoretical Debate over the Race-to-
the-Bottom in State Environmental Standard-Setting, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55 (1998) (same); Daniel 
A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283 (1997) (defending 
decentralization); Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities and the Matching Principle: The Case 
for Reallocating Environmental Regulatory Authority, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1996) (same); Richard B. 
Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (critiquing 
Revesz’s rationale for decentralization). 
233 Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23, 29 (1983) 
(“One of the common justifications for federal air pollution legislation is that, because no one state’s residents 
can collect all the benefits of cleaner air (which, after all, drifts east, while dirty air comes in with the breeze), 
the states lack the proper incentives to legislate.”); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1211–16 (“Given the mobility of 
industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally decline unilaterally to adopt high 
environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry . . . for fear that the resulting environmental 
gains will be more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.  If each locality 
reasons in the same way, all will adopt lower standards of environmental quality than they would prefer if 
there were some binding mechanism that enabled them simultaneously to enact higher standards, thus 
eliminating the threatened loss of industry or development.” (footnote omitted)). 
234 See HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY 17 (1996) (arguing against the significance of these phenomena and advocating decentralization); 
Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104 (summarizing the race to the bottom argument); Revesz, supra note 15, at 
1222 (noting, but critiquing, the economic assumptions supporting the environmental race to the bottom 
scenario); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1211–16 (providing the canonical formulation of economic-theory-based 
concerns about autonomous state environmental policy making); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the 
Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 67, 99–100 (1996) (reviewing these arguments). 
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the prisoner’s dilemma from noncooperative game theory.235  The claim is that, 
absent federal regulation, failures in the national market for “industrial firm 
location” provide economic incentives for state governments to “race to the 
bottom”—competing to attract industry by decreasing the stringency of 
environmental requirements.236
One response supporting decentralizing environmental regulatory authority 
draws on Charles Tiebout’s argument that competition among jurisdictions for 
residents through the provision of varying packages of regulation and taxation 
resembles competition in private markets.237  Wallace Oates and Robert 
Schwab, for example, argue that states’ or municipalities’ potential loss of 
residents could in some circumstances offset industrial gains from laxer 
environmental standards, reducing the risk of races to the bottom.238  Indeed, 
Oates and Schwab concluded, when modeled on a particular set of 
assumptions, that intergovernmental competition might produce socially 
optimal levels of environmental regulation.239  Richard Revesz has argued that 
this analysis supports a default rule of decentralized rather than centralized 
environmental authority.240
Theoretical projections about efficiency in environmental regulation 
purport to predict which level of government will, in fact, be most efficient in 
providing regulatory goods.241  Some base normative claims on such 
predictions—Revesz, for example, argues that we should redistribute primary 
regulatory authority to the level of government that will regulate most 
efficiently.242  He predicts that, most of the time, this will be the state 
governments.243  But claims about the efficiency of decentralizing 
235 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 55–56.  On the prisoner’s dilemma, see generally ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7–11 (1984), and SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS 
VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY 146–66 (1995). 
236 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1213–20; Stewart, supra note 13, at 1210–12. 
237 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104–05 (drawing on Tiebout’s theorem to argue for state 
environmental authority); Revesz, supra note 15 (same).  See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
238 Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: Efficiency 
Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 335–42 (1988). 
239 Id. at 342. 
240 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1253 (“[F]orces of interstate competition, far from being conclusively 
undesirable, are at least presumptively beneficial.”). 
241 See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 60 (noting that the question of whether races to the bottom in 
fact occur “is, at bottom, an empirical question”). 
242 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1211–12; Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 58–59. 
243 See Revesz, supra note 15, at 1253–54. 
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environmental regulatory power have met with stiff criticism.244  Aside from 
methodological critiques, the day-to-day uncertainties and information deficits 
that policymakers face render the “assumptions of perfect measurement” made 
in the underlying economic model on which Revesz relies contestable and thus 
not supportive of a general normative claim.245
Beyond the theory, an empirical study addressing the race to the bottom 
suggests that, although substantial evidence shows that relaxing environmental 
standards does little or nothing to enhance a state’s economic performance or 
attract new industry,246 state policymakers nevertheless appear to erroneously 
believe that lowering environmental standards will yield such benefits; some 
risk of races to the bottom therefore remains.247  It is common to regard cities 
as economic “growth engines”—they have perhaps the strongest set of 
incentives of any level of government to pursue policies aimed at enhancing 
the local economy248—so the risk of races to the bottom driven by the desire to 
attract industry seems real, perhaps even heightened, at the local government 
level.  Nevertheless, the broader empirical question of which option—
centralization or decentralization of environmental regulation (including land-
energy rules)—is generally most efficient remains unresolved.249  And the 
emerging scholarly consensus appears to be that these broad questions are 
simply the wrong questions.  Instead, perhaps, we should assess 
interjurisdictional regulatory competition in different environmental policy 
244 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 232; Esty, supra note 232; Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 57 (noting 
that Revesz’s arguments are rooted in neoclassical economic theory, while the race to the bottom argument 
rests in noncooperative game theory). 
245 The contestable assumptions include assumptions that state regulators know how much new business 
they may attract by lowering environmental standards, how many jobs will be created or wages increased, how 
much environmental harm will result, and the preferences of their constituents.  See Swire, supra note 234, at 
95–96; see also Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106 (calling Swire’s critique of Revesz “[a]mong the most 
cogent”). 
246 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 66–69 & tbl.1 (competitive environmental standard-setting does 
not enhance state economic performance); id. at 74 (industry mobility unaffected by relaxation of state 
environmental standards); see also Engel, supra note 232, at 346 (same). 
247 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 74–76; see also Engel, supra note 232, at 340 (noting potential 
political reasons why state officials might overstate the risk of industry relocation in standard-relaxation 
deliberations). 
248 See PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 22–38 (1981). 
249 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1105; Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving 
Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 6 (2005) (“[I]t has been easy for federal policy 
advocates to show that state policy is often ineffective and/or ill-advised, but more difficult to show that its 
irrationality would skew state policy in one direction (toward deregulation) . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
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areas to better understand the level of government that would most efficiently 
regulate various types of environmentally harmful activity.250
In the end, then, the efficiency debate leaves us with no general answer to 
the institutional-choice question in the context of distributed renewables.  
Leaving aside the observation that efficiency in the “provision of 
environmental goods” may not be the best criterion for evaluating 
environmental policy,251 there simply is no economic justification for lodging 
all environmental regulatory power at any one level of government.  At best, 
the literature shows that the question of efficiency in the allocation of 
regulatory power is complex, that the proper allocation likely varies from one 
environmental policy area to another—air and water pollutants with effects 
beyond state boundaries clearly merit federal regulation, for example—and 
that races to the bottom remain a risk at the subnational level.  Although there 
is no empirical evidence to suggest that the economic dynamics differ 
substantially from the general field of environmental regulation to the specific 
subject of distributed renewables policy, differences in the nature of 
technologies and business interests may raise distinct issues.252  For now, we 
assume relative similarity between environmental and distributed renewables 
regulation and that decentralizing regulatory authority to the state or local 
government level risks a race to the bottom.  We address remedies for that risk 
in Part II.B, below. 
2. The Politics Debate 
A second theoretical dilemma in identifying an optimal level of land-
energy governance cautions against too hasty a leap toward vesting primary 
regulatory authority in state or local governments.  This dilemma arises from 
the literature applying public choice theory to environmental regulation.253
Public choice theory holds that government policy is disproportionately shaped 
250 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 22, at 112–13; Carlson, supra note 17, at 1107; Kirsten H. Engel, 
Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 163–64 (2006) 
(contrasting “static economic models used to justify a preferred allocation of regulatory authority between the 
states and the federal government” with “the modern scholarly debate over environmental federalism[, which] 
seeks to determine the proper allocation of regulatory authority . . . with respect to specific environmental 
problems”); Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 746. 
251 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07 (criticizing the emphasis on efficiency in light of a more 
contextual framework); Swire, supra note 234, at 75–76 (criticizing the use of efficiency as the measure of 
sound environmental policy). 
252 We will take up this question again in later work. 
253 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104. 
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by the preferences of concentrated interest groups that provide significant 
electoral support for representatives and thereby secure access and influence 
over those representatives’ decisions.254  It thus highlights the importance of 
understanding the alignment and actions of relevant interest groups in 
describing the causes of past policy outcomes and predicting future 
outcomes.255  The classical objection is that interest groups that favor lax 
environmental regulation and have high individual stakes in regulatory 
outcomes—paradigmatically industry groups—tend to be small and cohesive, 
but groups favoring stricter environmental regulation tend to be more diffuse 
and less organized.256  This disparity in political power, from the perspective of 
economies of scale in political organization and advocacy of the two camps, is 
exacerbated at the state and local government levels.257  Diffuse environmental 
interests may muster the resources to organize and act within a single political 
forum, but organizing at multiple state or government locations would be too 
taxing upon their relatively undisciplined and typically underfunded 
infrastructures.258  Interests favoring laxer regulation, by contrast, are thought 
to possess relatively greater capacity to organize and advocate in multiple 
254 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991). 
255 Some think that interest group influence is the dominant force in shaping legislative outcomes 
generally.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 229 (1986).  But this view has its detractors, 
too.  See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 254, at 22–23. 
256 See, e.g., Esty, supra note 232, at 597–98 (“[T]he costs of environmental regulation are generally more 
concentrated and tangible than the benefits.  Costs are often borne by particular industries or enterprises, and 
are translated readily into monetary terms.  Benefits, however, accrue to the general public in ways that are 
hard to discern and monetize.” (footnote omitted)); Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 64 (“According to the 
economic theory of regulation, laws tend to respond to the wants of small, cohesive special interest groups, 
such as industry, at the expense of the wants of the larger, more diffuse public.  The public, which is the 
intended beneficiary of stringent regulation, is often in a weaker political position than industry, which is the 
primary beneficiary of less regulation.” (footnote omitted)); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213 (similar); Swire, 
supra note 234, at 101. 
257 See Esty, supra note 232, at 598; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A 
Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559–61 (2001) (describing this as the “dominant claim 
among supporters of federal regulation on public choice grounds”); Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Continuing 
Imperative (but Only from a National Perspective) for Federal Environmental Protection, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y F. 225, 285–86 (1997). 
258 See, e.g., Sarnoff, supra note 257, at 285–86 (arguing that interests seeking stricter environmental 
protection, because of their nature and composition, “may be more successful than ‘concentrated’ compliance 
interests in affecting legislative and bureaucratic policy at the federal level than at the state level” due to 
“economies of scale and reduced transaction costs for organizing and lobbying” (footnote omitted)); Esty, 
supra note 232, at 650–51 & n.302 (similar); Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213 (similar). 
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government forums and thus enjoy a comparative advantage.259  Comparative 
institutional analysis thus suggests that federal environmental authority is 
preferable to state or local authority because the federal level is the most 
efficient receiver of broadly shared but often under-organized public interests 
in environmental protection, which are needed to counterbalance industrial 
interests that would otherwise dominate the political process and impose their 
narrow interests on the unwitting public.260
The public choice claim is a sophisticated version of the traditional 
“tragedy of the commons” argument,261 and it is typically tied to Mancur 
Olson’s work on collective action problems.  Olson suggested that individuals 
generally will prefer to pursue their own interests where they conflict with 
common goals of the group, that cohesive interest groups—industry groups, 
for example—will push their own agendas as far as their influence allows even 
where doing so diminishes the public good, and that disparities in interest 
group influence explain many policy outcomes.262  As with general claims 
from the law and economics literature, the emerging consensus among scholars 
is that the complexities of interjurisdictional environmental policy require 
more nuanced analysis.263  For one thing, Olson’s account does not directly 
suggest that federal regulatory power is the solution to the disparity in 
259 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 13, at 1213–14 (“Centralized decisionmaking may imply similar scale 
economies for industrial firms, but these are likely to be of lesser magnitude—particularly if such firms are 
already national in scope.”). 
260 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 560–61. 
261 As Dan Rodriguez summarizes it, “[T]he ‘tragedy of the commons[]’ . . . is[] basically the idea that 
individual landowners have incentives to exploit natural resources to fulfill their own private interests at the 
expense of the long-term interests of the commonwealth.”  Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 748–49.  See 
generally ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 1–8 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).  In the context of comparative organizational capacity among interests, the lax-
regulation-seeking industry groups influence the political process in a manner designed to facilitate their 
exploitation of natural resources at the expense of the public interest which is too diffuse and intangible to 
serve as an effective rallying point for opposing interest-group mobilization. 
262 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY 
OF GROUPS (1971) [hereinafter OLSON, GROUPS] (providing an account of the factors that cause individual 
group members to act in their own interests even when such action hampers the promotion of interests 
common to the group); MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982) [hereinafter OLSON, NATIONS] (developing his account of group 
dynamics to posit an explanation for economic decline in developed countries as attributable in part to the 
growth of politically powerful interest groups with diverging interests).  See also Glicksman, supra note 230 
(manuscript at 14–18) (discussing the implications of Olson’s and related work for allocating climate 
regulatory authority among levels of American government). 
263 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104 (noting that the public choice case for or against centralized 
federal regulatory power is unsettled); Revesz, supra note 257, at 576–77; sources cited supra note 250. 
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influence between industry and environmental groups.264  Several factors 
suggest that subnational governments may in fact constitute forums in which 
industry and environmental interests might be more evenly matched than at the 
federal level.  First, advocacy groups at the subnational level are likely to be 
smaller in size, and smaller groups will have fewer free riders; cost-bearing 
members of the group may be more likely to have sufficient incentives to 
counterbalance the costs of acting and maintaining the organization.265
Second, action by smaller groups in subnational governmental proceedings 
presents lower organizational and political entry costs, making it cheaper for 
interest groups to coalesce and achieve initial policy victories that can enhance 
cohesion and lower organizational costs over time.266  And third, smaller 
groups representing a geographically discrete set of interests are likely to have 
greater interest-homogeneity among members, which may also enhance group 
cohesiveness, reduce the number of free riders, and channel group resources 
into clear policy initiatives.267  These factors suggest that the best forum for 
advocates of stricter environmental regulation (including regulation that 
encourages distributed renewables) is the state or local level, not the federal 
level.268  They mesh well with the traditional hypothesis, found in the technical 
literature on social movements, that individual policy entrepreneurs alter the 
264 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 560–71. 
265 See OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262, at 21–22 (describing the free-rider problems endemic to all 
groups, regardless of size, but suggesting that they may be less detrimental in smaller groups); Revesz, supra
note 257, at 560–61. 
266 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 561–62; see also OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262, at 22 (discussing the 
unusually high cost of obtaining a group’s first unit of shared benefit). 
267 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 563 (“[N]ational aggregation of environmental interests results in the 
loss of homogeneity of interests . . . .  [E]nvironmentalists in Massachusetts may care primarily about air 
quality, whereas environmentalists in Colorado may care more about limitations on logging on public lands.  
[All else] equal, state-based environmental groups seeking, respectively, better air quality in Massachusetts 
and more protection of public lands in Colorado are likely to be more effective than a national environmental 
group seeking both improvements at the federal level.”); see also OLSON, NATIONS, supra note 262, at 24 
(arguing that “socially heterogeneous groups . . . are less likely to agree on the exact nature of whatever 
collective good is at issue or on how much of it is worth buying,” so that, in such groups, “collective action 
can become still less likely”); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of 
Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 132 (1999) (highlighting the importance of policy wins to 
interest groups, whose “ongoing existence depends on success in furthering their agenda”); Daniel A. Farber, 
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 70–75 (1992) (noting that 
environmental interest groups benefit from policy success since “the passage of environmental legislation 
creates a new set of environmental entitlements,” which, when under-implemented or otherwise threatened, 
provide groups with additional means to “spark increased organizational involvement”). 
268 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 578–626 (highlighting progressive state government environmental 
regulatory efforts as evidence suggesting environmental interests do succeed at the state government level and 
that the public choice justification for any particular allocation of regulatory power will be substantially more 
complicated than the standard, pro-centralization claim). 
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social and political dynamics surrounding certain issues.269  We return to this 
point in the next section. 
Despite these theoretical contentions, empirical analysis of the attitudes of 
state regulators and legislators, aimed at explaining the continuing risk of races 
to the bottom, appears to support the initial public choice critique of 
decentralization.270  State environmental regulators—bureaucrats—tend to 
come closer to correctly approximating the low relative value of relaxing 
environmental standards to attract industry and enhance economic 
performance271 than do state legislators, who tend to overvalue lax 
environmental standards.272  The dominant influence of state legislators in state 
environmental policy means that incorrect beliefs in the statehouses may 
explain why race to the bottom dynamics persist despite the absence of any 
real economic benefit.273  Legislative misperception of the economic benefits 
of under-regulation may result from ignorance, but it may also represent a 
rational calculation; state legislators have incentives to deliver policy benefits 
to their supporters, and concessions in the form of relaxed environmental 
standards, like monetary subsidies, constitute visible “deliverables” that 
legislators are motivated to provide.274  In addition, even if the industry-
attracting potential is uncertain, the opportunity to claim a visible policy win if 
industry does decide to move into the state—and to avoid the blame that would 
flow from having declined to relax environmental standards if industry stays 
away—provides powerful motivation for legislators to relax environmental 
standards.275  For example, in 2003 the Ohio legislature rejected bills that 
would have required utilities to gradually increase the portion of electricity 
generated from renewable sources.276  The concern, according to the chair of 
269 See infra Part II.B.2.a. 
270 On the continuing risk of races to the bottom, see supra notes 246–49 and accompanying text. 
271 Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 76–77. 
272 Id. at 78–79. 
273 Id. at 78; Scott P. Hays et al., Environmental Commitment Among the States: Integrating Alternative 
Approaches to State Environmental Policy, PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM, Spring 1996, at 41 (highlighting state 
legislative influence in environmental policy making). 
274 See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 79, 83. 
275 Id. at 79–80 (comparing relaxation of environmental standards to relocation subsidies and arguing that 
“a politician is better off providing industry with a location subsidy than not providing such a subsidy since, by 
offering the subsidy, she can claim credit for the siting of new industry if a new plant does in fact choose to 
site locally, and can avoid blame if industry ends up siting somewhere else”); id. at 80 (“The relaxation of 
environmental standards may reduce a state’s overall social welfare, yet, at the same time, it may accrue 
sizable political benefits to the politician who claims credit for industry siting within the state.”). 
276 See Tom Henry, New Sources of Power: Proposals Seek to Tap Ohio’s Renewable Energy Potential,
TOLEDO BLADE, Nov. 14, 2004, at B1. 
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the committee in which the bills died, was that “driv[ing] the cost of energy 
higher [would] make it less likely that industries will locate in Ohio.”277
The same kinds of incentives likely motivate local policymakers, since 
they, too, may accrue substantial political benefits from industrial siting and 
economic development.  Although national legislators also have 
geographically bounded constituencies to whom they might “sell” industrial 
siting as a political win, the necessity of building coalitions among 
representatives of a variety of different areas to pass legislation makes such 
motivations less likely to succeed in shaping enactments at the national 
level.278
These observations weaken the claim that recent state environmental 
decisions show that state legislative forums provide better access to 
environmental interests than does Congress.279  The “receptiveness” of a 
governmental forum to environmental interests is in part a function of where 
those interests choose to concentrate their political resources, and that choice 
may vary with the political valence of various levels of government: 
Recent state enforcement activism proves little about inherent state 
environmentalism but instead reflects political opportunities opened 
up by a more anti-environmental shift in federal policy.  As long as 
our country at all levels is ruled by a system of elected government, 
then the degree of environmental fervor at each level will inevitably 
fluctuate.280
And such events do not undermine the broader observation that most real 
environmental progress in the United States has required some form of federal 
leadership.281
277 Id. (quoting then-Ohio Representative Lynn Olman) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also 
Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable Portfolio Standards 
(RPS), 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 10 (2007–2008) (discussing the Ohio proposals). 
278 See Saleska & Engel, supra note 232, at 83–84 (noting that the perverse incentives generated by 
industrial siting politics at the state level “are less likely to exist in federal environmental standard setting” 
because “[t]he uniform nature of most federal standards provides less opportunity for state representatives at 
the national level to use environmental standards to attract industry to particular states or localities”). 
279 See Revesz, supra note 257, at 583–626, 630–41; see also infra notes 382–89 and accompanying text. 
280 Buzbee, supra note 22, at 113.  This dynamic is just what modern federalism theory predicts in more 
general terms.  See Engel, supra note 250, at 180–81; Ernest A. Young, Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, 
Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival After Gonzales v Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 33. 
281 See Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 749 (“As hopeful as we might be about the prospects of ‘bottom-up’ 
local initiatives, the modern history of environmental regulation suggests that any real progress has taken place 
only where federal and state decisionmakers have pursued strategies either in tandem with local efforts or else 
as regulatory ushers of some sort.”). 
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Specific public choice dynamics from the environmental realm, however, 
suggest that environmental groups may benefit from operating at the local 
level; these dynamics are therefore relevant to evaluating the benefits of 
allocating authority over distributed renewables regulation to local 
governments.  First, local governments, compared to the state and federal 
governments, appear less likely to be targeted by the influential utility and 
carbon fuel lobbies that might vehemently resist a push for more renewable 
energy.282  These groups, although well established, entrenched, and influential 
at the federal and state government levels, nevertheless are limited in their 
capacity.283  They cannot be everywhere all of the time.  As a result, like any 
other organization, they must rely to some degree on “fire alarm” rather than 
“police patrol” monitoring of regulatory activity to alert them to initiatives on 
which their interests require intervention.284  Local government actions, 
because of their lower political profile, seem less likely to capture these 
lobbies’ attention as often as would state or federal actions.285  And given the 
small scale of the effects of local government actions, such groups may view 
losses at the local level as less consequential than higher level actions and 
accordingly allocate fewer resources to resisting local initiatives.286
282 See Santiago Bañales-López & Vicki Norberg-Bohm, Public Policy for Energy Technology 
Innovation: A Historical Analysis of Fluidized Bed Combustion Development in the USA, 30 ENERGY POL’Y
1173, 1176 (2002) (“Several sources suggest the conservatism of the traditional utility business works against 
taking risks with new technologies . . . .”); Bronin, supra note 11, at 568–70 (discussing utility resistance to 
renewable energy initiatives generally, noting that utilities are likely to resist microgrid programs—which 
allow individuals to supply energy to others—more strongly than laws that enhance individuals’ capacity to 
use distributed renewable devices for personal energy consumption); Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 101 
(“[E]arly dedication [to renewable energy was] unraveled by the mid-1980s during an era of cheaper fossil 
fuels and overt hostility to renewable energy from the utility and energy industries.”); cf. Robert R.M. 
Verchick, Why the Global Environment Needs Local Government: Lessons from the Johannesburg Summit, 35 
URB. LAW. 471, 476 n.24 (2003) (“[O]ne imagines that even those forces [that are powerful at the local level] 
can be unseated more easily by concentrated local opposition than is possible with, say, the aerospace or 
petroleum lobbies at the national level.”). 
283 Oil lobby influence in federal and state politics is well documented.  See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool 
& Kelly E. Sovacool, Preventing National Electricity-Water Crisis Areas in the United States, 34 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 333, 385–86 & nn.294–95 (2009) (“During important elections . . . [Greenpeace estimated that] oil 
and gas companies contributed about $255 million to political campaigns and electric utilities an additional 
$20 million for the 2004 election cycle.  From 2003 to 2006, fossil fuel lobbyists contributed about $58 million 
to state-level campaigns alone.  Over the same period, renewable energy lobbyists spent just over $500,000.”). 
284 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: 
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
285 Cf. Bronin, supra note 107 (manuscript at 28–29) (suggesting that while utilities constitute a major 
source of political opposition to alternative energy programs at the state government level, the primary source 
of such opposition in local government settings is “neighbors”). 
286 See supra notes 113–17 and accompanying text. 
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Incidents like the “Seaweed Rebellion” suggest that political interests 
contrary to those of carbon fuel groups may succeed at the local government 
level even if they are blocked at the federal and state levels.287  The Seaweed 
Rebellion involved citizens in a number of California cities who, dissatisfied 
with federal and state regulation of offshore drilling, overwhelmingly and 
successfully backed local zoning measures that prohibited the placement of 
necessary onshore processing facilities.288  Less frequent and intense 
adversarial lobbying efforts by the hostile industries at the local level, then, is 
one comparative advantage to allocating regulatory authority over renewables-
related land-energy decisions to local governments. 
Second, there is a sort of structural endowment effect that arises from the 
connection between deploying distributed renewable devices and land use 
regulation, which favors local authority.  The fact that local governments have 
exercised authority over land use issues for most of our history aids existing 
local groups. 
[It] ensures that there are durable interest groups in the form of both 
property owners and local decisionmakers who have a stake in 
preserving existing patterns of land use regulation and management.  
Even where property owners find themselves on the short end of the 
regulatory stick, their investment in relationships and patterns of 
influence in the processes of land management makes preservation of 
the status quo regulatory arrangements in their long-term interest.289
Where private property owners are also environmental advocates, their 
interests will be more readily advanced if they can align their environmental 
goals with local governments’ and property owners’ interests in the stability of 
local land use regulatory authority.  Fostering distributed renewable energy 
technology in a community inevitably requires modification of land-energy 
rules.  Accordingly, property-owning advocates will have incentives to pursue 
strategies that maintain local government decision-making authority on the 
land use questions even if they wish to alter the substantive outcomes of those 
287 See EDWARD A. FITZGERALD, THE SEAWEED REBELLION: FEDERAL-STATE CONFLICTS OVER 
OFFSHORE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT 1–2, 28 (2001) (giving the history of the conflict). 
288 ROBERT SOLLEN, AN OCEAN OF OIL: A CENTURY OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE OVER PETROLEUM OFF THE 
CALIFORNIA COAST 12, 169–71 (1998); see also Edward A. Fitzgerald, California Coastal Commission v. 
Norton: A Coastal State Victory in the Seaweed Rebellion, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 155, 155 (2004) 
(describing how local resistance to offshore drilling has affected the extent to which statutes, regulations, and 
judicial decisions create roles for state or local governments in regulating offshore activities). 
289 Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 751. 
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decisions.290  The potential for these sets of interests to converge on shared 
policy outcomes also suggests that distributed renewable technology advocates 
may be most effective if they concentrate their efforts at the local, rather than 
federal, level. 
But the connection between distributed-renewables implementation and 
land use rules raises a particular worry, too, that cuts back against the case for 
local government authority.  In local governments, our hypothetically 
progressive, distributed-renewables-favoring property owner will face 
opposition from a set of influential and entrenched interests with incentives to 
maintain the substance of status quo land-energy rules.291  Opponents likely 
will include developers and transportation- and utility-related businesses, who 
tend to exercise significant influence in local land use decision making and 
favor policies that grant them flexibility in carrying out their operations.292
These groups may be predisposed to resist changes to land-energy rules 
designed to foster distributed renewables, since such changes likely will be 
viewed as disruptive alterations to business as usual, requiring large up-front 
investments.293  Powerful “homevoters,” in turn, will make aesthetic arguments 
against land-energy rules that accommodate the installation of distributed 
renewable generation.294  If renewable energy interests face entrenched 
290 See id. at 751–52 (“[T]he municipality/property owner relationship is one of mutual interdependence.  
To the extent that private property owners’ and public officials’ interests converge, there is a combination 
formed that has very strong incentives to resist relinquishing control to other, more central authorities.”). 
291 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 726, 734–36 (2010) 
(discussing the influence of developers and other business interests in local land use decision making). 
292 See id. at 726 (discussing developers’ incentives to favor land use policies that enhance their own 
discretion); Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81–82. 
293 See Wiseman, supra note 291, at 726, 735–36; Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81–82.  This kind of 
political dynamic seems likely to be at work in those cities that have gone nowhere, or even backward, on the 
renewable energy front.  See Sara C. Bronin, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use 
Regulation, and the States, 93 MINN. L. REV. 231, 249–55 (2008) (discussing examples of local inaction on 
and resistance to green building initiatives, suggesting “homevoter” resistance as one causal factor); supra
notes 223–27 and accompanying text (noting local resistance to, or inaction on, renewable energy initiatives). 
294 See, e.g., Goodnough, supra note 115 (describing how some homeowners object to the aesthetics of 
backyard wind turbines); Bronin, supra note 11, at 570–72 (discussing the political influence of neighbors and 
their tendency to resist alternative energy initiatives).  Professor Bronin suggests that, together, utility and 
homevoter opposition may be insurmountable and that reform at the state level may be most capacious for 
fostering microgrid development.  See id. at 574–84.  We do not disagree that these sources of political 
opposition are powerful; we argue, however, that political opposition at the local level may be somewhat 
diffused by the possibility of interest convergence and that the costs of overcoming local opposition are largely 
offset by the benefits that local governments provide in the form of access for renewables entrepreneurs.  In 
any event, Professor Bronin’s suggestions for state-level reforms are additional, welcome correctives to the 
conventional thinking about energy regulation. 
PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 
2011] LOCAL ENERGY 931 
political opposition at the local level, a public choice analysis might favor 
action at the state or federal level instead.295
The discussion thus far reveals few if any general justifications for 
claiming that one level of government is a preferable administrator of 
environmental policy.  The efficiency debate yielded mixed conclusions: 
Although decentralized control may efficiently distribute environmental 
protection, the risk of a race to the bottom persists and may be heightened 
where authority is allocated to local governments rather than states.  The 
politics debate is similarly murky.  Environmental interests may fare better at 
the federal level, but the literature on small-group dynamics suggests that they 
may also succeed in local government settings.  State governments appear to 
be the least favorable forum, based on the large influence of carbon-fuel 
interests in state government decision making and the organizational 
advantages that these industry interests enjoy relative to more diffuse 
environmental interests.  On the whole, these broad theoretical debates are 
unresolved and fail to support any normative claim that there is a clear first-
best level of government to which we should allocate environmental regulatory 
(and hence land-energy) authority.296  It appears that each level of government 
offers certain benefits and costs, which suggests that the best solution may 
involve a combination of governmental institutions wielding land-energy rule-
making authority.  We consider additional factors that may point more clearly 
to an answer in the next section. 
B. Allocating Authority for Distributed Renewables 
Our conclusions in the previous section are consistent with the emerging 
consensus in the modern environmental regulation and environmental 
federalism literatures that, most often, a cooperative interjurisdictional strategy 
will be the optimal approach to allocating regulatory authority for distributed 
295 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 267, at 81 (noting the possibility of corrupt over-influence of business 
interests in city planning as a possible factor in the growth of urban sprawl); Paul H. Sedway, Commentary,
Plan-Based Administrative Review: A Planning and Zoning Debate, in LAND USE LAW: ISSUES FOR THE 80S, at 
95 (Edith Netter ed., 1981) (describing zoning as “corrupt, and usually subject to derision,” as well as 
“unfair[,] . . . self-serving[,] . . . [and] poorly administered”).  On industry capture of regulatory institutions, 
see generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 
1684–88 (1975). 
296 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1107; Revesz, supra note 257, at 578–626; Rodriguez, supra note 229, 
at 746–47. 
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renewables.297  Cooperative regulatory regimes may capture the benefits of 
decentralization while avoiding the theoretical problems—imposing a federal 
minimum standard may offset some public choice pathologies and prevent 
subnational governments from racing to the bottom.298  A concomitant 
delegation of regulatory discretion to state or local governments to experiment 
“above the federal floor” can leverage their familiarity with local problems and 
resources into tailored standards that avoid the problems of a uniform national 
rule.299  This reflects a general trend in current federalism theory toward more 
“interactive” or “dynamic” accounts of the relationship and proper allocation 
of power between the federal and state governments.300  And it better reflects 
the reality of environmental regulatory practice.301  For something as sprawling 
and multifaceted as the distributed renewable energy problem, the best strategy 
will involve action by multiple levels of government,302 but the optimal mix of 
actors may vary from that for other environmental issues.  Drawing from the 
297 See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal 
Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 369 (2006); 
Donald A. Brown, Thinking Globally and Acting Locally: The Emergence of Global Environmental Problems 
and the Critical Need to Develop Sustainable Development Programs at State and Local Levels in the United 
States, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175 (1996); Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Caps: A Case Study of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479 (2008); 
Engel, supra note 18; Engel, supra note 250; Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, Consumption, and Cities, 36 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 253 (2009); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal 
Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Laboratories for Local Solutions for 
Global Problems: State, Local, and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and 
Effects of Climate Change, 12 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15 (2004); Rodriguez, supra note 229; Richard B. 
Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Change Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures,
50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008); sources cited supra note 230. 
298 Cf. Glicksman, supra note 230 (manuscript at 18–23) (arguing that race to the bottom and collective-
action problems justify federal “floor” regulation in the related field of climate change adaptation). 
299 See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Carlson, supra note 17, at 1102; 
Rodriguez, supra note 229, at 757–58. 
300 See, e.g., J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems: 
Applications to Climate Change Adaptation Law, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 22–23), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694187 (noting that “the emerging theory of 
dynamic federalism has captured the attention of environmental law scholars . . . . [and] calls for overlapping 
federal and state (and through states, local) jurisdictions” and canvassing the “dynamic federalism” literature 
(footnote omitted)); Heather Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term Foreword: Federalism All the Way 
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18–20 (2010) (canvassing the literature on cooperative federalism, which Gerken 
calls “federalism all the way down”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States: The Need to Limit Federal 
Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 69 (2005); Engel, supra note 250, at 176; Robert A. Schapiro, Justice Stevens’s 
Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133 (2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Polyphonic 
Federalism: State Constitutions in the Federal Courts, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1409 (1999). 
301 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106–07; Engel, supra note 250, at 166. 
302 As we observed, every level of government currently engages distributed renewables in some way.  
See supra, Part I.C.2.a–c.  The problem, we think, is that the current approach lacks coherence and amounts to 
a counterproductive patchwork. 
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literature on interjurisdictional cooperation and the “microanalysis of 
institutions,”303 we discuss in more detail the ideal allocation of land-energy 
law-making authority for distributed renewables in this section. 
Our analysis departs from the literature in two important ways.  First, most 
of the cooperative strategies that have been suggested involve federal–state
cooperation and suggest ways to enhance state government decision-making 
authority.304  This appears to be an intellectual leftover from the now-defunct 
“dual federalism” account of the American governmental structure as 
comprising two distinct, sovereign “spheres” of authority, federal and state.305
Many analysts of intergovernmental relations continue to view the federal 
structure this way, despite the now nearly complete overlap of state and federal 
authority on most subjects.306  We instead emphasize the importance of 
federal–local cooperation and argue that state authority regarding land-energy 
rules is detrimental to the goal of fostering distributed renewables. 
Second, the classic “policy laboratories” argument for empowering 
subnational governments typically trumpets the potential for regulatory 
pluralism to generate, through trial and error over time, first-best solutions that 
may then be imposed uniformly from the national level.307  While we do 
303 See Buzbee, supra note 22, at 113; Edward L. Rubin, Commentary, The New Legal Process, the 
Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1433–37 (1996). 
304 See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 22; Carlson, supra note 17; Engel, supra note 250.  While some 
commentators explicitly address local governments, see, e.g., Michael Burger, Empowering Local Autonomy 
and Encouraging Experimentation in Climate Change Governance: The Case for a Layered Regime, 39 
ENVTL. L. REP.: NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,161 (2009), most treat the role of municipalities as less significant than 
that of both the federal and state governments. 
305 See Gerken, supra note 300, at 11–14 (discussing the “ghost” of the dual-federalism idea of state 
“sovereignty” that haunts modern federalism scholarship).  For the canonical discussion of “dual federalism” 
and its “death” with the Supreme Court’s expansive New Deal-era interpretation of the Commerce Clause, 
which entailed the view that national and state regulatory power are largely concurrent (extending dualism, by 
contrast, would mean that the state “sphere” had shrunk to nothing), see generally Edward S. Corwin, The 
Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950). 
306 See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State 
Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REV. 959, 965–66 (2007).  Even those who argue for increased local government power 
tend to conflate the state and local governments in debates about federalism.  See Clayton P. Gillette, The 
Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA. L. REV. 1347, 1351–52 (1997) (arguing that 
current scholarship pays insufficient attention to distinctions between state and local governments in 
federalism). 
307 The “laboratories” argument is traced back to Justice Brandeis’s famous statement that “a single 
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).  For arguments that decentralization is justified on the laboratories rationale because 
it can eventually lead to better national policy making, see, for example, Robert R. Kuehn, The Limits of 
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advance a version of the “laboratories” justification to support empowering 
local governments in the distributed renewables field, we advocate regulatory 
diversity for certain instrumental reasons other than the possibility of 
discovering one “correct” or “optimal” national solution.  While we think that 
local variation may be beneficial in raising the profile of distributed 
renewables issues and sparking debate at the state and national levels,308 we 
view diversity primarily as valuable to the goal of fostering broader adoption 
of distributed renewables, owing to the variety of different kinds of land-
energy rules that will be needed to develop these technologies in different 
locations.  Allowing local governments to create various regulatory strategies 
for the renewables industry to grapple with will also drive innovation in 
distributed renewables technology, although wholly unconstrained variation 
will be cumbersome and impede progress.  Scholars argue that creating a 
meaningful role for state and local authority within environmental regulatory 
structures may enhance those structures’ capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances309 and to avoid potentially disastrous regulatory failures.310
While we do not discuss these important additional benefits at length, our 
suggestion is consistent with, and supported by, these observations as well as 
the benefits of local institutional competence, increased opportunity and 
motivation for energy entrepreneurship, and the potential for faster 
technological innovation. 
Our suggestion, then, is that the federal government should first establish 
some minimum standard—most likely a simple prohibition on state and local 
regulations that impede renewables siting—for fostering the adoption of 
distributed renewable energy technologies and should allocate primary
Devolving Enforcement of Federal Environmental Laws, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2373, 2383 (1996), and McKinstry, 
supra note 297, at 16. 
308 See Gerken, supra note 300, at 10, 17 (noting that local policy-making efforts may “serve as staging 
grounds for national debates” as local decisions “feed back into national policymaking” in the integrated 
system of regulatory federalism). 
309 See Ruhl, supra note 300 (manuscript at 13–26) (discussing the concept of “adaptive capacity”—a 
system’s capacity to absorb changed circumstances without collapsing—as applied to legal systems and 
deriving principles of regulatory design to foster adaptive capacity; noting that collaborative intergovernmental 
climate change regulation is desirable for fostering adaptability). 
310 See William W. Buzbee, Climate Change as an Innovation Imperative: Federalism, Institutional 
Pluralism and Incentive Effects 10–12 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, Paper No. 10-125, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694166 
(discussing the relatively greater resistance of cooperative intergovernmental regulatory regimes to common 
causes of regulatory failure; noting, for example, that “a diffused regulatory environment is akin to a fabric 
with many different threads providing strength[; t]o destroy that web of laws would require many successful 
political attacks, not just intense federal lobbying or a sympathetic president”). 
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authority for implementation and regulation, with substantial discretion, to 
local governments.311  Since land-energy regulations enabling the use of 
distributed renewable energy may raise business costs in the short term and 
may at least appear capable of deterring industrial siting, we contend that a 
federal minimum standard is necessary to prevent local governments from 
engaging in races to the bottom.312  A federal minimum requirement for 
implementing policies designed to promote the adoption of distributed 
renewables also should offset the local-level public choice problems that we 
have mentioned313 and thereby help to avoid “negative experiments” in which 
cities empowered with land-energy rule-making authority respond 
disproportionately to anti-renewables interests and stifle the adoption of 
distributed renewables.314
In one sense, this is similar to other “federal leadership with subnational 
government implementation” regimes that are characteristic of environmental 
federalism.315  But there is one crucial difference.  To truly empower local 
governments to exercise regulatory authority and discretion in the manner that 
will be most beneficial, the traditional power of state governments to preempt 
local government authority must be eliminated in this regulatory context.  
Perhaps paradoxically, then, establishing a stable regime of decentralized local 
regulatory authority requires, in addition to a federal minimum standard, 
federal preemption of state power to interfere with local decision making.  Our 
analysis is context dependent; we do not suggest that this form of federal–local 
cooperation is optimal in every environmental regulatory context.  Our 
argument is rooted in the particular dynamics of the regulation of distributed 
renewable energy technology.  We first explain our reasons for preferring to 
lodge primary regulatory authority over distributed renewables with local 
rather than state governments and then briefly discuss theoretical and doctrinal 
issues concerning the legality of our proposed cooperative regulatory scheme. 
311 A recent version of the stalled federal climate change legislation would establish a national renewable 
energy portfolio standard that expressly preserves from preemption stricter state renewable energy 
requirements.  See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. §§ 101, 610(i) 
(as passed by House, June 26, 2009); Burger, supra note 304, at 11,168 (discussing these provisions).  We 
would argue for the addition of specific distributed renewables targets, language empowering local 
governments to pursue those targets via land-energy rule making, and a similar prohibition on both federal and 
state preemption of local efforts. 
312 See supra notes 249–52, 270–80, and accompanying text. 
313 See supra notes 291–97 and accompanying text. 
314 See supra notes 223–27 and accompanying text. 
315 See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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1. Local Institutional Advantages 
The nature of environmental problems and the costs associated with their 
remediation varies greatly from place to place, and regulatory solutions must 
be adapted accordingly.316  As James Krier noted three decades ago in the 
context of pollution control, “[A]esthetic costs and materials losses will be 
functions of the varying resource endowments, degrees of development, and 
human attitudes that exist in different regions.  Even health costs . . . vary from 
place to place.”317  This variability of local conditions cautions against 
uniform, one-size-fits-all programs that are characteristic of federal action,318
and it highlights the important role for state or local governments, whose 
greater familiarity with and expertise regarding local conditions can improve 
regulation.319
Sensitivity to differing local conditions is particularly important in 
strategies to promote the adoption of distributed renewable energy 
technologies.  Variables including the nature of cities’ primary energy sources, 
local climate and weather patterns, the nature of the built environment, zoning 
plans, growth plans, population, and local economic conditions are all directly 
relevant to the choice of one or more distributed renewable technologies and 
316 See James E. Krier, supra note 15, at 326–27; Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal 
Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 535, 536–37, 547–48 (1997) (highlighting 
local variation in the goals and costs of environmental regulation as an independent justification for 
decentralized regulatory power). 
317 Krier, supra note 15, at 327 (footnote omitted). 
318 See Krier, supra note 316, at 327; James E. Krier, On the Topology of Uniform Environmental 
Standards in a Federal System—And Why It Matters, 54 MD. L. REV. 1226 (1995); Jonathan H. Adler,
Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133, 158–60 (2005); Butler 
& Macey, supra note 232, at 25. 
319 Revesz, of course, argues that devolving regulatory authority to state governments is independently 
justifiable, all else equal, because of the variable quality of environmental harms and remediation costs.  See
Revesz, supra note 316, at 547–48.  In a sense though, as we will argue more fully below, this may simply 
replicate the problem if there is sufficient variation in environmental problems and costs at the sub-state level, 
which suggests that local government control is preferable over federal or state authority.  Biodiversity 
protection initiatives, for example, seek to deal with environmental problems that are incredibly local in 
character and thus would seem to be best suited to the expertise of local governments.  See, e.g., Tarlock, 
Biodiversity, supra note 230, at 574–83.  Promotion of distributed renewables, in large part because of its 
similar linkage to local land law in the form of land-energy rules, may present similar sub-state variation 
problems.  See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (championing local governments’ capacity to provide regulatory goods 
that “match distinctive local conditions and preferences”); Verchick, supra note 282, at 475 (emphasizing the 
local nature of many environmental problems). 
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the means of deployment.320  For example, revising local land-energy rules to 
enable deployment of small wind turbines requires consideration of a variety of 
site-specific conditions, including wind-shadowing; local wind and gust 
patterns; size and layout of the surrounding built environment; turbines’ noise 
output and neighbors’ tolerance for it; the location of potential obstructions 
like utility poles, power lines, and trees; and local aesthetic preferences, among 
other things.321  So, too, with considering distributed solar energy technologies: 
typical roof sizes, slopes, composition, and load-bearing capacities, along with 
shade patterns created by surrounding trees or buildings, local weather 
conditions, sizes of yards if panels are to be installed on poles separate from 
the main building structure, the availability of porch or garage roofs as 
alternative locations, and, again, local aesthetic preferences are all relevant to 
deployment decisions.322  Similarly, variable local conditions affect the 
deployment and productivity of distributed renewable energy technologies.323
These devices are intended to mesh with residential and commercial buildings 
and neighborhoods; by design, they are meant to be adopted by reference to 
what is appropriate in the particular circumstances of the location.  On the city 
or community planning level, differences in wind or shade patterns, the size 
and shape of buildings, and aesthetic preferences from neighborhood to 
neighborhood or even block to block will require communities to adopt 
carefully tailored land-energy rules to promote various different “packages” of 
renewable technologies that fit the local conditions.  And efforts to integrate 
renewable energy technologies into broader “green” or “zero emissions” 
320 See JON CREYTS ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., REDUCING U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: HOW MUCH
AT WHAT COST? 22, 67–68 (2007), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/en/Client_Service/Sustainability/ 
Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/Sustainability/PDFs/Reducing US Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions/US_ghg_final_report.ashx (emphasizing the substantially different costs of various greenhouse gas 
reduction strategies stemming from “regional differences in population growth and/or density, carbon intensity 
of local power generation portfolios, energy productivity, climate, availability of renewable energy sources, 
forest cover, agricultural orientation, concentration of industrial activities, and other factors”); Kaswan, supra 
note 297, at 284–85 (arguing for local government decision-making authority over energy demand reduction 
strategies, in part, based on the way that local variation makes proper solutions location specific); Rodriguez, 
supra note 229, at 750–51 (arguing that traditional local authority over land use decision making is justified in 
part by local governments’ comparatively greater familiarity with local conditions and comparatively greater 
capacity to leverage local knowledge in regulatory decision making); Buzbee, supra note 267, at 83 (same). 
321 See, e.g., Christopher W. Fry, Comment, Harvesting the Sky: An Analysis of National and 
International Wind Power, 19 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 427, 437, 449–50 (2008); Jim Green, Nat’l 
Renewable Energy Lab., Installer Issues: Integrating Distributed Wind into Local Communities (June 4–7, 
2006) (PowerPoint presentation), http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy06osti/40096.pdf. 
322 See, e.g., CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, A GUIDE TO PHOTOVOLTAIC (PV) SYSTEM DESIGN AND 
INSTALLATION (2001), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/reports/2001-09-04_500-01-020.PDF. 
323 See, e.g., Trainer, supra note 87, at 1011–12 (explaining that “performance in the field . . . is some 10–
30% below rated capacity” for some solar panels). 
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residential and commercial building projects introduce a host of additional 
issues that will vary dramatically with local conditions.324
The familiar idea that empowering subnational governments allows for a 
greater influence of state or local preferences in policy and enhances the 
democratic responsiveness of the federal system is also relevant here.325  In 
federalism scholarship, it is commonly claimed that state governments are 
“closer”—that is, more accessible and accountable—to citizens than the 
federal government.326  The characteristics of state governments that support 
this claim—their smaller electorates, greater transparency and access to elected 
officials, and greater opportunities for citizen participation in governance—
suggest that local governments are closest to the people.327  Local “elected 
officials tend to be more responsive to voter demands because it is easier . . . to 
monitor politicians and it is easier for new politicians to challenge unpopular 
incumbents[,] . . . smaller political units allow for more deliberation and 
consensus building among members,” and “[p]olitics on a small 
scale . . . enables less affluent grassroots organizations to promote their 
interests through marches, speeches, and creative forms of activism that would 
not work on a national or regional scale.”328  In the distributed renewables area, 
this means that yet another argument against primarily federal-level action is 
that people in different locations may have different ideas about how much and 
what kind of renewable energy they want, and, as far as our broad energy 
324 See, e.g., P. TORCELLINI ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., LESSONS LEARNED FROM CASE 
STUDIES OF SIX HIGH-PERFORMANCE BUILDINGS, at vii–viii (2006), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/ 
fy06osti/37542.pdf (emphasizing that “the six commercial buildings we studied [have] a unique purpose and 
function, but all have commonalities,” and that whole-building energy efficient design projects are owner-
driven and develop according to owner design preferences, many of which “are not motivated by cost”); 
Buildings Research: Residential Building Design and Performance, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
http://www.nrel.gov/buildings/res_building_design.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2010) (noting that energy-
efficient building design packages must be designed “for specific savings levels in various climate zones,” and 
that relevant considerations include “energy savings, but also . . . non-energy issues important to builders, such 
as cost, code issues, occupant comfort, and marketability of energy features”). 
325 See generally Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53–58 
(2004). 
326 See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM 91–92 (1995) (“[T]o the extent the electorate is small, and 
elected representatives are thus more immediately accountable to individuals and their concerns, government 
is brought closer to the people, and democratic ideals are more fully realized.”); Young, supra note 325, at 58–
59. 
327 Shapiro’s arguments, for example, are not limited to state governments in particular.  See SHAPIRO,
supra note 326, at 91–92. 
328 Verchick, supra note 282, at 475–76; see also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1988). 
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transition goals and the need to encourage citizens to do their part will allow, 
we should do what we can to honor those preferences.329
Local governments may also have unique expertise in the renewables area, 
particularly at the deployment stage.  Typically cited institutional advantages 
of federal administrative agencies include economies of scale in regulation and 
federal regulators’ access to high-quality information, which allows for rapid 
accumulation of expertise, relevant research, and informed decision making.330
Federal agencies have been and remain essential authorities with respect to 
development-stage technological issues; the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL) in particular has been instrumental in producing cutting-
edge renewable technologies.331  But when distributed renewable devices are 
actually installed, the substantial variance in local conditions must generally 
drive deployment-stage regulatory strategy.  Federal agencies thus seem to lose 
the institutional advantage at deployment stage.332  Local governments have 
long held primary land use rule-making authority, and their expertise in that 
field is directly relevant to the modification of land-energy rules to foster 
distributed renewables.333  And cities are rapidly building relevant technical 
and regulatory expertise in dealing with varied local conditions through 
participation in cooperative initiatives like the U.S. Mayor’s Climate 
Protection Agreement, in which over 350 cities have agreed to pursue 
greenhouse gas reduction goals.334  “The number of communities involved 
promises a diversity of strategies and a steep learning curve as communities 
learn from one another what works, and what doesn’t work.”335
Internationally, approximately 850 cities cooperate to achieve climate goals 
329 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1106; Kaswan, supra note 297, at 285; Krier, supra note 15, at 327–28; 
Revesz, supra note 316, at 547–48. 
330 See Carlson, supra note 17, at 1104; Esty, supra note 232, at 573. 
331 See generally NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FY 2009 ANNUAL REPORT: A YEAR OF ENERGY 
TRANSFORMATION (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/about/pdfs/annual_report_fy09_45629.pdf 
(describing technological advances made in 2009). 
332 Federal support is still imperative to the deployment of renewable technology.  Once again, the NREL 
is currently a pivotal actor here.  See Applying Technologies, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., http://www. 
nrel.gov/applying_technologies (last updated Nov. 15, 2010) (explaining the laboratory’s “clean energy 
technology deployment projects”). 
333 See Alexandra B. Klass, Property Rights on the New Frontier: Climate Change, Natural Resource 
Development, and Renewable Energy, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 10–23), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1690564 (surveying the historical relationship between 
resources and property rights, and emphasizing the key role of local property law in the development of a 
sustainable energy infrastructure); supra notes 289–97 and accompanying text. 
334 See BAILEY, supra note 20, at 4. 
335 See id.
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and share information through the Large Cities Climate Leadership Group and 
the Cities for Climate Protection Campaign.336  With respect to expertise, 
capacity to generate expertise, and knowledge of conditions relevant to 
regulatory strategies, then, local governments possess important resources that 
federal institutions lack. 
To the extent that state governments generally possess advantages in 
administrative capacity relative to local governments, local government 
competence on the specific local issues relating to deploying distributed 
renewables nevertheless makes municipal control the superior choice.  State 
governments are “closer” to the facts on the ground than the federal 
government, to be sure, and they will have greater familiarity with some of the 
geographic, economic, social, and political particularities of their polities.  But 
state government initiatives by nature answer to statewide preferences and thus 
often will reflect compromises among geographically dispersed local interests.  
The “scale” or “matching” problem associated with federal control exists for 
state governments, too, and cuts against their institutional suitability to address 
local land-energy decisions.337  Local governments appear to possess the most 
relevant experience, likely will incur the lowest costs in accessing relevant 
information and gaining needed expertise, and are generally the best-
positioned institutions to exercise the primary regulatory role in distributed 
renewables promotion.338
2. Local Political and Technological Dynamics 
There are two additional reasons to prefer local government authority rather 
than state or federal control in the distributed renewables context.  First, local 
governments provide the best political forum for critical energy entrepreneurs 
to successfully express their interests and secure regulation consistent with 
their distributed renewables goals.  Large energy interests that tend to oppose 
336 See Michele M. Betsill & Harriet Bulkeley, Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate 
Change, 12 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 141 (2006); C40 CITIES CLIMATE LEADERSHIP GRP., http://www.c40cities. 
org (last visited May 1, 2011) (“C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group” is an alternate name for the Large 
Cities Climate Leadership Group); Climate, ICLEI–LOCAL GOV’TS FOR SUSTAINABILITY, http://www.iclei.org/ 
index.php?id=800 (last visited May 1, 2011). 
337 The “matching” principle is the idea that comparative institutional analysis and suggestions for 
allocating regulatory authority should attempt to “match” the level of government with the relative “size” of 
the regulatory subject.  See generally Butler & Macey, supra note 232. 
338 See, e.g., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE 
PROGRAM 5 (2007) (“Information at regional and local scales is most relevant for state and local resource 
managers and policy makers, as well as for the general population . . . .”). 
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renewables for fear of competition will invest less in lobbying efforts at the 
local government level.  Second, the great degree of variation that we expect to 
see from discretionary local decision making about land-energy rules and 
distributed renewables will, we think, stimulate innovation in renewable 
energy technologies, expanding their applicability and furthering the goal of 
increased adoption—provided, of course, that local rules are not so diverse as 
to impede the economies of scale offered by uniform technology production or 
to make installation economically infeasible. 
a. Entrepreneurs 
A general concern about implementation of distributed renewables 
programs—regardless of the level of government to which the task is 
assigned—is the need to overcome individuals’ initial hesitation, fear, and 
resistance and motivate them to make the investments in time, money, and 
lifestyle changes that are required to integrate distributed renewables into 
everyday life.339  We have said that overcoming these barriers of individuals’ 
unwillingness to embrace renewable technologies requires the intervention of 
“energy entrepreneurs.”340  Rembrandt Peale overcame individual fears about 
gas lighting first at the level of Baltimore’s city government; consumers of air 
conditioning similarly initiated technological deployment that sparked 
widespread adoption at the local government level.341  So too, local 
government action paved the way for the transition from local to centralized 
electricity production.342  These changes in individual preferences in response 
to the actions of motivated energy entrepreneurs resemble social 
movements,343 and the technical literature on social movements both 
339 See WILLIAM ANDREEN ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 11 (2008), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/ 
federalismClimateChange.pdf (arguing that the question of allocating implementing authority for climate 
change remediation initiatives generally must determine which institutions are “better suited to motivate the 
lifestyle changes among their citizens that will prove essential to an effective climate change policy over the 
long run”); Nicholas Lutsey & Daniel Sperling, America’s Bottom-Up Climate Change Mitigation Policy, 36 
ENERGY POL’Y 673, 674 (2008) (effective climate change mitigation requires “local commitment, down to 
individuals, to accomplish the type of economic and societal transformations that will be necessary to achieve 
very large reductions in carbon”); supra notes 112–17, 136–44, and accompanying text. 
340 See supra Part I.C.1. 
341 See supra notes 127–37, 143–50, and accompanying text. 
342 See supra notes 150–59 and accompanying text. 
343 See Glenn R. Carroll, Long-term Evolutionary Change in Organizational Populations: Theory, 
Models, and Empirical Findings from Industrial Demography, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 119 (1997); 
Michael V. Russo, The Emergence of Sustainable Industries: Building on Natural Capital, 24 STRATEGIC 
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substantiates the dynamic represented by our historical anecdotes and provides 
a causal account.344  Here again, theory suggests that local governments should 
possess primary authority to make land-energy rules that promote distributed 
renewables.  The characteristics of local governments make them particularly 
likely forums for energy pioneers—this time installing wind turbines and solar 
panels rather than gas lamps—to achieve critical early successes.345
Legal rules and structures can be designed to facilitate the formation, 
growth, and success of movements primarily by providing opportunities for 
access and the chance to secure the critical initial policy “deliverables” that can 
spark widespread acceptance.346  The building of organizational resources 
proceeds incrementally, and entrepreneurs are required to get organizations off 
the ground initially347: “A policy entrepreneur needs some sort of 
organizational structure to solicit funds or obtain voluntary efforts. . . .  But the 
more money and funds and effort she obtains, the greater her ability to solicit 
further money and effort.”348  Resources need not flow solely from members of 
the organization, though 
the interactive nature of government in the United States . . . provides 
innumerable opportunities for organized groups to influence 
elections, lobby elected officials between elections, and lobby 
appointed officials.  Any impact upon elections or public decision 
MGMT. J. 317, 318 (2002) (noting that the “strong social and institutional elements to the push toward 
greening” result in “green” industries beginning to look “like social movements”). 
344 See generally OLSON, GROUPS, supra note 262; DONATELLA DELLA PORTA & MARIO DIANI, SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS (2d ed. 2006); Bert Klandermans, The Formation and Mobilization of Consensus, in 1
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENT RESEARCH: FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION 173 (Bert Klandermans et al. 
eds., 1988); John D. McCarthy & Mark Wolfson, Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the 
Cooptation of Civic and State Infrastructures, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 273 (Aldon D. 
Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992); John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, The Trend of Social 
Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY 337, 377–79 (Mayer N. Zald & John D. McCarthy eds., 1987); Edward L. Rubin, 
Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 29 
(2001). 
345 Cf. Gerken, supra note 300, at 17 (“[P]olitical entrepreneurs . . . routinely use local sites as staging 
grounds for national debates.”) (citing Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent 
Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006)). 
346 See John D. McCarthy et al., The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements by the State in the 
United States, in 13 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 45 (Louis Kriesberg & 
Metta Spencer eds., 1991); Rubin, supra note 344, at 30. 
347 Jose Goldemberg et al., Energy for the New Millennium, 30 AMBIO 330, 336 (2001) (stressing the 
importance of energy entrepreneurs); Klandermans, supra note 344, at 184; McCarthy & Zald, supra note 344, 
at 22; Rubin, supra note 344, at 28. 
348 Rubin, supra note 344, at 29 (footnote omitted). 
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making becomes a “deliverable” that policy entrepreneurs can use to 
increase the number of commitment level of their membership.349
Local governments are the forum in which the transaction costs entrepreneurs 
have to pay for political entry are lowest—both because the campaigns are 
smaller in scale and because the institutions already possess land-energy rule-
making authority, allowing for direct changes to promote distributed 
renewables.  And the theory of group dynamics suggests that small-scale 
organization and action are more conducive to member cohesiveness, 
dedication, and group longevity, all of which are critical to success.350
The flexibility of local governments’ internal institutional structures also 
enhances opportunities for access by renewables pioneers and their supporters.  
Public and private interests cooperate on an ad hoc basis at the local 
government level and partner in more permanent advisory bodies within local 
governments.351  Such cooperative local government structures have been used 
to “bring public and private interests together to consider pollution-control or 
land-management decisions made pursuant to statutory or regulatory law.”352
These characteristics of local governments—which make them particularly 
conducive to the influence of newly formed, local social movements and 
political groups with local goals—provide the tools that energy entrepreneurs 
need to overcome both the problems of deficient public understanding of 
renewable energy technology and the public choice worries that flow from the 
adverse political interests at the local level.353  Local governments’ 
endorsement of renewables may help overcome individuals’ worries about and 
distrust of new energy technologies by adding a “stamp of approval” that 
people trust.354  And emerging renewable energy businesses, through 
cooperation with local governments, may gain access to resources and 
349 Id. at 30; see also Russo, supra note 343, at 328–29 (noting the importance of conducive government 
institutional environments to the development of renewable energy and other “green” industries). 
350 See supra notes 264–71 and accompanying text. 
351 See Verchick, supra note 282, at 476; infra notes 354–61 and accompanying text. 
352 Verchick, supra note 282, at 476. 
353 See supra notes 291–97 and accompanying text. 
354 MERRIAN C. FULLER ET AL., RENEWABLE & APPROPRIATE ENERGY LAB., UNIV. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
GUIDE TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY FINANCING DISTRICTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 7
(2009), available at http://erg.berkeley.edu/news/2009news/FullerKunkelKammen-MunicipalEnergyFinancing 
2009.pdf (“Local governments are an objective source of information, providing tools and resources to enable 
residents and businesses to take action.  For example, local governments can offer a single source of 
information on how to get started with clean energy upgrades, and many local governments provide 
educational workshops about the options available to their constituents.”). 
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information about local conditions and preferences that could prove essential 
to their economic success.355
An example of a cooperative structure in which local government and 
renewable energy businesses partner to share local information and to plan for 
renewables deployment is found in Sebastopol, California.  The “Solar 
Sebastopol” program is “a co-operative agreement between the city, private 
photovoltaic . . . vendors, the energy technology program at Sonoma State 
University, and individual citizens” that “provides a database of rooftops in 
Sebastopol that are good candidates for PV installation and free appraisal by 
the PV companies.”356  Larger cities also have implemented cooperative 
renewable energy advisory and deployment structures.  Chicago’s Green 
Ribbon Committee, for example, advises the city on progress under its Climate 
Action Plan, which includes a substantial renewable energy installation 
component and involves representatives of a variety of business and 
community interests.357  Local government experiments with Energy Financing 
Districts (EFDs)—like those that have been initiated in Berkeley and Palm 
Desert, California; Boulder, Colorado; and Babylon, New York—are another 
kind of example of local cooperation in the renewables field.358  EFDs 
appropriate extant local institutional processes to fund renewables—they “tap 
into existing mechanisms that local governments are already familiar with, 
such as special tax districts or assessment districts . . . to support clean energy 
projects.”359  This approach leverages local familiarity with and control over 
land use rules to foster renewable adoption while maximizing individual 
choice.  For example, city financing for a renewable device may be “repaid 
355 See Russo, supra note 343, at 320–21 (emphasizing the importance of “site-specific” information 
about relevant “natural capital,” like wind patterns, shade patterns, etc., to the viability of newly formed 
renewable energy concerns). 
356 Jennifer Bresee & David Room, Powering Down America: Local Government’s Role in the Transition 
to a Post-Petroleum World, ENERGY BULL. (Oct. 20, 2005), available at http://www.energybulletin.net/node/ 
9999; see also SOLAR SEBASTOPOL, http://www.solarsebastopol.com (last visited May 1, 2011).  The program 
was successful enough to receive a grant funding its expansion to a countywide effort.  See Solar News: Solar 
Sebastopol Wins Grant to Expand Countrywide, SOLAR SEBASTOPOL, http://www.solarsebastopol.com/ 
news.html (last visited May 1, 2011). 
357 See Clean & Renewable Energy Sources, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www. 
chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/renewable_energy_sources/13.php (last visited May 1, 2011); Green Ribbon 
Committee, CHI. CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, http://www.chicagoclimateaction.org/pages/partners__green_ribbon_ 
commitee/60.php (last visited May 1, 2011); supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
358 See generally FULLER ET AL., supra note 354, at 16–18 (describing the Berkeley Financing Initiative 
for Renewable and Solar Technology; the Palm Desert Energy Independence Program; Boulder’s 
ClimateSmart Loan Program; and Babylon’s Long Island Green Homes Program). 
359 Id. at 6. 
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over a set number of years through a ‘special tax’ or ‘assessment’ on the 
property tax bill of only those property owners who choose to participate in the 
program” with “little or no up-front cost to the property owner.”360
A system of regulatory authority that promotes site-specific, locally chosen 
distributed renewable energy technologies seems likely to maximize energy 
entrepreneurs’ access to social capital, which only enhances the odds that the 
technologies that they advocate will be adopted.  Local interpersonal 
communication networks—social groups, neighborhoods, community 
organizations, and the like—have their own internal norms that encourage 
uniformity in certain kinds of member behavior.  Accumulating social capital 
by accessing these networks is recognized as an important strategy for 
innovative sustainable businesses.361  Individuals who are satisfied by location-
specific technical solutions will share information about their success with new 
technologies through these informal communication networks, helping 
overcome consumers’ uncertainties and motivate broader adoption.362  And, in 
many cases, interpersonal norms operating in these networks will encourage 
adoption even by those who remain skeptical about new devices by punishing 
outliers in various ways.363
Since local government discretion seems to be the interjurisdictional 
allocation strategy most likely to foster location-specific renewable 
technology, it also likely will enhance energy entrepreneurs’ chances of 
gaining currency with important local networks of interpersonal influence.  
Opportunities to match energy technologies and policies with the preferences 
of individuals and communities through local government processes will 
increase renewable energy advocates’ chances to find political and economic 
common ground with developers and landowners—groups traditionally 
opposed to progressive changes in land-energy rules.364  They, too, must 
answer to local preferences, and the potential payoff from “greening” 
360 Id.
361 See Russo, supra note 343, at 321–22. 
362 Id.
363 See DEBIKA SHOME & SABINE MARX, CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON ENVTL. DECISIONS, THE PSYCHOLOGY 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION 30–32 (2009), available at http://www.cred.columbia.edu/guide/pdfs/ 
CREDguide_low-res.pdf (advising climate change advocates to tie sustainability goals to individuals’ group 
affiliations because “[g]roup affiliation can activate social goals (i.e., concern for others, maximizing the good 
of the group),” and “[p]articipating in a group allows group norms to exert a stronger influence on 
individuals”); Jason F. Shogren, Micromotives in Global Environmental Policy, INTERFACES, Sept.–Oct. 2002, 
at 47, 53. 
364 See supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text. 
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businesses, homes, and commercial buildings in a manner that fits with 
community values may bring these powerful local interests into the renewables 
camp, or at least dilute their opposition.365
b. Innovation 
Alongside the actions of energy entrepreneurs, a second important 
mechanism to promote renewable adoption is to foster innovation in 
distributed renewables technology.  The basic reason is clear: Widespread 
adoption of these technologies requires that they be modified to function under 
different sets of local conditions.  Making local governments the primary 
regulators will increase the number of different sets of regulatory environments 
to which renewable technologies will need to adapt in order to capture market 
share and will naturally promote this sort of low-level, “learn by doing” 
innovation.  In the state context, scholars have similarly noted that innovation 
in energy technology may be enhanced by decentralizing regulatory power 
over energy to the state governments: 
State programs can generate a diversity of approaches by virtue of 
their multiplicity and differing mixes of socioeconomic, 
environmental, and political factors.  For example, within the field of 
renewable energy, some states require that solar power constitute a 
specific share of an electricity provider’s portfolio, while others 
emphasize wind or geothermal resources.366
The local level, of course, promises even greater diversity.  A variety of 
regulatory packages creates a variety of geographic “clusters” in which 
renewable technologies must be deployed.  This enhances the likelihood of 
innovation because “technological change occurs most readily at small 
geographic scales,”367 and, more importantly: 
365 Some call this the “Baptists and Bootleggers” dynamic: where public interests converge with business 
interests, not substantively, but because a public-spirited policy proposal presents local business with the 
chance to disadvantage the competition.  See Revesz, supra note 257, at 577–78; Jonathan B. Wiener, Think 
Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966 (2007).  
Renewable energy entrepreneurs may ally themselves with industry groups that want to take advantage of state 
or local subsidies for renewables installation, green building programs, or the increasing competitive 
advantages that flow from consumer perception that a business is “green.”  Palm Desert’s EFD program, for 
example, is jointly funded by the city, the Southern California Gas Company, and Southern California Edison.  
FULLER ET AL., supra note 354, at 16; see also Burger, supra note 304, at 11,164–66 (discussing the increasing 
significance of “green” branding for businesses). 
366 Adelman & Engel, supra note 230, at 851. 
367 Id. at 852. 
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[I]nnovation is enhanced in geographic clusters (e.g. the Silicon 
Valley phenomenon) because spatial concentrations allow inventors 
to access knowledge externalities that reduce the costs of research, 
development, and commercialization.  These externalities are 
dominated by “tacit knowledge,” which is “vague, difficult to codify 
and often only serendipitously recognized,” and thus by definition 
cannot be formalized or written down.  These characteristics . . . limit 
the spread of tacit knowledge to the kinds of frequent face-to-face 
interactions that occur most efficiently in small geographic areas.368
In short, technological innovation will be enhanced by a regulatory allocation 
scheme that enables the kinds of small-group dynamics and informal 
communication networks that we have argued are best accommodated in local 
government settings.369
The reasons for favoring state over federal authority with respect to 
spurring innovation suggest that local authority, which adds thousands of 
additional variations in policy to the landscape and requires renewable energy 
firms to adapt their technologies to local conditions, would be better still.370
Economists have found that, in general, “diversity across complementary 
economic activities sharing a common science base is more conducive to 
innovation than is specialization.”371  Furthermore, it is recognized that 
“adoption (or diffusion) of existing technologies,” even without increased 
investment in research and development, can “produce innovation through 
‘learning by doing’ as experience is gained with the use and production of a 
technology.”372  Government policies that engage the renewables industry 
cooperatively, toward the end of facilitating community acceptance of new 
technologies, can provide location-specific information to guide this sort of 
innovation.373  To the extent that such innovation will expand the range of 
possible applications for existing technologies and drive down costs, this factor 
may further reduce consumer uncertainty and facilitate broad adoption.374  And 
368 Id. (quoting David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of 
Innovation, in 4 HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 2713, 2718 (Handbooks in Econ., Vol. 7, 
J. Vernon Henderson & Jacques-François Thisse eds., 2004)). 
369 See supra notes 316–31, 339–65, and accompanying text. 
370 See supra notes 318–28 and accompanying text. 
371 Audretsch & Feldman, supra note 368, at 2726. 
372 Adelman & Engel, supra note 230, at 847 (citing Richard G. Newell et al., The Effects of Economic 
and Policy Incentives on Carbon Mitigation Technologies, 28 ENERGY ECON. 563, 564–66 (2006)). 
373 See Russo, supra note 343, at 321.   
374 Increasing the applicability of distributed renewable devices under different conditions—along with 
overcoming consumers’ “lack of information about costs and benefits” and “high implicit consumer discount 
rates (potential benefits tend to be strongly discounted by individuals who have to invest time and money up 
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decreasing costs, of course, stimulates demand.  If this sort of innovation 
dynamic is desirable, as we think it is, then local government authority seems 
optimal.375
3. Local–State Dynamics 
The argument for empowering local governments to inspire innovation and 
support pioneers in the distributed renewables field requires a consideration of 
the states, to which all local governments are ultimately accountable.  The 
politics of climate change regulation are a useful place to start, as they have 
inverted the usual situation in environmental regulation.  Rather than federal 
leadership to initiate state implementation, the federal government has 
notoriously refused to lead on climate change.376  Instead, in the shadow of 
federal refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol377 and subsequent inaction, state 
governments have been the primary sources of regulation aimed at mitigating 
the causes and effects of climate change.378  These are important proactive 
efforts, but our concerns about state implementation and our preference for 
local authority in the distributed renewables context flow from potential public 
choice problems at the state level; these public choice concerns arise in part 
from observing the ongoing, intense efforts of carbon fuel, private utility, and 
business interests to influence state policy making, which might undermine 
optimal implementation.379  Regulatory scaling issues that arise from state 
governments’ relative insensitivity to the local considerations involved in the 
promotion of distributed renewables also contribute to our preference for local 
authority over land-energy rules.380
Currently, many states have chosen to adopt policies that empower local 
governments to experiment with a variety of different approaches to increase 
front in order to realize long-term savings),” will eventually drive down real costs of these devices.  
Goldemberg et al., supra note 347, at 336; see also supra notes 109–13, 136–44, and accompanying text.  See 
generally Shogren, supra note 363 (discussing the economic considerations affecting individuals’ decision-
making processes regarding climate change). 
375 See Goldemberg et al., supra note 347, at 336 (“Strong government-private sector collaboration has 
been a key feature of many successful market development programs” for energy technology.); Verchick, 
supra note 282, at 476; supra notes 347–53 and accompanying text. 
376 Engel, supra note 18, at 1021. 
377 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 18. 
378 ANDREEN ET AL., supra note 339, at 3–4; Engel, supra note 18, at 1015–16. 
379 See Heiman & Solomon, supra note 6, at 105–08 (describing private utilities’ successful attempts to 
influence state legislatures to prevent the establishment of local public utilities); supra notes 270–89 and 
accompanying text. 
380 See supra notes 330–40 and accompanying text. 
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the use of renewable energy.  But they need not adopt such policies, and they 
may change course in the future.381  State-level efforts like the New York, 
California, and Illinois incentive programs that complement local efforts and 
empower local governments through subsidies and other programs are 
laudable.382  Existing statewide programs, however, present problems of scale 
and generally are not designed to foster distributed renewables in particular.383
State renewable portfolio standards represent significant steps toward 
reforming the energy infrastructure but aim mainly to change the sources of 
power that large-scale utilities send to consumers over centralized grids.384
Consumer-generated renewable power sold back to utilities may count toward 
the requirement, but distributed generation currently is insufficient to provide 
utilities with all of the power that they need to comply.385  That, and the 
tendency for utilities and other influential interests to prefer centralized over 
distributed generation, make it likely that state RPS programs will drive 
growth in large scale renewable “farms” that can satisfy utilities’ power 
requirements soon, and in large chunks.386  This is an important step, but it 
does not directly aid the cause of distributed renewables, which we argue are a 
necessary component of a move toward a more sustainable energy future. 
381 See supra notes 184–207 and accompanying text (describing state distributed renewables/climate 
change efforts). 
382 See supra notes 184–88 and accompanying text. 
383 See supra notes 184–207, 330–40, and accompanying text. 
384 See ELIZABETH DORIS ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., STATE OF THE STATES 2009:
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF POLICY 92 (2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/ 
docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf (“RPS[] policies require utilities to own or acquire renewable energy or renewable 
energy certificates to account for a certain percentage of their retail electricity sales, or a certain amount of 
generating capacity[—that is, they must make renewable sources part of the sources of electricity they send out 
to their consumers over the grid—]within a specified timeframe.”). 
385 See supra text accompanying note 60 (showing that renewables as a whole—including renewable 
farms—currently make up less than one percent of U.S. energy production); supra text accompanying notes 
100–03 (describing how more than thirty states require from eight percent to more than thirty percent of 
electricity come from renewable sources). 
386 See, e.g., ERIC WANLESS ET AL., NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY: CALIFORNIA’S
SOLUTION FOR GLOBAL WARMING 9 (2007), available at http://www.nrdc.org/globalwarming/ca/ca.pdf 
(“California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard has helped to grow the market for and interest in large-scale wind 
farms.”); Douglas A. Codiga, Hawaii Clean Energy Law and Policy, HAW. B.J., Sept. 2009, at 4, 6 (describing 
an agreement between the state government and utility companies seeking to, among other things, “integrate 
up to 400 MW of wind power into the Oahu electrical system from one or more wind farms on Lanai or 
Molokai and transmitted to Oahu via an undersea cable system”).  On utilities’ propensity to favor “large, 
centralized plants” over “small, decentralized units,” see Benjamin K. Sovacool, Distributed Generation (DG) 
and the American Electric Utility System: What Is Stopping It?, 130 J. ENERGY RESOURCES TECH. 012001-1, 
012001-6 (2008). 
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To maximize the degree of location-specific variation that is so important 
to distributed renewables, future state actions that would diminish local 
discretion or, worse, contravene local decisions about distributed renewables in 
favor of uniform state-level solutions should be precluded.387  State 
governments have a somewhat sordid history when it comes to allowing local 
policy preferences to stand over time.  In the field of environmental regulation, 
states have repeatedly legislated out statewide policies that preempt more 
environmentally protective local rules.388  Examples include the Massachusetts 
Pesticide Control Act’s preemption of stricter local pesticide restrictions;389 the 
California Water Equipment and Control Act’s preemption of stricter local 
restrictions on the use of water-softening devices that increase the salinity of 
wastewater;390 and multiple states’ preemption of local hazardous waste rules 
that are more restrictive than statewide standards.391  Even ignoring 
preemption, seemingly progressive energy policies initiated at the state level 
nevertheless may end up being counterproductive if they generate strong local 
opposition based on their failure to account for local concerns.392  These 
factors also bolster our worry that existing state-granted local autonomy in the 
renewable energy area may be withdrawn, making the implementation regime 
unstable.393
The possibility of preemptive state action makes local authority contingent 
and, ultimately, subordinate to state-level political dynamics.  Such instability 
387 See Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for Local 
Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 467, 497–98 (1999) (“[T]he arguments made in favor of state action 
to protect the environment may extend to local governments.  Thousands of local government entities may 
adopt alternative and innovative policies to address environmental challenges and problems.  To the extent that 
local government efforts are preempted, innovation is stifled.” (footnote omitted)). 
388 See id. at 488–96 (discussing examples). 
389 See Town of Wendell v. Attorney Gen., 476 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Mass. 1985). 
390 See Water Quality Ass’n v. City of Escondido, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 878, 886–87 (Ct. App. 1997); Water 
Quality Ass’n v. Cnty. of Santa Barbara, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 194 (Ct. App. 1996). 
391 See Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. Cnty. of Owyhee, 735 P.2d 998 (Idaho 1987); Twp. of Cascade 
v. Cascade Res. Recovery, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 500 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Stablex Corp. v. Town of Hooksett, 
456 A.2d 94 (N.H. 1982); Rollins Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. of Logan, 508 A.2d 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1986). 
392 Local resistance to transmission required for the Texas wind power initiative is one case in point.  See, 
e.g., Initial Brief of Tom and Melissa Duren at 2, No. 37464 (Mass. State Office of Admin. Hearings Jan. 26, 
2010), available at http://interchange.puc.state.tx.us/WebApp/Interchange/Documents/37464_730_640083. 
PDF (challenging the “preferred route” designated for the transmission line because it would run 288 feet from 
the residents’ “dream home”).  Local resistance to state implementation of a uniform, streamlined zoning 
process for wind energy facilities in Massachusetts is another.  See, e.g., Peter Murkett, Op-Ed., A Sacrifice 
Worth Making, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2009, at A11 (writing in support of wind turbines in the Berkshires); 
Eleanor Tillinghast, Op-Ed., Turbines Are a Costly Blight, BOS. GLOBE, July 13, 2009, at A11. 
393 See supra notes 315–84 and accompanying text. 
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is detrimental to the goal of fostering truly local regulatory experimentation, 
and potential state preemption of local distributed renewables regulation and 
renewables-related land-energy rule making is thus undesirable.  Therefore, a 
federal effort to empower local government regulation of distributed 
renewables is important, and federal displacement of state government 
authority to diminish local government autonomy in this area is also needed.  
We briefly address legal objections to this approach in the next subsection. 
4. The Permissibility of a Federal–Local Approach 
Regardless of the interjurisdictional strategy for distributed renewables 
suggested by careful comparative institutional analysis, there remains the 
question of legal permissibility.  A program of local control over land-energy 
regulations, bolstered by a minimum federal standard, would fall squarely 
within Congress’s affirmative legislative powers under the modern, expansive 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  The question is whether any 
independent constitutional impediments remain.  Perhaps the most obvious 
objection to proposals for direct federal–local cooperation of the kind we 
suggest for distributed renewables—including federal action to displace 
counterproductive state government assertions of control over local 
governments—is an objection based on constitutional federalism requirements. 
The last twenty years have seen the Supreme Court’s “federalist revival” 
reestablish aggressive judicial protections for state government prerogatives in 
a variety of contexts.394  These decisions have reinvigorated the idea that the 
Constitution secures to state governments a characteristic of “sovereignty” or 
“autonomy” that serves as an external limitation on the powers of the federal 
government.395  That is, they suggest a broad norm that courts should 
invalidate federal legislation, even if it is clearly permissible under one of 
Congress’s enumerated powers, if it overly diminishes state government 
394 See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
47 (1996); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 456 (1991).  The term “federalist revival” was coined by Vicki 
Jackson.  See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 2180, 2213 (1998).  For detailed discussions of these decisions, see generally Young, supra note 280, 
and Young, supra note 325. 
395 See Young, supra note 325, at 23 (emphasizing that the federalist revival decisions “have opted for 
federalism doctrines that aggressively protect state sovereignty”). 
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prerogatives.396  And there are cases suggesting that states’ control over their 
internal governmental structures, including control over the existence and 
authority of local governments, is one aspect of state sovereignty that the 
federalist revival seeks to protect.397  Thus, the federalism objection appears 
front and center: Constitutional federalism norms demand that state 
governments retain authority to either permit local governments to exercise 
discretion or to impose uniform statewide standards that preempt local rules.  
Federal action displacing any aspect of this “traditional” state power, on this 
view, would be an unconstitutional invasion of state “autonomy” or 
“sovereignty.”398
For our purposes, a few brief observations suffice to dispel most of the 
force of this objection.  First, as others have ably argued, state sovereignty is 
not as clear a concept as it might seem.399  The Court’s own doctrine is far 
396 Professor Gerken argues that federalism scholars, who tend to discuss state “autonomy” and criticize 
the Court’s continuing focus on state “sovereignty,” nevertheless continue to make arguments that depend on a 
protected zone of state policy-making freedom that amounts to something very similar to “sovereignty.”  
Gerken, supra note 300, at 12–13. 
397 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 984–90 (giving examples).  Davidson suggests that judicial 
affirmations of state power over local governments typically come in the form of “intimat[ions] that internal 
political ordering is a fundamental attribute of state sovereignty.”  Id. at 986; see also, e.g., Nixon v. Mo. Mun. 
League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (invoking the “working assumption that federal legislation threatening to 
trench on the States’ arrangements for conducting their own governments should be treated with great 
skepticism, and read in a way that preserves a State’s chosen disposition of its own power, in the absence of 
the plain statement Gregory requires”); Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (denying federal power to “turn the State 
against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will”); 
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 (“Through the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise 
government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.”).  State control over local governments 
traditionally has been regarded as plenary.  See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907) 
(“The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon [municipal governments] and the territory 
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.”); Davidson, supra note 306, at 
976–84 (discussing the traditional conception of localities as “powerless,” lacking meaningful constitutional 
status, and subject to “plenary” state authority).  For an introduction to the literature on local government 
“powerlessness,” see generally Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pts. 1 & 2), 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 346 
(1990), and Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980). 
398 Davidson, supra note 306, at 1018 (“It is true that states are generally the primary institution in our 
federal system charged with overseeing local governments.”).  On federalism-based objections to federal 
preemption, see generally Garrick B. Pursley, Preemption in Congress, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 511 (2010); Young, 
supra note 325, at 52, 63; Ernest A. Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 
1369–70 (2001). 
399 See generally Gerken, supra note 300, at 13; Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Steadying the 
Court’s “Unsteady Path”: A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1447 (1995); 
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Listening to the “Sounds of Sovereignty” but Missing the Beat: Does the New 
Federalism Really Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11 (1998); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002); Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten 
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329 (2003). 
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from settled or uniform with respect to the permissibility of federal 
interference with states’ internal political ordering—the Court has upheld, after 
all, Congress’s application of federal wage and hour requirements400 and the 
federal Family and Medical Leave Act to state government employees.401
More specifically, as Nestor Davidson observes, it is unclear whether 
constitutionally enshrined state sovereignty precludes direct federal–local 
cooperation even over state government resistance.402  Federal courts have in 
fact upheld federal legislation that empowers local governments to take actions 
that state governments might wish to prohibit.403  Indeed, the Court in Nixon v. 
Missouri Municipal League, even while articulating a strong presumption 
against federal derogation of state control over local governments, allowed that 
such action might be permissible if Congress made its intentions plain in 
statutory text.404
Accordingly, federal empowerment of and cooperation with local 
governments does not seem straightforwardly unconstitutional on grounds of 
inconsistency with concepts of state “sovereignty,”405 even where the 
cooperation interferes with state control over local governments.  The Court’s 
federalism jurisprudence, including the decisions comprising the “federalist 
revival,”406 confirms that the Court has not applied a clearly defined concept of 
state sovereignty, but instead has been “engaged in a fundamentally 
functionalist enterprise” in which “pragmatic and normative concerns about the 
400 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530–31 (1985). 
401 Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 724–25, 733–35 (2003). 
402 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 995–98; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of 
Federal Law to Free State and Local Officials from State Legislatures’ Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 
1207–16 (1999). 
403 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 996–99; see, e.g., Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No. 
40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 257–61 (1985) (holding that federal Payment in Lieu of Taxes statute authorizing local 
governments to use federal funding for “any” governmental purpose preempted state statute purporting to 
require local governments to distribute federal funds under the program similarly to distribution of general tax 
revenue); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 324–26, 341 (1958) (affirming Tacoma’s 
claim of power to exercise eminent domain over state-owned fish hatcheries adjacent to dam project, despite 
state objection that state law granted Tacoma no such power, in reliance on Ninth Circuit’s upholding of the 
federal license’s validity); Wash. Dep’t of Game v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir. 1953) 
(upholding validity of Federal Power Act license issued to Tacoma to build a dam despite state government 
argument that state law prohibited the dam). 
404 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004). 
405 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 1000 (“[F]ederal empowerment jurisprudence and other instances of 
federal intervention in state internal political ordering undermine any robust view of the constitutional 
necessity of state control over local governments.”). 
406 See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and 
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1735–36, 1755–56 (2005). 
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appropriate allocation of power in a federal system have largely driven the 
jurisprudence.”407  Federalism doctrine must be justified instrumentally
because there is no textual constitutional commitment to any particular 
arrangement or constellation of state government powers within the 
constitutional system.408  All that we know is that the Constitution commits us 
to have federalism—there must be both federal and state governments—and 
we cannot tell very much from the text about how much power the states must, 
or should, retain against federal usurpation.409
In response to the lack of a firm textual basis, federalism doctrine 
traditionally has been designed to promote the familiar benefits that are 
thought to justify entrenching a federalist system in the first instance: the 
capacity of subnational governments to tailor policies to diverse citizen 
preferences; the value of regulatory diversity and experimentation; the capacity 
for decentralized governmental authority to prevent tyrannical accumulation of 
power at any one level of government; and the potential for multiple, 
differentiated governmental forums in which citizens may participate to 
enhance basic values of democratic engagement and popular sovereignty.410
Doctrines limiting federal power in the name of federalism find their sturdiest 
constitutional justification in their tendency to promote one or more of these 
values.411  The “values of federalism,” however, are not inextricably connected 
with the preservation of state authority.  It is not necessarily state policy 
407 Davidson, supra note 306, at 1006 (emphasis added); see also Gerken, supra note 300, at 18–23 
(noting that courts have shifted, in making federalism decisions, to “functional accounts that are keyed to the 
role states play in preserving a well-functioning democracy”). 
408 See ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS 96, 109 (2009) (arguing that the lack of specific constitutional text on federalism requirements makes 
it necessary to derive our federalism norms by “structural inference,” and that a variety of different inferences 
are consistent with the textual evidence that does exist); Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the 
Future of Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (observing that there is no “federalism clause” in the 
Constitution); Garrick B. Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, 89 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript 
at 17) [hereinafter Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists] (reviewing SCHAPIRO, supra, and noting the absence of 
textual support for specific federalism requirements); Garrick B. Pursley, Dormancy, 100 GEO. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2012) (arguing that the lack of textual specificity on federalism requirements permits the 
inference of only very basic, and broad, preclusions of government actions that undermine the constitutional 
structure). 
409 See SCHAPIRO, supra note 408, at 96; Gerken, supra note 300, at 23 (“[N]either the Constitution’s text 
nor its structure offers definitive guidance on how to referee federal-state interactions.”); Pursley, Federalism 
Compatibilists, supra note 408, at 13–17; Ernest A. Young, State Sovereign Immunity and the Future of 
Federalism, 1999 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 36 (observing that the Constitution contains “several clauses with important 
federalism implications, but no central ‘Federalism Clause’”). 
410 See Davidson, supra note 306, at 1006–08; Gerken, supra note 300, at 18–23; Young, supra note 325, 
at 52–65; supra notes 306, 317–21, 325–31, and accompanying text. 
411 Young, supra note 325, at 50–52. 
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experimentation that we value, just policy experimentation; it is not necessarily 
state government responsiveness to localized concerns that we value, just a 
tailored response from some governmental institution; and it is not statewide
forums for civic participation that we must preserve, it is a broad spectrum of 
opportunities to participate in government somewhere.412  There is no reason in 
principle why the instrumental considerations that justify protecting state
governments against federal intrusion should not also frame a strong normative 
case for empowering and protecting local governments, even if doing that 
requires that the federal government take action that intrudes into state 
government authority.413  Accordingly, if local empowerment would better 
serve the underlying ends of the system, then there seems to be a persuasive 
case for constitutional permissibility. 
In the renewables context, we think that the reasons we have given here for 
preferring a system of federal–local collaboration in promoting distributed 
renewable energy technologies show that, in this context, federalism’s 
underlying values are best promoted by enhancing local government power.414
The values that provide the very justification for federalism, in other words, 
make a persuasive normative case for local energy. 
412 See Pursley, Federalism Compatibilists, supra note 408 (manuscript at 14–15) (arguing that the 
traditional “values of federalism” are instrumental values that may be promoted through a variety of different 
governmental structures). 
413 See Richard Briffault, “What About the ‘Ism’?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary 
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305–06 (1994); Davidson, supra note 306, at 1010; Gerken, supra note 
300, at 23–24. 
414 This may seem paradoxical because local governments possess only the power that state governments 
grant to them through legislation.  Some commentators argue that there are—or should be—some 
constitutional protections for local government autonomy, particularly as it relates to protecting individual 
rights and liberties, that operate independently from state law.  See, e.g., David J. Barron, The Promise of 
Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 487, 560–95 (1999); Heather K. Gerken, 
Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005); Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in 
the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810 (2004) (discussing the role of local 
governments in the context of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses).  Since we are here concerned 
with environmental regulatory authority, we will assume that local governments must derive their power from 
either state or federal positive law.  Given that, the process of “freeing” local governments from state control 
does not merely involve federal invalidation of state law restrictions; the federal government must also confer 
regulatory authority on local governments in many cases.  This creates complexities that we do not explore 
here.  One problem is that even a federal grant of local power over renewable energy must operate against the 
backdrop of local governments’ general powers delegated by the state.  State control over the contours of city 
power generally means that state governments may find ways to change the “default conditions” under which 
federally delegated authority must be exercised, perhaps to the detriment of federal goals.  See Davidson, 
supra note 306, at 978.  Additional federal prohibitions may be needed to prevent such state tinkering, but this 
wrinkle requires separate analysis that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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CONCLUSION
The deployment of distributed renewable generation systems is an essential 
component of America’s sustainable future.  Wind turbines in backyards and 
solar panels on roofs are quick to install and are likely to attract lower levels of 
political attention from adversaries.  The individual impacts of these twenty-
first-century renewable gardens are small, but in the aggregate they may make 
an enormous difference in reducing demand for electricity during peak hours, 
empowering individuals and communities, and producing locally grown 
electricity, jobs, and profits.  America’s ability to shed its antiquated energy 
infrastructure and move toward the essential distributed renewable component 
of a twenty-first-century energy system, however, depends on upending 
traditional governance structures in this area.  Widespread distributed 
renewable energy generation, and the larger transformation that it potentiates, 
is best facilitated by an unusual cooperative federal–local regulatory structure.  
Local governments must have the power to shape land-energy rules to enable 
broader adoption of distributed devices in a manner tailored to unique, 
localized physical, social, and political conditions.  The great moves from 
candles to provision of gas for centralized home lighting began with local 
innovation.  Individual entrepreneurs—early energy pioneers—persuaded 
citizens of their home towns that the change was worthwhile and safe, that 
their homes would no longer be smoky and dark, and that new forms of energy 
were convenient and accessible; then they persuaded local governments to 
adopt policies that enabled the change.  Additional pioneering efforts, again 
initially with local governmental support, helped to make electricity a 
nationwide good delivered through a massive centralized infrastructure. 
The next necessary transition—away from this centralized system—will 
require the same kinds of bottom-up actions of pioneers and innovation that 
arise from energy entrepreneurs’ responses to varied local challenges.  Solar 
panels and wind turbines must physically appear in yards; neighbors must 
discuss their experiences with these new technologies; and the word must 
spread beyond the neighborhood level.  For that to happen, land-energy laws 
must be retooled to maximize opportunities for promotion and adoption of 
these technologies.  Empowering local governments in this area will generate 
clusters of differing regulatory packages crafted to reflect unique geographical, 
social, and political circumstances, to which renewables pioneers will have to 
creatively respond.  The innovation inspired by these differences will create 
thousands of approaches to renewables deployment from which other localities 
can pick and choose. 
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In addition to local governments that are empowered to write and enact 
local land-energy rules, a federal minimum standard is needed to prevent 
negative, anti-renewables regulatory variation.  And to ensure that local 
governments are able to implement a variety of land-energy rules, we have 
argued that states must not intervene; the federal government must therefore 
preempt state laws that unacceptably constrain municipal land-energy laws.  
The underlying values of federalism are best promoted by local governments in 
the distributed renewables land-energy context, and there seems to be no 
constitutional barrier to this type of federal–local cooperative system. 
This Article is only an initial step toward a broader vision of a new energy 
future.  Local governments, even though not yet fully empowered to enact 
local land-energy laws, have already begun to move aggressively toward this 
future—with some even declaring that one-hundred percent of their electricity 
will come from renewable sources.415  The production of vast quantities of 
electricity from clean, distributed renewable generation is currently a fragile 
vision that is part of an energy future shrouded in uncertainty.  This Article has 
suggested the ideal governmental levels at which sustainable energy, grown 
from the bottom up, will become more than a vision.  From this partial 
foundation, we hope that much will emerge.  Indeed, for a prosperous future, it 
must. 
415 See supra text accompanying note 102 (describing San Jose’s initiative). 
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ADDENDUM
Authors’ note: This table is not comprehensive.  It does not include, for 
example, many local and state financial incentives for renewables, such as tax 
credits.  It also tends to focus on efforts toward distributed generation, not 
renewables farms.  Its purpose is to begin to suggest the impressive level of 
renewables-based activity that is occurring at the state and particularly the 
local level in some of the major population centers. 
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TABLE 1. SELECT LOCAL AND STATE ORGANIZATIONS AND EFFORTS RELATING 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PURSLEY&WISEMAN GALLEYSFINAL 6/10/2011 11:11 AM 
2011] LOCAL ENERGY 969 
cx
xx
vi
ii
fo
rw
ar
dD
al
la
s!
 C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 P
la
n,
F
O
R
W
A
R
D
D
A
L
L
A
S
!,
 h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.d
al
la
sc
it
yh
al
l.c
om
/f
or
w
ar
dD
al
la
s/
in
de
x.
ht
m
l 
(l
as
t 
vi
si
te
d 
M
ay
 1
, 
20
10
) 
(“
O
n 
Ju
ne
 1
4,
 2
00
6,
 C
it
y 
C
ou
nc
il
 a
do
pt
ed
 t
he
 f
or
w
ar
dD
al
la
s!
 
C
om
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 P
la
n.
”)
.  
cx
xx
ix
 D
al
la
s 
C
it
y 
H
al
l, 
su
pr
a 
no
te
 2
11
. 
cx
l
Id
. a
t 2
4.
 
cx
li
Id
. 
at
 1
9;
 C
it
y 
of
 D
al
la
s,
 A
ge
nd
a,
 C
it
y 
C
ou
nc
il
 M
ee
ti
ng
 4
 (
Ja
n.
 2
2,
 2
00
3)
, 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.c
i.d
al
la
s.
tx
.u
s/
cs
o/
pd
f/
ag
01
22
03
.p
df
(a
pp
ro
vi
ng
 c
ou
nc
il
 a
ge
nd
a 
it
em
 t
o 
“[
a]
ut
ho
ri
ze
 i
m
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
C
it
y 
of
 
D
al
la
s 
G
re
en
 B
ui
ld
in
g 
P
ro
gr
am
 to
 . 
. .
 in
co
rp
or
at
e 
su
st
ai
na
bl
e 
bu
il
di
ng
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
co
ns
tr
uc
ti
on
 p
ra
ct
ic
es
 in
to
 m
un
ic
ip
al
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 w
it
h 
th
e 
fa
ci
li
ty
 p
ro
je
ct
s 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
20
03
 B
on
d 
P
ro
gr
am
”)
. 
cx
li
i
C
it
y 
of
 D
al
la
s
G
re
en
 I
ni
ti
at
iv
es
 a
nd
 A
cc
om
pl
is
hm
en
ts
 F
ac
t 
Sh
ee
t, 
G
R
E
E
N
D
A
L
L
A
S
, 
ht
tp
:/
/w
w
w
.g
re
en
da
ll
as
.n
et
/p
df
s/
F
ac
tS
he
et
.p
df
(l
as
t 
vi
si
te
d 
M
ay
 1
, 
20
11
).
  
M
os
t 
of
 t
hi
s 
po
w
er
, 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
co
m
es
 f
ro
m
 l
ar
ge
 w
in
d 
fa
rm
s.
Id
.
cx
li
ii
 C
li
m
at
e 
P
ro
t. 
C
tr
., 
su
pr
a 
no
te
 x
iv
. 
cx
li
v
Se
e 
su
pr
a 
no
te
 x
v 
an
d 
ac
co
m
pa
ny
in
g 
te
xt
. 
cx
lv
E
ne
rg
y 
C
on
se
rv
at
io
n 
&
 M
an
ag
em
en
t, 
C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.s
an
di
eg
o.
go
v/
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l-
se
rv
ic
es
/e
ne
rg
y/
in
de
x.
sh
tm
l (
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 M
ay
 1
, 2
01
1)
. 
cx
lv
i
Se
e 
su
pr
a 
no
te
 2
12
 a
nd
 a
cc
om
pa
ny
in
g 
te
xt
. 
cx
lv
ii
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
N
O
. 9
00
-1
4,
 S
U
S
T
A
IN
A
B
L
E
B
U
IL
D
IN
G
P
O
L
IC
Y
 1
 (
20
10
) 
[h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, 2
01
0 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
],
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//
do
cs
.s
an
di
eg
o.
go
v/
co
un
ci
lp
ol
ic
ie
s/
cp
d_
90
0-
14
.p
df
;
se
e 
al
so
 
C
IT
Y
 
O
F
 
S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
N
O
. 
90
0-
14
, 
S
U
S
T
A
IN
A
B
L
E
B
U
IL
D
IN
G
P
O
L
IC
Y
 
1 
(2
00
3)
 
[h
er
ei
na
ft
er
 
C
IT
Y
 
O
F
 
S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, 
20
03
 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
],
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 
ht
tp
:/
/w
w
w
.s
an
di
eg
o.
go
v/
en
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l-
se
rv
ic
es
/e
ne
rg
y/
pd
f/
90
0-
14
.p
df
. 
 O
th
er
 c
it
ie
s 
si
m
il
ar
ly
 r
eq
ui
re
 n
ew
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
 t
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
L
E
E
D
 c
er
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
 b
ut
 d
o 
no
t 
sp
ec
if
ic
al
ly
 m
en
ti
on
 r
en
ew
ab
le
s;
 i
n 
su
ch
 c
as
es
, 
th
e 
gr
ee
n 
bu
il
di
ng
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t 
is
 n
ot
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
w
it
hi
n 
th
e 
ta
bl
e.
  
Se
e,
 e
.g
., 
D
al
la
s,
 T
ex
., 
O
rd
in
an
ce
 2
71
31
 (
A
pr
. 9
, 2
00
8)
, a
va
il
ab
le
 a
t 
ht
tp
:/
/w
w
w
.g
re
en
da
ll
as
.n
et
/p
df
s/
gr
ee
n_
bu
il
di
ng
_o
rd
in
an
ce
.p
df
 (
in
co
rp
or
at
in
g 
th
e 
gr
ee
n 
bu
il
di
ng
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
re
co
m
m
en
da
ti
on
s 
of
 
th
e 
G
re
en
 
B
ui
ld
in
g 
T
as
k 
F
or
ce
);
 
D
al
la
s 
C
it
y 
H
al
l, 
C
it
yw
id
e 
G
re
en
 
B
ui
ld
in
g 
P
ro
gr
am
, 
S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 
O
rd
in
an
ce
 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
8–
11
 
(P
ow
er
P
oi
nt
 
pr
es
en
ta
ti
on
),
 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 
ht
tp
:/
/w
w
w
.g
re
en
da
ll
as
.n
et
/p
df
s/
gr
ee
n_
bu
il
di
ng
_o
rd
in
an
ce
_h
ig
hl
ig
ht
s.
pd
f 
(s
um
m
ar
iz
in
g 
th
e 
T
as
k 
F
or
ce
 r
ec
om
m
en
da
ti
on
s,
 s
uc
h 
as
 e
ne
rg
y 
ef
fi
ci
en
cy
, 
w
at
er
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
, 
an
d 
L
E
E
D
 c
er
ti
fi
ca
ti
on
, 
bu
t 
no
t 
m
en
ti
on
in
g 
in
st
al
la
ti
on
 o
f 
re
ne
w
ab
le
s)
.  
cx
lv
ii
i  C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, 2
00
3 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cx
lv
ii
, a
t 2
. 
cx
li
x  C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
D
IE
G
O
, 2
01
0 
C
O
U
N
C
IL
P
O
L
IC
Y
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cx
lv
ii
, a
t 3
. 
cl
Id
. a
t 1
 (
“[
T
]h
e 
S
us
ta
in
ab
le
 B
ui
ld
in
g 
P
ol
ic
y 
w
il
l b
e 
up
da
te
d 
ev
er
y 
th
re
e 
ye
ar
s 
to
 r
em
ai
n 
cu
rr
en
t w
it
h 
ne
w
 S
ta
te
 a
nd
 F
ed
er
al
 g
ui
de
li
ne
s 
an
d 
lo
ca
l n
ee
ds
.”
).
 
cl
i  M
em
or
an
du
m
 f
ro
m
 J
oh
n 
S
tu
ff
le
be
an
, s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
21
3,
 a
t 1
. 
cl
ii
Se
e,
 e
.g
., 
M
in
ut
es
, 
C
it
y 
of
 S
an
 J
os
e,
 R
eg
ul
ar
 M
ee
ti
ng
 o
f 
th
e 
S
an
 J
os
e 
T
ra
ns
po
rt
at
io
n 
an
d 
E
nv
ir
on
m
en
t 
C
om
m
it
te
e 
2 
(N
ov
. 
2,
 2
00
9)
, 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.s
an
jo
se
ca
.g
ov
/c
le
rk
/A
ge
nd
a/
20
09
11
17
/2
00
91
11
7_
06
01
.p
df
(m
en
ti
on
in
g 
a 
ve
rb
al
 r
ep
or
t f
ro
m
 c
it
y 
st
af
f 
to
 th
e 
co
m
m
it
te
e 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
“R
en
ew
ab
le
 E
ne
rg
y 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s”
).
 
cl
ii
i  
M
em
or
an
du
m
 f
ro
m
 E
d 
S
hi
ka
da
, 
D
ep
ut
y 
C
it
y 
M
an
ag
er
, 
an
d 
P
au
l 
K
ru
tk
o,
 C
hi
ef
 D
ev
. 
O
ff
ic
er
, 
to
 M
ay
or
 a
nd
 C
it
y 
C
ou
nc
il
 6
 (
N
ov
. 
12
, 
20
08
),
av
ai
la
bl
e 
at
 h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.s
an
jo
se
ca
.g
ov
/m
ay
or
/g
oa
ls
/e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t/
G
re
en
V
is
io
n/
11
-1
7-
08
C
M
O
.p
df
. 
cl
iv
 M
em
or
an
du
m
 f
ro
m
 J
oh
n 
S
tu
ff
le
be
an
, s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
21
3,
 a
t 2
. 
cl
v
G
re
en
 V
is
io
n 
G
oa
ls
, C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
, h
tt
p:
//
gr
ee
nv
is
io
n.
sa
nj
os
ec
a.
go
v/
G
re
en
V
is
io
nG
oa
ls
.a
sp
x 
(l
as
t v
is
it
ed
 M
ay
 1
, 2
01
1)
. 
cl
vi
 O
ff
ic
e 
of
 M
ay
or
 C
hu
ck
 R
ee
d,
 G
re
en
 V
is
io
n,
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
, h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.s
an
jo
se
ca
.g
ov
/m
ay
or
/g
oa
ls
/e
nv
ir
on
m
en
t/
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t.a
sp
 (
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 M
ay
 1
, 2
01
1)
. 
cl
vi
i
C
le
an
te
ch
 O
pe
n 
G
al
a,
 C
L
E
A
N
T
E
C
H
O
P
E
N
, h
tt
p:
//
cl
ea
nt
ec
ho
pe
ng
al
a.
co
m
/a
rc
hi
ve
s/
15
74
 (
la
st
 v
is
it
ed
 M
ay
 1
, 2
01
1)
. 
cl
vi
ii
 O
ff
ic
e 
of
 M
ay
or
 C
hu
ck
 R
ee
d,
 s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
vi
. 
cl
ix
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
, D
R
A
F
T
 O
F
 S
T
R
A
T
E
G
IC
E
N
E
R
G
Y
P
L
A
N
 1
6 
(M
ar
. 2
3,
 2
00
9)
, a
va
il
ab
le
 a
t h
tt
p:
//
w
w
w
.s
an
jo
se
ca
.g
ov
/e
sd
/n
at
ur
al
-e
ne
rg
y-
re
so
ur
ce
s/
P
D
F
s/
20
09
S
tr
at
eg
ic
E
ne
rg
yP
la
n_
D
R
A
F
T
_3
-2
3-
09
.p
df
.
cl
x  M
em
or
an
du
m
 f
ro
m
 J
oh
n 
S
tu
ff
le
be
an
, s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
21
3,
 a
t 4
. 
cl
xi
 O
ff
ic
e 
of
 M
ay
or
 C
hu
ck
 R
ee
d,
 s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
vi
. 
cl
xi
i  S
an
 J
os
e’
s 
ci
ty
 c
ou
nc
il
 a
do
pt
ed
 th
e 
pl
an
 in
 2
00
7.
  G
re
en
 V
is
io
n 
G
oa
ls
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
v.
  T
he
 m
ay
or
 h
as
 m
ad
e 
ef
fo
rt
s 
to
 im
pl
em
en
t s
tr
at
eg
ie
s 
th
at
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
e 
pl
an
’s
 g
oa
ls
.  
O
ff
ic
e 
of
 M
ay
or
 C
hu
ck
 R
ee
d,
 s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
vi
. 
cl
xi
ii
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
ix
, a
t 2
. 
cl
xi
v  C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
10
2,
 a
t 2
.  
T
hi
s 
go
al
 w
as
 in
tr
od
uc
ed
 in
 th
e 
S
an
 J
os
e 
G
re
en
 V
is
io
n.
  G
re
en
 V
is
io
n 
G
oa
ls
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
cl
v.
 
cl
xv
 C
IT
Y
 O
F
 S
A
N
JO
S
E
,s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
10
2,
 a
t 4
. 
cl
xv
i
Id
.
cl
xv
ii
Id
. a
t 1
1.
 
cl
xv
ii
i
Id
. a
t 3
. 
cl
xi
x  M
em
or
an
du
m
 f
ro
m
 J
oh
n 
S
tu
ff
le
be
an
, s
up
ra
 n
ot
e 
21
3,
 a
t 1
 (
in
te
rn
al
 q
uo
ta
ti
on
 m
ar
k 
om
it
te
d)
. 
cl
xx
Id
.
cl
xx
i
Id
. a
t 3
. 
